Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case 22STCV13883 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling

This is a property damage action stemming from a fire that occurred in Plaintiff’s home on 10/17/18. (Compl. p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “so negligently and carelessly maintained and/or operated their business and/or business operations so as to allow a fire to erupt within Plaintiff's home, causing significant fire and related damage to the structure, contents and fixtures, as well as personal property.” (Ibid.) On 4/26/22, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging a sole cause of action for General Negligence. On 7/13/22, Defendants filed their answer.

On 9/7/22, Defendants filed their original motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the premise that Plaintiff’s action is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On 10/5/22, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 10/20/22, Defendants filed their reply. On 10/21/22 and 1/4/23, the Court vacated the motion’s hearing date.

On 1/6/23, Defendants re-filed and served the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. No opposition was filed thereto. On 3/16/23, the Court considered granting the unopposed motion, but continued the hearing to consider the earlier-filed opposition and reply.

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party that filed the pleading subject to the motion to determine whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion. If an amended pleading is filed, the responding party must meet and confer again with the party that filed the amended pleading before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the amended pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).)

Defendants’ counsel declares that on 9/1/22 and 9/7/22, he met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel via email regarding the issues raised in the instant motion, without coming to a resolution. (Decl. of Gregory Dilts, ¶¶ 4.) Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings made by a defendant may be based on the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made on the ground that the cause of action alleged is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Ponderosa Homes v City of San Ramon (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1768–1769.) Here, “an action for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels, including an action for the specific recovery of personal property” must be commenced within three years of the date of the alleged injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (c)(1).) “Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., Emergency Rule 9, subd. (a).)

Here, as Defendants observe, the alleged injury to Plaintiff occurred on 10/17/18. (Compl. p. 4.) Therefore, under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c)(1), Plaintiff was required to commence this action on or before 10/17/21. With the addition of the emergency 180-day emergency tolling period, Plaintiff was required to commence this action on or before 4/15/22. Plaintiff filed her complaint on 4/26/22, and therefore her action is barred by the statute of limitations, even when tolled.

Plaintiff argues in opposition that Defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. “Four elements must ordinarily be proved to establish an equitable estoppel: (1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had the right to believe that it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and, (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Hopkins v. Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736, 756.) “The determination of whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to invoke the doctrine is a factual question entrusted to the trial court's discretion.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff asserts that a third-party insurance claim adjuster for Defendants represented to her that the applicable statute of limitations, after being tolled, would expire on 4/16/22, and that he was attempting to negotiate a settlement of her claims. (Pl.’s Opp. 2:3–18; Exs. 1 and 2 to Pl.’s Opp.) Plaintiff contends that she relied on the representations that the adjuster was still awaiting loss repairs to be completed in order to settle Plaintiff’s and other claimant’s claims, and “did not understand the significance of the extended statute of limitations based upon her reliance upon representations of the various Farmers adjusters.” (Id. at 3:14–16.)

Defendants argue in reply that “even if the Plaintiff had relied upon such statements to their injury, the correspondence provided by the Plaintiff in their opposition motion does not establish the requisite conduct to establish Equitable Estoppel. The Farmers Claims representative merely informed Ms. Tolbert … of the correct date on which the Statute of Limitations would expire and in no way indicated to either the Plaintiff … that she would be able to recover damages past April 16, 2022.” (Defs.’ Reply, 3:17–22.)

The Court agrees with Defendants, and finds that here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the intent and ignorance elements for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply. As Defendants observe, “Plaintiffs do not provide any facts or law to substantiate the contention that the claims adjuster in question intended for his correspondence with the Plaintiff to result in the Plaintiff’s delayal of trial past the expiration of the Statute of Limitations.” (Id. at 4:1–4.) Moreover, “Plaintiff was fully apprised of the true state of facts and has not provided any evidence to substantiate the … assertion that the Defendant’s agent intended for their correspondence, which correctly conveyed the April 16, 2022 expiration date, to result in injury.” (Id. 4:7–10.)

That Plaintiff purportedly did not understand the significance of the statute of limitations, and mistakenly relied on the insurance claim adjuster’s representations to her injury does not automatically lead to a conclusion that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to her otherwise time-barred action. The proffered communications indicate that the adjuster apprised Plaintiff twice of the expiration date of the statute of limitations, and that he planned on attempting to negotiate a settlement after he received documentation of all damages. (Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Opp.) However, the adjuster notably did not suggest that Plaintiff should refrain from filing a legal action before the expiration date in reliance on his representations.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants are not equitably estopped from asserting the applicable statute of limitations to the instant action. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, without leave to amend.