Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01419, Date: 2024-05-14 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV01419    Hearing Date: May 14, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 3/8/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff C.C. (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant William S. Hart Union High School District (erroneously sued as Doe 2) (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Request No. 17.

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s RFP No. 17 within 30 days.

BACKGROUND

This is a childhood sexual assault action in which Plaintiff alleges that in 1980, she was sexually assaulted, abused, and harassed by Doe defendant 1, Plaintiff’s high school band and orchestra teacher, while she was a 14-year-old student attending a public high school located within Doe defendant 2’s school district. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3.)

On 12/16/22, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Doe defendants 1 and 2, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Sexual Abuse and Harassment in the Educational Setting; (2) Violation of the Bane Act; (3) Gender Violence; (4) Sexual Harassment; (5) Sexual Battery; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7) False Imprisonment; (8) Constructive Fraud; (9) Breach of Mandatory Duties; (10) Negligence; (11) Negligent Hiring/Retention; (12) Negligent Failure to Warn, Train, or Educate; (13) Aiding and Abetting; and (14) Fraudulent Concealment.

On 5/19/23, Defendant filed its answer and cross-complaint against Doe defendant 1 for (1) Total Equitable Indemnity; (2) Partial Equitable Indemnity; and (3) Declaratory Relief.

On 10/17/23, Plaintiff served Defendant with her Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. (Decl. of Jordan L. Kellogg, ¶ 2.) On 12/29/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 3.) On 2/16/24, Defendant served further responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

On 3/8/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 17. No opposition has been filed to date. On 5/8/24, Plaintiff filed her reply to the non-opposition.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks to compel additional responses to her first set of RFPs, specifically Request No. 17, which seeks: “ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTS CONCERNING DOE 1, including, but not limited to, personnel files, records, training certificates, and disciplinary records.” (Ex. A to Kellogg Decl.)

A.    Meet and Confer

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that on 3/4/24 and 3/5/24, she met and conferred with Defendant’s counsel regarding the issues raised in the instant motion, but the parties were unable to come to a resolution. (Kellogg Decl. ¶ 6.) The Court therefore finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). 

B.     Defendant’s Objections

Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s objections to RFP No. 17 are without merit. (Pl.’s Mot. 6:4–5; Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) Defendant objected to the subject request as follows:

“Objection: This request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, assumed facts not in evidence, violates the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine, lacks foundation, and is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery is continuing. Responding party objects on the basis of attorney-client, attorney work product and invasion of third party privacy privileges. Notwithstanding said objections, and without waiver of same, responding party will amend or supplement this response at a later date.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 2:23–26.)

Defendant’s supplemental response states: “Objection, this request is vague, compound, ambiguous, overbroad, speculation, and an invasion of privacy. Base[d] on the foregoing, responding party is unable to produce Doe 1’s personnel file without a Court order.” (Id. at 3:1–2.) 

a.                   Relevance 

Plaintiff argues that any objections to the subject RFP on the basis that it seeks irrelevant matter are meritless because the scope of discoverability is much broader than what may be relevant. (Pl.’s Mot. 3:10–12.) Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that “the information sought by Request for Production No. 17 (all documents concerning Defendant Doe 2’s employee, Defendant Doe 1, is relevant to Plaintiff’s civil rights and personal injury claims and likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence pursuant to Section 2017.010.” (Pl.’s Mot. 3:17–20.) Plaintiff further argues that her “request that Defendant Doe 2 produce all documents concerning its employee and co-defendant, Doe 1, is directly relevant and material to the issues raised in this action in that these documents will help elucidate the scope of Doe 1’s responsibilities at Doe 2 and both Doe 1’s and Doe 2’s duties to Plaintiff with regard to the subject incident.” (Id. at 5:5–8.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Request No. 17 seeks information discoverable as relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, namely that Defendant had prior knowledge of Doe defendant 1’s history of sexual misconduct, but concealed the misconduct and failed to discipline him, contributing to Plaintiff’s injuries. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–24.) The Court also notes that Defendant has failed to file any opposition to the instant motion. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s relevance objections to RFP No. 17 are without merit.

b.                  Privacy

It appears that the focus of Defendant’s objections to RFP No. 17 is that the request is an “invasion of privacy.” When information protected by the right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution is sought by way of discovery, the burden falls on the party asserting a privacy interest to show that their privacy interests are so serious that they outweigh the interests of the requesting party’s prospective invasion. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that “Plaintiff’s need for the requested information is substantial and outweighs the minimal privacy interests held by Doe 1.” (PL.’s Mot. 8:12–13.) “These documents are directly relevant to determining whether Doe 1 should have avoided, prevented, and/or is liable for committing the harm to Plaintiff. Responsive documents may also include admissible evidence concerning Defendant Doe 2’s training procedures, supervision of employees, including Doe 1, monitoring of complaints from other students and/or staff, and compliance with state laws, all of which are directly relevant to proving Doe 2’s liability for the harm to Plaintiff and numerous alleged violations of state laws with regard to the subject incident.” (Id. at 8:19–25.)

As Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that “Defendant has failed to satisfy its burden to establish a serious invasion of Doe 1’s privacy that outweighs Plaintiff’s substantial need for Doe 2’s documents concerning Doe 1 during his tenure as an employee of Doe 2.” (Id. at 9:1–3, citing Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 557.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s privacy objections to RFP No. 17 are without merit. Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further code-compliant responses to her RFPs, Set One, No. 17.

CONCLUSION

The unopposed motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s RFP No. 17 within 30 days.