Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV01483, Date: 2023-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 22CHCV01483    Hearing Date: August 10, 2023    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 8/10/23

Case #22CHCV01483

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 5/24/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Daniel Galindo Ramirez aka Daniel Galindo (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 16, 19–32, 37–41, and 45–46. Plaintiff also requests monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $3,210.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs, Request Nos. 16, 19–32, 37–41, and 45–46 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $950.00

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on or around 12/18/19, which was manufactured and distributed by Defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 14.) Plaintiff alleges that “defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to transmission, engine, and electrical” but “Defendant GENERAL MOTORS has failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.” (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 20.)

On 12/23/22, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; and (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty. On 1/25/23, Defendant filed its answer.

On 2/24/23, Plaintiff served his Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, on Defendant. (Decl. of Phil A. Thomas ¶ 5.) On 3/24/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 6.) On 5/24/23, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to his RFPs, Set One. On 7/26/23, Defendant filed its opposition. On 8/3/23, Plaintiff filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks to compel additional responses to his first set of RFPs, specifically to request Nos. 16, 19–32, 37–41, and 45–46, which relate to “GM’s general policies and procedures relied upon when handling vehicle repurchase or replacement requests and calculating repurchase offers” and “internal codes generated or utilized by Defendant, and similar consumer complaints and repurchases of other vehicles of the same year make and model as Plaintiff’s vehicle with the same or similar nonconformities.” (Pl.’s Mot. 6:14–16, 7:25–27.) Plaintiff argues that the motion is warranted because Defendant unjustifiably failed to respond to the requests and made meritless, boilerplate objections thereto.

Meet and Confer 

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that beginning on 5/3/23, he began meeting and conferring with Defendant’s counsel regarding raising the issues in the instant motion. (Thomas Decl. ¶ 10.) The parties further discussed these issues on 3/29/23, 3/30/23, 3/31/23, 4/14/23, 5/9/23, and 5/15/23, but were unable to come to an informal resolution. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–14, 18.) While the parties each dispute the good-faith nature of opposing counsel’s meet and confer efforts, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). 

Defendant’s Objections

Here, Plaintiff argues, in part, that Defendant’s objections to his first set of RFPs are without merit. (Pl.’s Mot. 13:26–28; Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) Defendant objected to each request at issue as follows: 

“GM objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216 … Specifically, whether Plaintiff(s) is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information in the form of GM’s internal policies and procedures. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.”

(Ex. B to Thomas Decl.)

a.                   Scope/Relevance 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s objections to the subject RFPs on the basis that they seek irrelevant matter are meritless because “evidence regarding GM’s practices in handling consumer complaints is relevant to determining whether GM’s willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act when it refused to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Pl.’s Mot. 12:18–20.) Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonable calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff argues that “these documents are relevant to the case at bar because they will likely shed light on whether Defendant has a policy in place that results in systemic violations of the Song-Beverly Act.” (Pl.’s Mot. 6:16–18.) “Specifically, Plaintiff seek[s] information regarding GM’s general compliance with the Song-Beverly Act, and methods for handling and responding to various customer complaints. As stated above, these corporate policies and procedures can be used to show a willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act, and which entitles Plaintiff to recover civil penalties.” (Id. at 7:11–15.) Plaintiff also seeks “these documents to prove that GM has a record of the same or similar issues for the year, make and model of the Subject Vehicle, and that GM has knowledge of these known issues and consumer complaints.” (Id. at 9:2–4.) “The information sought by Plaintiff regarding other similar vehicle complaints may prove a widespread defect or nonconformity, or show when it arose; and may also demonstrate GM’s knowledge of widespread problems and GM’s failure to act despite its knowledge.” (Id. at 10:8–11.)

Defendant argues in opposition that “documents about other vehicles are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims and GM’s defenses in this case.” (Def.’s Opp. 7:1–2.) “This breach of warranty case is about Plaintiff’s Sierra and repairs of that Sierra under warranty. GM has already produced documents relevant to Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims. Documents about other complaints from or by other consumers, or the design of specific component systems or parts are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that GM failed to repair his Sierra within a reasonable number of attempts. Plaintiff has zero need for the documents sought in the requests at issue.” (4:7–12 [emphasis in original].)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1790 et seq.) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiff’s is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiff in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects. While the cases relied on by Plaintiff (i.e., Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967) may not involve the exact circumstance before this Court, they are sufficient to show that the requested information could itself be admissible or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s relevance objections to Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 16, 19–32, 37–41, and 45–46 are without merit.

b.                  Undue Burden

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s objections to his first set of RFPs on the basis that they are unduly burdensome and oppressive are meritless absent any additional showing of any such undue burden or oppression. (Pl.’s Mot. 16:15.) The party objecting to a discovery request on this basis bears the burden of supplying evidence of “the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) 

In opposition, Defendant observes that Plaintiff has propounded 157 total discovery requests, and Defendant has already produced various requested documents in response to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs. (Def.’s Opp. 1:3–22.) However, the Court notes that Defendant has not supplied evidence to show the “quantum of work required” to respond in full to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs as requested in the instant motion. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to the requests to the extent that they are unduly burdensome or oppressive are without adequate support. 

c.                   Trade Secrets 

Defendant objected to RFP Nos. 16, 19–32, 37–41, and 45–46 on the basis that each requests “seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information in the form of GM’s internal policies and procedures.” (Ex. B. to Thomas Decl.) Evidence Code § 1060 provides that the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret and to prevent others from disclosing it, unless allowing the privilege will conceal fraud or result in injustice. A party that is claiming the trade secret privilege has the burden of proving the party's entitlement to that privilege. (Amgen Inc. v California Correctional Health Care Servs. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 733.)

“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civ. Code § 3426.1, subd. (d).)

Here, Defendant argues that “the documents sought by Plaintiff may relate to and contain confidential communications between GM employees and its suppliers, and sub-suppliers pertaining to technical, mechanical, and commercial issues and analyses.” (Def.’s Opp. 8:15–17.) “Because wholesale disclosure of GM’s internal, confidential materials would cause GM competitive harm as well as harm in the marketplace, GM should not be compelled to produce these confidential, proprietary documents without a heightened showing of the need for the documents to prove Plaintiff’s case.” (Id. at 9:16–19.)

In support of its argument, Defendant offers the sworn declaration of Huizhen Lu, a Senior Manager/Technical Consultant of Engineering Analysis employed with Defendant, attesting that the documents sought may include, “design specifications, evaluations, and performance analysis relative to specifications, material selection, cost, and quality. Such information is not generally available to the public. GM LLC derives value from this information’s confidentiality and would be harmed by the loss of confidentiality. Consequently, GM LLC makes considerable effort to keep this information confidential.” (Ex. C to Decl. of Cameron Major, ¶ 11.)

The Court notes that Plaintiff has represented that the parties have agreed to a protective order, and therefore any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information may be adequately protected by the terms of that protective order. (Thomas Decl. ¶ 14.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown adequate cause that the specific documents requested by Plaintiff are trade secrets protected from discovery, particularly where the parties appear amenable to a protective order.

As set forth above, Defendant’s objections to the subject requests are stricken/overruled, therefore the Court orders Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to these requests and produce further documents accordingly within 30 days. Production of any documents Defendant contends contain trade secret or confidential proprietary information shall be so designated and will be subject to the stipulated protective order.

Sanctions 

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).) 

Here, Plaintiff requests sanctions in the total amount of $3,210.00 to be imposed on Defendant. This amount includes: (1) 3 hours of Plaintiff’s attorney’s time working on this motion, at his hourly billing rate of $450.00 per hour; (2) an anticipated 2 hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition and drafting a reply; (3) an anticipated 2 hours preparing for and attending the instant hearing; and (4) a $60.00 filing fee. (Thomas Decl. ¶¶ 22–23.) Defendant argues in opposition that it acted with substantial justification in objecting to the overbroad requests. (Def.’s Opp. 10:4–6.)

In granting the instant motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $950.00.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs, Request Nos. 16, 19–32, 37–41, and 45–46 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $950.00.