Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 22CHCV01453, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

JUNE 3, 2025

(Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and

Requests for Production of Documents, Set One)

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 22CHCV01453

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Lourdes Barreto; and Franco Barreto (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (“Defendant”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders compelling Defendant’s further responses to the following discovery requests:

· Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 30–33, 43, and 45.

Plaintiffs also seek monetary sanctions to be imposed against Defendant and its attorneys in the combined amount of $6,255.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set One, No. 15.1, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One, No. 13, is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ RFPs, Set One, is GRANTED IN PART. The Court orders Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to RFP Nos. 30–33 and 43, as limited above, within 30 days.

The Court imposes $750.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel, payable within 45 days.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is denied.

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 4/25/18, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (FAC ¶¶ 8, 10.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “was unable to repair the vehicle in accordance with the written warranty or the consumer protection and warranty laws of the State of California.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)

On 12/20/22, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; and (2) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment. On 5/9/23, Plaintiffs filed their FAC, alleging the same causes of action against Defendant. On 9/27/23, Defendant filed its answer.

On 1/28/25, Plaintiffs served their first set of discovery requests on Defendant. (Decl. of Keishunn Johnson ¶ 4; Decl. of Harita Nandivada ¶ 3.) On 3/12/25, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 5; Nandivada Decl. ¶ 4.)

On 4/25/25, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions to compel Defendant’s further responses to the subject discovery requests. No opposition has been filed to date. On 5/28/25, Plaintiffs filed notices of Defendant’s non-opposition.

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that on 3/27/25 and 4/15/25, they sent Defendant’s counsel meet and confer letters regarding the issues discussed herein but received no response. (Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Nandivada Decl. ¶¶ 5–8.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (b)(1) and 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered; (2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings; or (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (c).)

A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories if any of the following apply: “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatory No. 15.1 asks Defendant to “identify each denial of a material allegation and each special or affirmative defense in your pleadings and for each: (a) state all facts upon which you base the denial or special or affirmative defense; (b) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and (c) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your denial or special or affirmative defense, and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT.” (Pls.’ FROG Sep. Stmt. 2:8–16.) In response, Defendant asserted objections based on ambiguity, scope, and privilege. (Id. at 2:18–27.)

Plaintiffs argue that further responses are warranted because “Defendant’s Answer asserts 27 affirmative defenses but Defendant’s response to Form Interrogatory 15.1 neither identifies these affirmative defenses nor provides any of the required information.” (Pls.’ FROG Mot. 3:17–19.) The Court agrees, and therefore finds Defendant’s response to Form Interrogatory No. 15.1 to be evasive and incomplete. Based on the foregoing, and Defendant’s failure to oppose the motion, the Court grants the motion to compel Defendant’s further response to Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set One, No. 15.1.

Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatory No. 13 asks: “If YOU contend that the SUBJECT VEHICLE does not qualify for repurchase under the provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, please state all facts supporting YOUR contention.” (Pls.’ SPROG Sep. Stmt. 3:7–10.) In response, Defendant asserted objections based on ambiguity, scope, privilege, and undue burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230. (Id. at 3:11–26.)

Plaintiffs argue that “Defendant’s use of California Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030.230 to cite to various documents in response to Special Interrogatory No. 13 is improper because it leaves Plaintiffs to speculate what within the referred to documents Defendant contend are the facts that support its contention that the Subject Vehicle did not qualify for repurchase or replacement under the Song-Beverly Act. … Answering this interrogatory does not require making an audit or abstract of the referenced documents of which the cost and expense would be the same for Plaintiffs as for Defendant, because Plaintiffs have no way of knowing what within the repair records Defendant believes are the facts that support its contention that the Subject Vehicle does not qualify for repurchase or replacement under the Song-Beverly Act.” (Pls.’ SPROG Mot. 4:3–12.) The Court agrees and finds Defendant’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 13 to be evasive and incomplete, again noting Defendant’s failure to oppose the motion. Based on the foregoing, the Court grants the motion to compel Defendant’s further response to Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set One, No. 15.1.

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 30, 32, and 43 seek the production of documents relating to customer complaints of the same defect arising in 2018 Honda Pilot vehicles. RFP No. 31 seeks documents evidencing repurchases of these vehicles based on transmission defects. RFP No. 33 seeks documents evidencing quality problems identified by Defendant in the transmission in 2018 Honda Pilot vehicles. RFP No. 45 seeks the production of documents produced in a federal class action lawsuit against Defendant. In response, Defendant asserted objections based on relevance, ambiguity, scope, and privilege.

Plaintiffs assert that further responses are warranted because “the information sought by Plaintiffs’ RFPs Nos. 30, 32, 43 may demonstrate American Honda’s knowledge of widespread problems and American Honda’s failure to act despite its knowledge.” (Pls.’ RFP Mot. 9:16–18.) Plaintiffs further argue that “documents showing complaints by other owners of 2018 Honda Pilot vehicles for the same complaints the subject vehicle was presented to Defendant’s authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period are all relevant to determining whether Defendant willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act when it refused to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle.” (Id. at 10:16–19.) Plaintiffs also maintain that “documents evidencing vehicle repurchases are directly related to and relevant to Defendant’s obligations under the Act.” (Id. at 11:7–8.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that good cause exists for the discovery of documents relating to customer complaints regarding the same defects alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint in 2018 Honda Pilot vehicles, Defendant’s repurchase rates, and knowledge of quality problems. However, the Court limits the scope of the requests to 2018 Honda Pilot vehicles specifically purchased within the State of California.

As to RFP No. 45, Plaintiff argues that the documents produced in Browning v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., United States District Court Northern District of California, Case No. 5:20-cv-05417, (N.D. Cal.), are subject to discovery because the class action lawsuit “brought by consumers who purchased vehicles equipped with the same 9-Speed Transmission Defect present in Plaintiffs’ vehicle.” (Pls. RFP Mot. 11:25–26.) However, the Court finds that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that no further responses to RFP No. 45 are warranted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 30–33 and 43, subject to the limitations above. The Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to RFP No. 45.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories [or RFPs], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).) Additionally, “the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiffs request a total combined sum of $6,255.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant. (Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Nandivada Decl. ¶¶ 9–11.) In granting the instant unopposed motions, the Court finds it reasonable to impose $750.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set One, No. 15.1, is granted.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One, No. 13, is granted.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ RFPs, Set One, is granted in part. The Court orders Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to RFP Nos. 30–33 and 43, as limited above, within 30 days.

The Court imposes $750.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel, payable within 45 days.