Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV00494, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV00494    Hearing Date: February 5, 2025    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51¿¿ 

Date: 2/5/24 

Case #22CHCV00494

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS

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Motion Filed: 9/18/24

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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Michael Brang (“Plaintiff”)¿

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”)¿

NOTICE: OK¿

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RELIEF REQUESTED: Terminating sanctions against Defendant.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND¿ 

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on 12/2/20, and for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8.)

On 7/6/22, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b). On 8/5/22, Defendant filed its answer.

On 9/5/23, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable (“PMK”) and Custodian of Records. On 6/7/24, the Court partially granted Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions against Defendant for its failure to comply with the Court’s 9/5/23 order.

On 9/18/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. On 1/21/25, Defendant filed its opposition thereto. On 1/29/25, Plaintiff filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

The Court may issue terminating or monetary sanctions, upon noticed motion, “against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030.) However, “A trial court must be cautious when imposing a terminating sanction because the sanction eliminates a party’s fundamental right to a trial, thus implicating due process rights. … Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure … a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective.” (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 [internal citations omitted].)

Here, Plaintiff brings this second motion for terminating sanctions against Defendant because “GM’s PMK was unqualified to give testimony to all Matters of Examination as ordered by the Court.” (Pl.’s Mot. 4:6–7.)

A.    Terminating Sanctions

Plaintiff contends that Defendant should be sanctioned for violating the Court’s 9/5/23 and 6/7/24 Orders, because despite presenting its PMK for deposition on 7/22/24, “GM’s PMK was utterly unqualified to speak to all Matters of Examination as ordered by this Court,” specifically Matter Nos. 8 and 9. (Pl.’s Mot. 3:11–17.) In opposition, Defendant argues that “Defendant’s PMK completed the remaining topics of examination for PMK Category Nos. 2 and 7-9, which Defendant’s PMK testified fully to.” (Def.’s Opp. 2:1–3.) Defendant therefore contends that “GM has demonstrated consistent good faith despite Plaintiff’s characterization.” (Id. at 2:9.)

Plaintiff argues in reply that “during the second deposition, [Defendant’s PMK] Ms. Mock testified that she was unable to respond to categories 8 and 9.” (Pl.’s Reply 1:27–28, citing Ex. K to Decl. of Sepehr Daghighian.) Plaintiff argues that this “shows that Defendant still refuses to accept its obligation to produce a qualified PMK as required by the Court’s two orders. Defendant’s conduct is egregious and not just a procedural misstep, as Defendant claims.” (Id. at 4:19–21.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s actions do not rise to the level of misconduct warranting terminating sanctions. The Court finds that Defendant substantially complied with the Court’s prior orders by producing its PMK for deposition on the matters specified, albeit her lack of knowledge of Matter Nos. 8 and 9. Accordingly, the motion is denied. The Court notes that Plaintiff does not seek monetary sanctions by way of this motion.

CONCLUSION¿ 

The motion is denied.