Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01386, Date: 2023-10-30 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV01386    Hearing Date: October 30, 2023    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51¿¿ 

Date: 10/30/23¿ 

Case #22CHCV01386

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

DEMURRER

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Demurrer Filed: 7/31/23

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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Open Bible Standard Churches, Inc. (sued as “Doe 3, an Iowa non-profit corporation”) (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff R.W., an individual (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

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RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendant demurs to the third and fourth causes of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

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TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled. Moving Defendant to file and serve its answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.

BACKGROUND¿ 

This is a childhood sexual assault action in which Plaintiff alleges that in 1994, when he was 15 years old, he was sexually assaulted by nonmoving defendant Doe 4, who was Plaintiff’s youth group leader at his church. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 12.) Moving Defendant, sued as “Doe 3, an Iowa non-profit corporation,” is an association of churches and ministers which oversees Plaintiff’s church. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

On 12/14/22, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Sexual Assault of a Minor; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention; (4) Negligent Supervision of a Minor; and (5) Negligence. Only the third and fourth causes of action are alleged against Moving Defendant.

On 7/31/23, Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On 10/17/23, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 10/20/23, Moving Defendant filed its reply.

ANALYSIS

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer based on any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

Here, Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention or Negligent Supervision of a Minor.

A.    Meet and Confer

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that on 7/24/23, she sent Plaintiff’s attorney a meet and confer letter regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer. (Decl. of Olesya Mikhaylova ¶ 2.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

B.     Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges against Moving Defendant Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention. The elements of a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are: (1) the employer’s hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee; (2) the employee was incompetent or unfit; (3) the employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and (4) harm occurs. (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836–837.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Doe 4 was assigned by Entity Defendants to conduct youth group service at their church in Santa Clarita while Plaintiff was a member;” “Doe 4 isolated minor boys, including Plaintiff, to be alone with them for the purpose of grooming and sexually assaulting them;” and “prior to the date that Plaintiff was sexually assaulted and/or abused, Entity Defendants knew or should have known that Doe 4’s conduct towards several male minors was inappropriate and criminal in nature, that Doe 4 was unfit to work with and be around minor males, and that Doe 4 posed a serious threat to the mental health, physical health, and safety of minors.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 30, 32.) “As a result of the negligence of Entity Defendants, acting through their administrators, supervisory employees, and staff, Doe 4 was able to, and did, commit sexual assault, sexual harassment, and other misconduct against Plaintiff on multiple occasions.” (Id. at ¶ 38.)

On demurrer, Moving Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts showing either that Open Bible knew or should have known its employee presented a particular risk of sexual abuse, or that Open Bible knew or should have known of the employee’s alleged misconduct and did not act in a reasonable manner.” (Dem. 5:22–25.) Moving Defendant further asserts that “the complaint alleges no facts demonstrating that Doe 4’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable or that Open Bible had reason to believe Doe 4 presented a particular risk of abuse.” (Id. at 5:26–28.)

Plaintiff argues in opposition that at the demurrer stage, the factual allegations made in his complaint sufficiently state a cause of action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention, because they allege that “Defendant’s negligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining Perpetrator enabled Perpetrator to spend inordinate amounts of time, alone, for no rational reason, with Plaintiff – thereby enabling a relationship to develop and ultimately – multiple sexual assaults to occur.” (Pl.’s Opp. 4:27–5:2.)

The Court agrees, and finds that at the demurrer stage, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has alleged facts to support each element of a cause of action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action.

C.    Negligent Supervision of a Minor

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges against Moving Defendant Negligent Supervision of a Minor. “To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. Recovery for negligence depends as a threshold matter on the existence of a legal duty of care.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 669 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) “Under some circumstances, a defendant may have an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff from harm at the hands of a third party, even though the risk of harm is not of the defendant's own making.” (Id. at 670.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Entity Defendants had a duty to adequately and properly supervise, monitor, and protect Plaintiff from known and knowable dangers, such as those posed by Doe 4;” and “breached their duty to properly and adequately supervise, monitor, and protect Plaintiff, in part because their officers, agents, administrators, employees, and staff knew or should have known that Doe 4 was engaged in inappropriate conduct with minors at church including but not limited to publicly touching children in a sexual manner, soliciting unsupervised access to children at church, and forcing Plaintiff to perform sexual acts.” (Compl. ¶¶ 76, 77.) Plaintiff further alleges that “had Entity Defendants, and each of them, adequately and properly supervised, monitored, and protected Plaintiff, Plaintiff would not have been harmed, or would not have been harmed to the extent that he was.” (Id. at ¶ 81.) “As a direct and legal result of the acts and omissions of Entity Defendants, inclusive, and each of them, Plaintiff has been severely damaged emotionally and physically, and otherwise.” (Id. at ¶ 84.)

On demurrer, Moving Defendant argues that “there is no special relationship alleged between Open Bible and Plaintiff” “giving rise to the inference that Plaintiff had a ‘right to expect’ protection from Open Bible.” (Dem. 7:5–7.) “A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that gives the victim a right to expect protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that entails an ability to control [the third party's] conduct. … The common features of a special relationship include an aspect of dependency in which one party relies to some degree on the other for protection and the other party has superior control over the means of protection.” (Doe, 70 Cal.App.5th at 670 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged that he “was a child member of Defendant’s church organization and had the expectation of being kept safe. Defendant, as a church organization, held itself out as a safe haven, where its agents were placed in a position of leadership, guidance, and trust.” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:19–22.) The “special relationship” between Plaintiff and Moving Defendant is specifically alleged in Paragraphs 33 and 57 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts sufficient to support each element in a Negligent Supervision of a Minor cause of action. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is overruled.

CONCLUSION¿ 

The demurrer is overruled. Moving Defendant to file and serve its answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.