Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV00037, Date: 2025-02-27 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00037    Hearing Date: February 27, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion Filed: 9/17/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Haroon Temueri; and Shaheen Temueri (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: A judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, and an order granting Plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount of $51,011.50, and costs in the amount of $4,396.01.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $45,076.51 in attorney fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 7/24/22, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 11.) Plaintiffs allege that “the Subject Vehicle was delivered to Plaintiffs with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to the Vehicle abruptly shutting off and jerking, and check engine warning light illumination, and other serious nonconformities to warranty” (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs allege that on 10/8/22, they presented the vehicle for repair at an authorized repair facility, defendant Mercedes-Benz of Valencia (“MB Valencia”), but the defects remain. (Id. at ¶¶ 13–15, 84.)

On 1/6/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2(b); and (4) Negligent Repair (against MB Valencia).

On 8/26/24, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. (Pls.’ Mot. 1:3–6.) On 9/17/24, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. On 1/8/25, Defendant filed its opposition. On 1/13/25, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

On 1/21/25, the matter came on for hearing, and the Court requested supplemental briefing to clarify discrepancies in the amounts requested by Plaintiffs. On 1/21/25, Defendant filed a supplemental opposition. On 1/22/25, Defendant filed a notice of errata. On 1/22/25, Plaintiffs filed an opposition and request to strike Defendant’s second opposition. On 1/30/25, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief. On 2/13/25, Defendant filed a reply.

ANALYSIS

1.      Right to Recovery

An award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, the Song-Beverly Act authorizes a buyer “to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

Moreover, Plaintiffs base the instant motion on their 8/26/24 settlement agreement, wherein Defendant agreed to settle the claim for a total amount of $95,000.00, plus “‘attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs’ by way of a stipulation agreed upon between the parties, or, if the parties cannot agree on an amount, by way of a noticed ‘motion to the Court.’” (Decl. of Michael Saeedian ¶¶ 26–27.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant motion is authorized both by contract and statute.

2.      Attorney Fees Incurred

A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable” attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) “The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 169.) In determining a reasonable fee award, the Court begins with the lodestar method of calculation, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.¿(Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095–1096.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover $51,011.50 in attorney fees, encompassing 104.2 hours of their attorneys’ time, billed at the following rates:

a.       Counsel’s Hourly Rate

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider whether the stated rates “are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded [to] comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

Here, Plaintiffs assert that “the rates charged by The Lemon Pros, LLP are in line with the Laffy [sic] Matrix which is a recognized source of contingency based attorney’s fees.” (Pls.’ Mot. 8:3–4.) The Laffey Matrix, an attorney fee billing matrix for attorneys in the Washington, D.C. metro area, which California courts have applied to attorney fee awards in the Los Angeles area. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 15, citing Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1057, fn. 5; Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1; 569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 125; Gutierrez v. Chopard U.S. Ltd. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 383; Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691; Nemecek v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641.)

In opposition, Defendant presents a number of cases where courts elected to reduce hourly billing rates of plaintiff’s counsel in similar cases. (Def.’s Opp. 6:23–7:16.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates should be reduced to an attorney rate of $400.00 per hour and paralegal rate at $150.00 per hour, because “Plaintiff’s Counsel claims rates that are double and nearly triple actual market rates for the same kind of work.” (Id. at 6:20–21.)

In reply, Plaintiffs argue that lawyers who work on a contingency fee basis may seek heightened attorney fees because of the inherent contingent risk associated with their cases. (Pls.’ Reply 1:11–21, citing Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 “a contingent fee contract, since it involves a gamble on the result, may properly provide for a larger compensation than would otherwise be reasonable.”)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that their attorneys’ hourly billing rates are commensurate with their experience and fall within the range of reasonable rates charged by attorneys and judicially awarded in similar cases. Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly billing rate.

b.      Hours Expended

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees for the 104.2 hours expended by their attorneys on this matter, totaling $51,011.50. Plaintiffs proffer an itemized list of time entries detailing their attorneys’ work on this matter. (Ex. A to Saeedian Decl.)

In addition to the attorney hourly billing rate, Defendant challenges the following specific entries in Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ proffered time log: (1) time spent preparing and responding to motions to compel further discovery responses; (2) time spent on responding to an OSC re: failure to appear; (3) time spent relating to the attorney/client agreement; (4) time spent on clerical tasks; (5) time spent opposing Plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration; and (5) time spent defending Plaintiff’s deposition.

i.                    Discovery Motions

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ attorney time spent preparing untimely motions to compel Defendant’s further discovery responses are not recoverable. Defendant challenges a total of 1.7 hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel (1.2 hours by AO, and 0.5 hours by MS) on these tasks. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 10:10–25.) The Court agrees and finds that the above fees are not reasonably incurred, particularly where Plaintiffs reduced their billing related to these motions by 10.1 hours. (Pls.’ Supp. Brief. 2:19–20.) Therefore, the Court reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 1.7 hours (1.2 hours by AO, and 0.5 hours by MS), for a total reduction of $1,181.50.

Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ attorney time spent preparing motions to compel the dealership’s further discovery responses should be reduced. Defendant challenges a total of 10.0 hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel (10.0 hours by AO) on these tasks. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 11:6–18.) Defendant argues that “these four Motions to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production, form interrogatories, special interrogatories and requests for admissions to MBV are all templates that only require primarily cut and paste editing. … The legal argument is part of the template in the motion and the separate statement, and the majority of the work is pasting in the same sentence after each allegedly deficient response referring to the argument stated previously.” (Id. at 11:8–14.) Based on the foregoing, the Court reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 5.0 hours (5.0 hours by AO) for a total reduction of $3,475.00.

ii.                  OSC Re: Failure to Appear

Defendant further argues that attorney time spent preparing for and attending a hearing on an Order to Show Cause re: Failure to Appear (0.9 hours by AO) should be stricken. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 10:26–11:5.) Defendant argues that “these hours were not reasonably incurred and MBUSA should not be required to compensate Plaintiff’s counsel for tasked related to their non-appearance at the hearing for their own motion.” (Id. at 11:2–4.) The Court agrees and finds that the above fees are not reasonably incurred. Therefore, the Court reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 0.9 hours (0.9 hours by AO) for a total reduction of $625.50.

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iii.                Attorney/Client Agreement

Defendant argues that attorney time spent drafting the attorney-client agreement is considered overhead. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 11:19–12:2.) Defendant challenges a total of 0.8 hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel (0.4 hours by JLA, and 0.4 hours by MS) on these tasks. The Court agrees and finds that the above fees are not reasonably incurred. Therefore, the Court reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 0.4 hours (0.2 hours by JLA, and 0.2 hours by MS), for a total reduction of $189.00.

iv.                Clerical Tasks

Defendant further argues generally that throughout the billing records, there are entries for clerical “such as receiving invoices and conformed proofs of service, updating and organizing the file, checking the docket and calendaring dates, and serving documents.” (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 12:5–8.) Defendant challenges a total of 8.0 hours of Plaintiffs’ attorney’s time spent on various tasks, including the organization of various documents. (Id. at 12:3–20.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects 2.4 hours (1.8 hours by JLA in paralegal role, 0.6 hours by JLA in attorney role) incurred for purely administrative tasks. (Ex. A to Saeedian Decl., passim.) The Court finds that the above fees were not reasonably incurred, and therefore reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 2.4 hours for a total reduction of $660.00.

v.                   Motion to Compel Arbitration

Defendant further argues that attorney time spent preparing Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (10.1 hours by CU) should be reduced. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 12:21–13:2.) Defendant argues that “the amount of time claimed for this Plaintiff’s opposition is excessive for and attorney who claims the expertise to bill $525/hour and is familiar with the law on the issue.” (Id. at 13:1–2.) Based on the foregoing, the Court reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 5.0 hours (5.0 hours by CU) for a total reduction of $2,625.00.

vi.                Deposition

Defendant further argues that attorney time spent defending Plaintiff’s deposition (5.0  hours by CU) should be reduced. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 13:4–9.) Defendant argues that the deposition only lasted 1.7 hours, therefore Plaintiffs should only be able to recover up to 2 hours of their attorneys’ time. (Ibid.) Based on the foregoing, the Court reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 3.0 hours (3.0 hours by CU) for a total reduction of $1,575.00.

3.      Costs Incurred

Plaintiffs assert that they incurred costs and expenses totaling $4,396.01, which encompasses: (1) $998.58 in filing and motion fees; (2) 172.08 in jury fees; (3) $2,885.05 in deposition costs; (4) $130.00 in process server fees; (5) $112.11 in electronic filing/service fees; and (4) $98.19 in other unspecified costs. (Ex. B to Saeedian Decl.) Defendant does not contest Plaintiffs’ costs. (Def.’s Supp. Opp. 13:10–12.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff $45,076.51 in attorney fees and costs, as outlined below:

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $45,076.51 in attorney fees and costs.