Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01419, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV01419    Hearing Date: November 7, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Motion filed: 6/18/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant William S. Hart Union High School District (erroneously sued as Doe 2) (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff C.C. (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

This is a childhood sexual assault action in which Plaintiff alleges that in 1980, she was sexually assaulted, abused, and harassed by Doe defendant 1, Plaintiff’s high school band and orchestra teacher, while she was a 14-year-old student attending a public high school located within Doe defendant 2’s school district. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3.)

On 12/16/22, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Doe defendants 1 and 2, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Sexual Abuse and Harassment in the Educational Setting; (2) Violation of the Bane Act; (3) Gender Violence; (4) Sexual Harassment; (5) Sexual Battery; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7) False Imprisonment; (8) Constructive Fraud; (9) Breach of Mandatory Duties; (10) Negligence; (11) Negligent Hiring/Retention; (12) Negligent Failure to Warn, Train, or Educate; (13) Aiding and Abetting; and (14) Fraudulent Concealment.

On 5/19/23, Defendant filed its answer and cross-complaint against Doe defendant 1 for (1) Total Equitable Indemnity; (2) Partial Equitable Indemnity; and (3) Declaratory Relief.

On 6/18/24, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. On 10/25/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 10/31/24, Defendant filed its reply.

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ANALYSIS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings made by a defendant may be based on the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) “The grounds for motion … shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Id. at subd. (d).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452–453.)

Here, Defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s entire complaint, arguing that Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”), which further amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 in 2019, “cannot constitutionally operate to revive already unenforceable claims that were subject to the claims presentation requirements before AB 218, because the Legislature has no power to create liability for past conduct where no enforceable claim existed.” (Def,’s Mot. 6:12–14.)

A.    Meet-and-Confer 

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party that filed the pleading subject to the motion to determine whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that on 4/1730/24, she met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the issues raised in the instant motion, but the parties were unable to come to a resolution. (Decl. of Katti E. Trinh, ¶ 5.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a). 

B.     Constitutionality of AB 218

Plaintiff brings this action under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which sets forth the procedural requirements that must be followed when a plaintiff seeks to pursue a claim for childhood sexual assault. Actions brought under Section 340.1 are subject to the Government Claims Act, which typically requires written claims for damages against a public entity to be timely presented to that entity for resolution prior to filing suit. (Gov. Code § 900 et seq.) In 2019, the Legislature enacted AB 218, which revived otherwise time-barred claims for childhood sexual abuse, and exempted all claims based on childhood sexual assault from the claims presentation requirement, with retroactive application. (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 424.)

1.      Gift Clause

Here, Defendant argues that AB 218 constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The gift clause of the California Constitution states, in relevant part, that “the Legislature shall have no power ... to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever ....” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.) The gift clause denies “to the legislature the right to make direct appropriations to individuals from general considerations of charity or gratitude, or because of some supposed moral obligation resting upon the people of the state.” (Stevenson v. Colgan (1891) 91 Cal. 649, 651.)

Defendant argues that “AB 218 violates the Constitutional prohibition against gifts of public funds, because imposition of liability for a ‘past act of negligence’ against a public entity ‘would, in effect, be the making of a gift.’” (Def.’s Mot. 10:24–26, quoting Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.) Defendant argues that therefore, “in the years before AB 218 was enacted, plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim against the District because plaintiff did not present a claim for damages within six months of Jeffrey Plum’s alleged misconduct, as was required by the Government Claim Act at that time.” (Id. at 15:17–19.)

Defendant’s argument relies on the theory that the claims presentation requirement is a substantive element of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff under Section 340.1. However, this precise argument was considered and rejected by the Court of Appeal in its recently published opinion in West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243, a case directly applicable here. In West Contra Costa, the Court of Appeal specifically held that the claims presentation requirement did not impose substantive liability on the defendant school district for revived claims of childhood sexual assault. (103 Cal.App.5th at 1257.) Rather, the West Contra Costa Court found that “the claim presentation requirement is a condition on the state’s consent to suit, and not an aspect of the state’s substantive liability. … Accordingly, the [Government Claims Act] itself makes clear that the District’s substantive liability existed when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred; timely presentation of a claim was a condition to waiver of government immunity, but it was not necessary to render the underlying conduct tortious.” (Id. at 1261.)

Based on the foregoing, here, as in West Contra Costa, the Court finds that AB 218’s exemption to the claims presentation requirement does not create substantive liability where none previously existed. Accordingly, the Court follows West Contra Costa and finds that AB 218’s retroactive waiver is not a gift of public funds.

2.      Public Purpose Exception

Even if, assuming arguendo, AB 218’s retroactive waiver was found to be a gift of public funds, such an appropriation is not unconstitutional if it is to be used for a public purpose. (Los Angeles County v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876–877 [“In determining whether an appropriation of public money is to be considered a gift within the constitutional prohibition, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or a private purpose. If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not a gift even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.”].) “The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that AB 218’s retroactive waiver falls within the public purpose exception because “‘the language of the retroactivity provision of section 340.1 indicates a clear legislative intent to maximize claims of sexual-abuse minor plaintiffs for as expansive a period of time as possible. The public policy is manifest from the text of the law.’” (Pl.’s Opp. 8:22–25, quoting Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) “The legislative history [of AB 218], noting that Code of Civil Procedure section ‘340.1’s delayed discovery provisions recognize’ that ‘[f]or many victims, the emotional and psychological trauma from childhood sexual abuse does not manifest itself until well into adulthood,’ states the intention ‘to ensure that victims severely damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible, whether those responsible are private or public entities.’” (Coats, 46 Cal.App.5th at 422.)

Defendant argues in reply that “it is the Court’s role to make a determination on [the] issue [of AB 218’s constitutionality] regardless of policy considerations.” (Def.’s Reply 7:21– 22.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant have not shown that AB 218 does not serve a valid public purpose. Accordingly, the Court finds that any purported “gift” of public funds created by AB 218 is not unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied.

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

Motion Filed: 6/18/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant William S. Hart Union High School District (erroneously sued as Doe 2) (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff C.C. (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order staying proceedings in the instant action pending the Court of Appeal’s outcome of two matters pending before it.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibit H, and is granted as to the existence, but not the contents, of Exhibits A–G.

ANALYSIS

“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.)

Here, Defendant has concurrently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiff. Defendant argues that the substantive issues argued in its motion for judgment on the pleadings are pending before the Court of Appeal in two different matters, and that “a decision by either court will govern this Court’s decision on the District’s upcoming motion for judgment on the pleadings. Thus, the District requests that this Court stay this matter pending resolution of one or both of the pending writs.” (Def.’s Mot. 3:24–27.)

Defendant argues that the action should be stayed as requested to avoid wasting the Court’s resources and litigating the case when a decision by the Court of Appeal may dispose of the litigation entirely at the pleadings stage. (Def.’s Mot. 6:11–16, 9:19–25.)

Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that as the facts underlying this case occurred over 40 years ago, any further delays in bringing the case to trial may result in the loss of evidence and/or recoverable damages due to deteriorating memories, health issues, etc. (Pl.’s Opp. 4:10–16.) The Court further notes that since the date of the filing of the instant motion, the Court of Appeal recently published opinion in West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243. Any future rulings on Roe #2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707) may be considered by this Court if and when they are finalized or published by the Court of Appeal.

Based on the foregoing circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds insufficient basis to stay this action. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

CONCLUSION¿ 

The motion is denied.