Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01256, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV01256    Hearing Date: March 18, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 12/18/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Heritage Christian School (“Responding Defendant”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders compelling Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 12–18.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. The Court orders Responding Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 12–18, within 30 days.

BACKGROUND

This is a childhood sexual assault action in which Plaintiff alleges that in October 2018, she was bullied, sexually assaulted, and sexually harassed by a fellow student, defendant John Doe 1, while she was a 15 to 16-year-old student attending Responding Defendant’s private school. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–4, 10–12.)

On 11/30/22, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Supervision of a Minor; (3) Assault; (4) Battery; and (5) Sexual Battery. Only the first and second causes of action are alleged against Responding Defendant. On 3/22/23, Responding Defendant filed its answer.

On 5/28/24, Plaintiff served her RFPs, Set One, on Responding Defendant. (Decl. of David E. Weeks ¶ 2.) On 10/30/24, Responding Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 7w.)

On 12/18/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Responding Defendant’s further responses to the subject RFPs. On 3/5/25, Responding Defendant filed its opposition. On 3/11/25, Plaintiff filed her reply and evidentiary objections.

ANALYSIS

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel Responding Defendant’s further responses to RFP Nos. 12–18, which seek: “The student file of John Doe 1 (No. 12); documents which relate to HCS’s knowledge of any sexual misconduct occurring on the campus during the 2018-2019 school year (No. 13); documents sent to any parents or legal guardians of HCS students relating to sexual misconduct occurring on the school campus during the 2018-2019 school year (No. 14); documents created by HCS relating to any sexual misconduct on the school campus during the 2018-2019 school year (No. 15); documents relating to any complaints made by anyone concerning sexual misconduct at the HCS campus during the 2018-2019 school year (No. 16); documents relating to any response made by HCS to anyone complaining about sexual misconduct during the 2018-2019 school year (No. 17); and documents relating to warnings, reprimands or discipline given to John Doe 1 while a student at HCS (No. 18).” (Pl.’s Mot. 1:23–2:5.)

A.    Meet and Confer 

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating, “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.) 

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that beginning on 11/22/24, he and Responding Defendant’s counsel met and conferred to discuss the issues raised herein, but the parties were unable to come to a resolution. (Weeks Decl. ¶¶ 9–12, 17–18.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).

B.     Waiver of Objections

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argue that Responding Defendant’s objections to the subject RFPs are improper because Responding Defendant has waived its right to assert them. A responding party who fails to serve a timely response “waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product” unless the Court grants it relief upon motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that despite having been granted two deadline extensions to serve responses to the subject RFPs, Responding Defendant served untimely responses and therefore has waived all objections to the requests. However, “despite having waived all objections by failing to timely serve responses to Plaintiff’s discovery, Defendant’s responses to the Requests for Production of Documents were replete with multiple objections, including a prefatory ‘General Objections’ section, that incorporated each of the General Objections into each response for good measure.” (Pl.’s Mot. 3:8–12.)

In opposition, Responding Defendant argues that “here, since HCS has served substantially compliant responses and HCS’s failure to serve timely responses was the result of mistake, inadvertently, and/or excusable neglect by HCS’s legal counsel’s office, HCS should be permitted to assert its applicable and valid objections and Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.” (Def.’s Opp. 12:7–11, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Responding Defendant further asserts that “Defendant’s failure to timely provide its to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents was solely due to an inadvertent and excusable calendaring error by defense counsel’s office.” (Id. at 13:19–21.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the Court should disregard Responding Defendant’s argument because “Defendant never filed a motion for the requested relief it seeks in its opposition. It cannot seek affirmative relief by merely asking for it in an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Pl.’s Reply 2:19–21.) The Court agrees and finds that Responding Defendant has waived its objections to the subject discovery requests and has not sought relief by way of noticed motion. Additionally, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that “even if the Court grants relief to Defendant from the waiver of its objections, the Court is empowered and authorized to order the production of student files and information.” (Id. at 9:19–21.)

C.    Relevance

Responding Defendant asserted relevance objections in response to the subject RFPs. Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that “the student file of John Doe 1, any complaints made to Defendant HCS about sexual assault or harassment at the school or perpetrated on the school campus against Plaintiff and other students, and documents sent to parents of HCS students addressing sexual assault or harassment are all relevant to show the knowledge of the school with respect to such matters on its campus. They also validate Plaintiff’s allegation that John Doe 1 did sexually assault and harassed Plaintiff, as well as others, on the HCS campus, and show what, if anything, Defendant HCS did with respect to any complaints it received.” (Pl.’s Mot. 8:9–15.)

Responding Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff’s Requests to Produce Nos. 12-18 seek totally irrelevant documents, including private student files and records for then-minor students and communications with their parents/guardians and third parties, having no involvement at all with the instant matter.” (Def.’s Opp. 8:16–19.) Specifically, Responding Defendant argues that John Doe 1’s “transcripts, medical information/records, emergency/contact information, documents concerning John Doe’s personal and background information, prior education, family members, personal issues, etc.” are irrelevant. (Id. at 8:21–23.) Responding Defendant further argues that the request for John Doe 1’s disciplinary records “encompasses confidential documents that have nothing to do with the sexual harassment allegations against him (such as any warnings for attendance issues, talking in class, bad grades, etc.).” (Id. at 9:20–22.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that “the student records of John Doe 1, the student perpetrator who sexually assaulted Plaintiff, and by Defendant’s own admission, at least one other student on Defendant’s school campus, are essential to establish ratification, notice and/or knowledge of Defendant, and what Defendant did, if anything, to address the acts of the student perpetrator and protect its students, including Plaintiff.” (Pl.’s Reply 1:23–27.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the requested documents are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, namely that Responding Defendant had prior knowledge of John Doe 1’s history of inappropriate or sexual misconduct, and “failed to implement and/or enforce policies and procedures regarding the safety of their students and/or that were aimed at supervising students and/or preventing or deterring physical or sexual assault of their students including Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Responding Defendant’s relevance objections to the subject RFPs are without merit.

D.    Privacy

Responding Defendant also asserted privacy objections in response to the subject RFPs. When information protected by the right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution is sought by way of discovery, the burden falls on the party asserting a privacy interest to show that their privacy interests are so serious that they outweigh the interests of the requesting party’s prospective invasion. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.)

Here, Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that “the production of John Doe 1’s student file will show that despite Plaintiff notifying Defendant HCS of the sexual assault by John Doe 1 and requesting that he not be enrolled in the same classes attended by Plaintiff, Defendant HCS permitted John Doe 1 to be enrolled in the same classes attended by Plaintiff, thereby enabling John Doe 1 to harass Plaintiff and cause her further mental anguish and emotional distress.” (Pl.’s Mot. 11:22–26.) “As such, Plaintiff’s compelling need for the requested documentation, and the Court’s inherent interest in facilitating the ascertainment of the truth to ensure the case is determine on the merits, far outweighs the diminished privacy rights of the student perpetrator, or others also assaulted by the perpetrator, on the HCS campus.” (Id. at 12:3–6.)

Plaintiff further contends that “the parties have already agreed to a Protective Order which was entered by this Court on October 21, 2024. The Protective Order effectively allows Defendant HCS to designate documents as confidential and ensure said documents will only be used for purposes of this litigation, and then destroyed or returned thereafter.” (Id. at 2:8–11.)

In opposition, Responding Defendant asserts that Education Code sections 49073, 49076, and 49077 prohibit it from producing the requested documents. “School districts shall adopt a policy identifying those categories of directory information as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 49061 that may be released. The school district shall determine which individuals, officials, or organizations may receive directory information.” (Ed. Code § 49073.) “A school district shall not permit access to pupil records to a person without written parental consent or under judicial order.” (Ed. Code § 49076, subd. (a).) “Information concerning a pupil shall be furnished in compliance with a court order or a lawfully issued subpoena.” (Ed. Code § 49077, subd. (a).)

Here, Responding Defendant argues that “since none of Plaintiff’s document demands fall under the categories authorized for release of directory information or pupil records, any voluntary release of student information by HCS could, and would likely, subject HCS to civil liability by the student whose privacy rights would be violated. Disclosure of the information/documents sought may also open HCS up to greater penalties as imposed by the State for the release of confidential student information.” (Def.’s Opp. 11:7–11.) Responding Defendant contends that “the parties’ stipulated protective order does not excuse or change Defendant’s obligations to its students under the aforementioned laws.” (Id. at 11:28–12:1.)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and as Plaintiff observes, “the Court may order the disclosure of student records under both FERPA and the Education Code.” (Pl.’s Reply 4:17–18.) Here, Plaintiff maintains that “any concerns with respect to the confidentiality or dissemination of the records to ‘the public at large’ have been sufficiently addressed by the Protective Order signed by the parties and entered by this Court in this action.” (Id. at 5:27–6:1.)

Plaintiff further argues that her needs outweigh Responding Defendant’s privacy interests because “the documents and information sought are relevant and essential to the prosecution of the action against Defendant. Moreover, documents contained in the perpetrator’s student file, which is solely in the possession of Defendant, will likely be the most reliable and contemporaneous evidence with respect to Defendant HCS’s notice, knowledge, and ratification of the acts of the student perpetrator and what the Defendant did, if anything, to protect Plaintiff.” (Id. at 7:9–13.) Plaintiff further asserts that “the student files of John Doe 1, as well as all documents related to any warnings, reprimands or discipline given to him and his attendance records are the best and most reliable evidence of crucial information, including, but not limited to: 1) any complaints made against him while he was a student at HCS; 2) any disciplinary action taken against him when he was a student at the HCS; and 3) his whereabouts on the campus during the relevant time period.” (Id. at 7:20–25.)

In weighing the parties’ respective interests, the Court agrees with Plaintiff, as earlier discussed, that the requested information is relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Further, any claimed private or confidential student information may be adequately protected by the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order entered on 10/21/24. Accordingly, the Court overrules Responding Defendant’s privacy objections to RFP Nos. 12–18, and orders Responding Defendant to produce further responsive documents thereto.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted. The Court orders Responding Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 12–18, within 30 days.