Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22STCV18112, Date: 2024-08-23 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 22STCV18112    Hearing Date: August 23, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Motion filed: 6/18/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District; and San Fernando/Sylmar Community of Schools (collectively, “Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff T.S. (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

Plaintiff is reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former student at San Fernando Middle School, brings this action against Defendants, two school districts in which the school sits, alleging that in 1996, she was sexually abused and assaulted by a school yard duty worker when she was approximately 13 years old. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–4, 30–35.)

On 6/2/22, Plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging against Defendants six causes of action for Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision. On 7/27/22, Defendants filed their answer.

On 6/18/24, Defendants filed the instant motion and request for judicial notice. On 8/8/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition and request for judicial notice. On 8/16/24, Defendants filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings made by a defendant may be based on the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) “The grounds for motion … shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Id. at subd. (d).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452–453.)

Here, Defendants move for a judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s entire complaint, arguing that “the Legislature’s Assembly Bill 218 (‘AB 218’), which further amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 in 2019, is unconstitutional because it retroactively strips governmental immunity from public entities in violation of Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution, which prohibits gifts of public funds.” (Mot. 2:10–13.)

A.    Meet-and-Confer 

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party that filed the pleading subject to the motion to determine whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendants’ counsel declares that on 4/30/24, she sent Plaintiff’s counsel a meet and confer letter discussing the issues raised in the instant motion. (Decl. of Amanda C. Lewis, ¶ 2.) On 5/10/24, counsel for the parties met and conferred telephonically, but were unable to come to a resolution. (Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a). 

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B.     Constitutionality of AB 218

Plaintiff brings this action under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which sets forth the procedural requirements that must be followed when a plaintiff seeks to pursue a claim for childhood sexual assault. Actions brought under Section 340.1 are subject to the Government Claims Act, which typically requires written claims for damages against a public entity to be timely presented to that entity for resolution prior to filing suit. (Gov. Code § 900 et seq.) In 2019, the Legislature enacted AB 218, which revived otherwise time-barred claims for childhood sexual abuse, and exempted all claims based on childhood sexual assault from the claims presentation requirement, with retroactive application. (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 424.)

1.      Gift Clause

Here, Defendants argue that AB 218 constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The gift clause of the California Constitution states, in relevant part, that “the Legislature shall have no power ... to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever ....” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.) The gift clause denies “to the legislature the right to make direct appropriations to individuals from general considerations of charity or gratitude, or because of some supposed moral obligation resting upon the people of the state.” (Stevenson v. Colgan (1891) 91 Cal. 649, 651.)

Defendants argue that AB 218’s “retroactive lifting of a substantive element (i.e., alleging compliance with the Government Claims Act), impermissibly imposes liability where no enforceable claim previously existed,” therefore constituting an unconstitutional gift of public funds. (Mot. 1:15–17.) Defendants argue that therefore, “because Plaintiff never presented a government claim, there was never a time in this case prior to 2020 (prior to AB 218) that all of the elements of a cause of action against the LAUSD Defendants existed.” (Mot. 10:8–9.)

Defendants’ argument relies on the theory that the claims presentation requirement is a substantive element of Defendants’ liability to Plaintiff under Section 340.1. However, this precise argument was considered and rejected by the Court of Appeal in its recently published opinion in West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (July 31, 2024, A169314) __Cal.Rptr.3d__ [2024 WL 3593932], a case directly applicable here. In West Contra Costa, the Court of Appeal specifically held that the claims presentation requirement did not impose substantive liability on the defendant school district for revived claims of childhood sexual assault. (2024 WL 3593932 at *5.) Rather, the West Contra Costa Court found that “the claim presentation requirement is a condition on the state’s consent to suit, and not an aspect of the state’s substantive liability. … Accordingly, the [Government Claims Act] itself makes clear that the District’s substantive liability existed when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred; timely presentation of a claim was a condition to waiver of government immunity, but it was not necessary to render the underlying conduct tortious.” (Id. at *6.)

Based on the foregoing, here, as in West Contra Costa, the Court finds that AB 218’s exemption to the claims presentation requirement does not create substantive liability where none previously existed. Accordingly, the Court follows West Contra Costa and finds that AB 218’s retroactive waiver is not a gift of public funds.

2.      Public Purpose Exception

Even if, assuming arguendo, AB 218’s retroactive waiver was found to be a gift of public funds, such an appropriation is not unconstitutional if it is to be used for a public purpose. (Los Angeles County v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876–877 [“In determining whether an appropriation of public money is to be considered a gift within the constitutional prohibition, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or a private purpose. If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not a gift even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.”].) “The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that AB 218’s retroactive waiver falls within the public purpose exception because “the legislative history leading to the enactment of AB 218 makes clear the public purpose of AB 218, and its abrogation of notice-of-claim requirements for claims arising from child sexual assault, has been recognized by the courts.” (Opp. 4:19–22, citing Coats, 46 Cal.App.5th at 422 [“The legislative history, noting that Code of Civil Procedure section ‘340.1’s delayed discovery provisions recognize’ that ‘[f]or many victims, the emotional and psychological trauma from childhood sexual abuse does not manifest itself until well into adulthood,’ states the intention ‘to ensure that victims severely damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible, whether those responsible are private or public entities.’”].)

Plaintiff argues that therefore, “the lesson that should be learned from this history of legislation and appellate decisions is that the Legislature has been steadfast in furthering the state interest and public purpose of allowing victims of childhood sexual assault to bring their claims and holding the responsible institutions accountable, whether they be public or private.” (Id. at 6:1–4.) “The statutory amendments are therefore not just to benefit past victims of childhood sexual assault, but they are to prevent future assaults by holding individuals and institutions, public and private, accountable. Their intent is to eliminate reliance on the passage of time to avoid accountability.” (Id. at 6:16–19.)

Defendants argue in reply that no public purpose exists here because “the appropriation of public funds for the payment of unenforceable claims serves no public purpose.” (Reply 3:11–13, citing Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195, 200.) This argument was also explicitly addressed and rejected in West Contra Costa. (2024 WL 3593932 at *9 [“at the outset, we reject the District’s blanket assertion that ‘California precedent firmly establishes that making previously unenforceable claims actionable cannot serve’ a public purpose.”].) Here, as in West Contra Costa, Defendants’ argument relies on Conlin v. Board of Sup’rs of City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17, Jordan v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, and Orange County, 139 Cal.App.3d 195. Defendants argue that “in both Conlin and Powell, the California Supreme Court made clear that, in the context of appropriations related to legal claims, moral and equitable considerations cannot be part of the analysis—any and all appropriations of public money for unenforceable claims are prohibited by Article XVI, Section 6.” (Reply 4:15–18.)

The West Contra Costa Court expressly found that “Conlin is distinguishable because, as [previously] discussed … AB 218 does not create new substantive liability. … Orange County and Jordan are analogous to Conlin.” (2024 WL 3593932 at *9.) The Court of Appeal ultimately found that “in contrast to Conlin, Orange County, and Jordan, which involved only discrete payments to private parties with no larger public goal, in the present case the Legislature sought to provide relief to a disadvantaged group of persons. … that is a sufficient public purpose under the gift clause.” (Ibid.) “In seeking to aid victims of childhood sexual assault, the public purpose underlying AB 218 is not fundamentally different from the public purpose involved in any of a number of other enactments providing assistance to other disadvantaged classes of persons in the best interests of the general public welfare.” (Id. at *11 [internal quotations omitted].)

The Court notes that Defendants fail to address the West Contra Costa opinion in their reply argument. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have not shown that AB 218 does not serve a valid public purpose. Accordingly, the Court finds that any purported “gift” of public funds created by AB 218 is not unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied.