Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01136, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV01136    Hearing Date: May 10, 2023    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 5/10/23

Case #22CHCV01136

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO STRIKE

Motion Filed: 2/24/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Easton Investments, II, L. P. dba Village Apartments (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Claudia Madrigal; Ruben Madrigal; Celeste Madrigal; Benjamin Madrigal (a minor); Izel Madrigal (a minor); and Adriah Madrigal (a minor) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant moves to strike all references to punitive damages in Plaintiffs’ complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Defendant shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint within 30 days of this hearing date.

BACKGROUND¿ 

This is a landlord-tenant dispute in which Plaintiffs, tenants of certain property located at 20900 W. Costa Brave, No. 39-204, Santa Clarita, California, allege that Defendant, their landlord, failed to maintain the property, resulting in various habitability violations. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s inaction resulted in a mold infestation, plumbing leaks, water-damages walls and ceilings, and rodent, vermin, and insect infestations, along with inadequate electricity, heating, and flooring. (Compl. ¶¶ 12–21.)

Plaintiffs also allege that despite being given notice by the County inspector to abate or repair the health code-defective conditions at the subject property, Defendants failed to do so, and instead retaliated against Plaintiffs by unlawfully increasing the rent and modifying the terms of Plaintiffs’ rental agreement. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34, 43–44.)

On 11/10/22, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Defendant and nonmoving defendant Geoff Palmer, an individual, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Retaliation; (2) Discriminatory Housing Practices; (3) Negligence; (4) Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (5) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (6) Premises Liability (Negligence Per Se); (7) Nuisance; and (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiffs pray for punitive damages in relation to their first, seventh, and eighth causes of action. (Compl. 26:1.)

On 2/24/23, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike. On 4/25/23, Plaintiffs filed their opposition and request for judicial notice. On 5/3/23, Defendant filed its reply.

ANALYSIS

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id. at subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.)¿Here, Defendant moves to strike all references to punitive damages in Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Meet and Confer¿ 

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).) The parties are required to meet and confer at least five days before the date a motion to strike must be filed, otherwise the moving party is granted a 30-day extension to file the motion. (Ibid.)¿ 

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that on 2/16/23, she emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel a meet and confer letter regarding the issues raised in the instant motion to strike but received no response. (Decl. of Tiffanie Spivey, ¶ 3.) Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has satisfied the preliminary meet-and-confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).)

¿¿ 

Punitive Damages 

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Id., subd. (c); Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) 

Punitive damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.) 

Malice

“To support an award of punitive damages on the basis of conscious disregard of the safety of others, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867 [quotations and citations omitted].)

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have insufficiently alleged facts to support their prayer for punitive damages against Defendant because they have not alleged facts to support a finding of malice, fraud, or oppression. Defendant argues that the alleged facts of the instant case do not rise to the requisite level of “despicable conduct” for a finding of malice warranting the recovery of punitive damages. Defendant argues that “the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to give rise to an inference of intentional conduct, despicable conduct, or the conscious disregard for the safety of others to support an award of punitive damages.” (Def.’s Mot. 7:9–11.)

Defendant cites to College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, arguing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted not just with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, but also that the defendant willfully engaged in despicable conduct.” (Def.’s Reply, 3:16–20.) However, the Court declines to analogize the instant case to that in College Hospital, because there, the plaintiff alleged that she, while receiving treatment for certain mood disorders on an outpatient basis, was traumatized when her extramarital affair with a hospital employee ended. (8 Cal.4th at 704.) The facts of the instant case have no relation to the facts presented in College Hospital.

            The Court finds that the instant case is more appropriately compared to Penner, where the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of a motion to strike plaintiff’s punitive damages prayer where “the pleadings sufficiently allege facts setting forth long existing physical conditions of the premises which portend danger for the tenants. The pleadings also set out that respondents knew of those conditions for up to two years, had power to make changes, but failed to take corrective and curative measures. If proven, these allegations would support an award of punitive damages.” (153 Cal.App.3d at 867.)

Plaintiffs argue that under the Penner standard, they have alleged facts in their complaint to show that “Defendants had multiple notice of the defects in the unit since the beginning of the tenancy of Plaintiffs in the subject property. … Despite the notices is [sic] given for more than three years, Defendants failed to correct defects and put the unit in tenantable conditions. … Moreover, Defendants not only failed to correct defects, but also retaliated against Plaintiffs by materially changing the terms of the lease and increasing the rent when Plaintiffs complained and reported these defects to the county and city.” (Pls.’ Opp. 6:6–14.)

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the subject premises “was unsafe, unsanitary, unhealthy, uninhabitable, untenantable, in a serious state of disrepair, and in gross violation of building health and safety laws.” (Compl. ¶ 9.) After Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to seek redress directly by Defendant, Plaintiffs reported the defective living conditions to the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health. (Id. at ¶ 39.) After an inspection by a department inspector, who “found that the walls, door trims, bathrooms and the ceiling were infested by mushrooms and mold and that the subject Unit's condition was in violation of the Health Codes,” “the Inspector cited the Defendants for a numerous violation of the Health Codes and gave Defendants notice to correct the cited violations.” (Id. at ¶¶ 41–42.) “Because of the Defendants' refusal to make the necessary repairs, including but not limited to replacing the carpeting which emits a foul odor, Plaintiffs, including their five (5) minor children, are having difficulty breathing. At least one of the minor children has asthma.” (Id. at ¶ 25.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant “was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Penner, 153 Cal.App.3d at 867.) Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant was put on actual notice of the health code violations in Plaintiffs’ unit, and given a deadline to abate the problems, yet failed to do so. This conduct may be considered a conscious and deliberate disregard for the safety and rights of others. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) The Court finds that these factual assertions are sufficient at the pleading stage to allege malicious and oppressive conduct warranting a prayer for punitive damages. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the motion to strike all references to punitive damages in Plaintiffs’ complaint is denied.

CONCLUSION¿ 

The motion is denied. Defendant shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint within 30 days of this hearing date.