Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHLC23808, Date: 2024-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).


Case Number: 22CHLC23808    Hearing Date: April 9, 2024    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 4/9/24

Case #22CHLC23808

 

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

 

APRIL 8, 2024

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 22CHLC23808

¿ 

Motion Filed: 1/3/24                                                                                 Non-Jury Trial: 6/24/24

¿ 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Kinecta Federal Credit Union (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Rachael Hooker-Saran (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: OK¿ 

¿ 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted.

 

BACKGROUND¿ 

 

This is a collections action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 6/24/21, Defendant executed a loan agreement “in the principal sum of $20,000.00, which was payable in monthly installment payments of $411.58, beginning on August 8, 2021, with one final payment of $411.18, due on July 7, 2026.” (FAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant defaulted on the loan agreement on 7/8/22. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

 

On 10/28/22, Plaintiff filed its original complaint against Defendant and dismissed defendant The Estate of Gurdip Saran, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Unsecured Written Agreement; and (2) Common Count. On 1/5/23, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging: (1) Breach of Unsecured Written Agreement; (2) Common Count; (3) Breach of Agreement; (4) Open Book Account; (5) Account Stated; (6) Breach of Agreement; (7) Open Book Account; and (8) Account Stated. Only the first and second causes of action are alleged against Defendant.

 

On 2/10/23, Defendants filed their answer. On 7/20/23, Plaintiff dismissed The Estate of Gurdip Saran from the action without prejudice. On 1/3/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment. No opposition has been filed to date.

//

//

//

ANALYSIS

 

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381–382.) 

 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment has met its “burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

 

A.    Breach of Unsecured Written Agreement

 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendant alleges Breach of Unsecured Written Agreement. To state this cause of action, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

 

Here, Plaintiff proffers evidence of the loan agreement Defendants entered into with Plaintiff on 6/24/21. (Ex. 1 to Decl. of Matthew Marquez.) Plaintiff asserts that it has performed all of its obligations under the loan agreement, and that Defendant breached the agreement by defaulting under the agreement, resulting in payment owed to Plaintiff in the principal sum of $17,369.80 plus interest. (Marquez Decl. ¶¶ 17, 25–28.)

 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its initial burden of proving each element of its cause of action for Breach of Contract against Defendant. As Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion, she has likewise failed to meet her responsive burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to this cause of action. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion as to its first cause of action.

//

//

B.     Common Count

 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges against Defendant Common Count. The required elements of a common count claim are “(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment. A cause of action for money had and received is stated if it is alleged the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.” (Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460 [citations and quotation marks omitted].)

 

Here, Plaintiff proffers Defendant’s account statements under the loan agreement, showing that “there remains a balance due and owing from Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount of $17,369.80, plus interest of $2,344.32, which is calculated at the Agreement rate of 8.49% (per diem rate of $3.96 for 595 days) from August 27, 2022 to April 9, 2024, the date of hearing on this motion, and costs of $999.50 (TOTAL OF $20,713.62).” (Marquez Decl. ¶ 23; Exs. 2–3 to Marquez Decl.)

 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its initial burden of proving each element of its cause of action for Common Count against Defendant. The Court again notes that Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion as to its second cause of action.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The unopposed motion is granted. Plaintiff is to file a proposed judgment within 10 days for Plaintiff and against Defendants in the total amount of $20,713.62.