Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01296, Date: 2025-02-03 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV01296    Hearing Date: February 3, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion Filed: 9/23/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ana Torres (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Plaintiff her attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $51,655.05.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. Plaintiff is awarded $25,191.60 in attorney fees. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence, but not the substance, of Exhibits 1–21.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS: Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are overruled.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle she purchased on 12/27/20, and for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s warranty. (Compl. ¶ 9.)

On 12/5/22, Plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability. On 1/4/23, Defendant filed its answer.

On 5/21/24, the parties executed a settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, settling entire lawsuit by Defendants paying Plaintiff $105,000.00, plus prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses either by written stipulation or by noticed motion. (Ex. 3 to Decl. of Angel M. Baker, ¶¶ 1–4.) On 5/21/24, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement of the entire case.

On 9/23/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. ¿On 1/17/25, Defendant filed its opposition. On 1/27/25, Plaintiff filed her reply.

ANALYSIS

1.      Right to Recovery

An award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, the Song-Beverly Act authorizes a buyer “to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

Moreover, Plaintiff bases the instant motion on the parties’ 5/21/24 settlement agreement, wherein the parties agreed that “at Plaintiff’s election, Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, expenses and costs that have been reasonably incurred pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(d) may be determined by the Court via noticed motion. For purposes of any such motion, GM will agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.” (Ex. 3 to Baker Decl., ¶ 3.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant motion is authorized both by contract and statute.

2.      Attorney Fees Incurred

A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable” attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) “The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 169.) In determining a reasonable fee award, the Court begins with the lodestar method of calculation, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.¿(Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095–1096.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover $31,740, encompassing 62.8 hours of her attorneys’ time, billed at the following rates:

a.       Counsel’s Hourly Rate

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider whether the stated rates “are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded [to] comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that the rates charged by her attorneys are commensurate with the experience and skill of the attorneys involved and have been approved by courts in the past. (Pls.’ Mot. 9:1–10:9; Decl. of Payam Shahian ¶¶ 48–71.) The Court notes that Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates in its opposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that her attorneys’ hourly billing rates are commensurate with their experience and fall within the range of reasonable rates charged by attorneys and judicially awarded in similar cases. Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly billing rate.

b.      Hours Expended

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney fees for the 62.8 hours expended by her attorneys on this matter, totaling $31,740.00. Plaintiff proffers an itemized list of time entries detailing her attorneys’ work on this matter. (Ex. 22 to Shahian Decl.)

Defendants challenges the following specific entries in Plaintiff’s attorneys’ proffered time log: (1) time spent on Plaintiff’s complaint; (2) time spent drafting discovery requests and responses; (3) time spent drafting motions in limine and trial subpoenas; (4) time incurred in connection with the instant fee motion; (5) improperly blockbilled time entries; and (6) excessively billed tasks.

i.                    Plaintiff’s Complaint

Defendant argues that the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel in drafting the complaint and finalizing supporting documents is excessive and unreasonable. (Def.’s Opp. 5:27–6:2.) Defendant argues that it should not take “more than 30 minutes to review and otherwise modify the documents for use in this case, as they were templates that Counsel deploys in almost every other case against GM.” (Id. at 6:1–2.) Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects that 1.9 hours (1.4 hours by SV, 0.5 hours by TC) were incurred in these tasks. (Ex. 22 to Shahian Decl., p. 1.) The Court finds that the above fees were not reasonably incurred, and therefore reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 1.0 hours (0.7 hours by SV, 0.3 hours by TC) for a total reduction of $592.00.

ii.                  Discovery

Defendant further argues that the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel in drafting Plaintiff’s discovery requests and responses to Defendants should be reduced because they are essentially the same as other requests and responses served by Plaintiff’s counsel in similar matters. (Def.’s Opp. 6:3–12.) Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects that 7.3 total hours (2.6 hours by EL, 2.4 hours by SV, and 2.3 hours by JC) were incurred in these tasks. (Ex. 22 to Shahian Decl., p. 1.) The Court reduces the hours incurred for these tasks by 3.65 hours (1.3 hours by EL, 1.2 hours by SV, and 1.15 hours by JC), for a total reduction of $2,001.25.

iii.                Motions in Limine; Trial Subpoenas

Defendant further argues that the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel in drafting Plaintiff’s motions in limine and trial subpoenas should be reduced because they are essentially the same as other motions and subpoenas served by Plaintiff’s counsel in similar matters. (Def.’s Opp. 6:13–24.) Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects that 12.3 total hours (3.0 hours by IM and 9.3 hours by MO) were incurred in these tasks. (Ex. 22 to Shahian Decl., pp 1–2.) The Court reduces the hours incurred for these tasks by 6.15 hours (1.5 hours by IM and 4.65 hours by MO), for a total reduction of $3,194.25.

iv.                Fee Motion

Defendant further argues that the 7.2 hours (incurred by YT) incurred in bringing the instant motion, and the anticipated $3,500.00 Plaintiff’s counsel expects to incur in reviewing Defendant’s opposition, drafting a reply, and preparing for and attending the instant hearing are unreasonable. (Defs.’ Opp. 6:25–7:7.) In reply, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that they actually incurred $2,625.00 in reviewing Defendant’s opposition and preparing Plaintiff’s reply. (Decl. of Dhara Chandy ¶¶ 4–5.) Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to reduce the time actually incurred for these tasks.

v.                   Blockbilling

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s counsel impermissibly block-billed their time entries on multiple occasions, totaling 8.8 hours. (Def.’s Opp. 7:23–8:5, 8:15–20.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s blockbilling prevents the Court to evaluate the reasonableness or necessity of each task, or the time spent on each. (Ibid.) The Court agrees that these entries constitute impermissible block-billing and reduces the entries by 20 percent (0.5 hours by RL, 0.76 hours by MO, 0.5 hours by MR), for a total reduction of $948.70.

vi.                Excessive Time Entries

Defendants argue that throughout the billing records, there are various excessively billed time entries for such tasks as drafting repair chronology, telephone conferencing with the client, billing for redacted entries, and trial preparation. (Def’s Opp. 7:9–8:24.) Defendants challenge a total of 18.6 hours of Plaintiff’s attorney’s time spent on these tasks “as excessive and unreasonable because the work alleged to have been completed could not have reasonably taken the amount of time claimed by Counsel or should have been completed by a legal secretary or paralegal at a significantly reduced rate or a lower billing attorney.” (Ibid.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects that 0.7 hours (0.7 hours by NS) were unreasonably excessively billed. (Ex. 22 to Shahian Decl.) The Court finds that the above fees were not reasonably incurred, and therefore reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 20 percent (0.44 hours by HC, 0.4 hours by SV, 0.16 hours by TC, 1.48 hours by MO, and 2 hours by MR) for a total reduction of $2,437.20.

3.      Multiplier

“Once the lodestar has been calculated, the second step is to apply any positive or negative multipliers. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351 [internal quotations omitted].) “Perhaps the most common multiplier applied, at least where a plaintiff prevails, is a modifier for the contingent nature of the representation.” (Ibid.) Whether a multiplier is applied to adjust the lodestar amount based on the contingent nature and risk associated with the action and other factors, such as degree of skill required, and ultimate success achieved is within the discretion of the trial court.

Here, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recover a 1.35 multiplier enhancement because her attorneys obtained a favorable outcome, counsel works on a contingency basis, and Defendant has delayed in payment of settlement monies. (Pls.’ Mot. 12:23–14:20.) Defendant argues in opposition that “a non-complex lemon law matter such as this, in which not a single motion was filed nor deposition taken, which never went to trial, and which settled within the statutory limits, does not command such a fee recovery.” (Def.’s Opp. 11:18–20.) Moreover, Defendants observe that “the ‘contingent risk’ in this particular litigation was minimal. Song-Beverly mandates fee-shifting of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 10:11–12.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a multiplier enhancement is not warranted in this case. While Plaintiff ultimately prevailed, the action appears to have been a relatively straightforward Song-Beverly case. As such, the Court finds the lodestar fee award sufficient to compensate Plaintiff’s counsel.

4.      Costs Incurred

Plaintiff asserts that she incurred costs and expenses totaling $5,306.05. As Defendant observes, Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum of costs summarizing the costs incurred in this action. (Def.’s Opp. 12:19–21.) “Instead, the table included in Counsel’s Declaration appears to have been generated by Counsel’s billing system or created specifically for Counsel’s fee motion. This is not enough. Indeed, many of the charges have zero description as to what was being served or filed, while others list different types of charges without identifying what service was being performed.” (Id. at 12:21–26.)

The Court agrees, and notes that in reply, Plaintiff represents that she “is filing a Memorandum of Costs.” (Pl.’s Reply, p. 1, fn.1.) To date, no Memorandum of Costs has been filed. The Court agrees with Defendant that based on Plaintiff’s proffered table of costs, the Court is unable to ascertain the reasonableness of the claimed costs and whether they are recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. Accordingly, the Court declines to award Plaintiff its costs. Should Plaintiff file a memorandum of costs in the future, nothing in this ruling prevents the parties from presenting arguments regarding the recovery of those costs.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff $25,191.60 in attorney fees, as outlined below:

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $25,191.60 in attorney fees.