Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV00172, Date: 2024-09-30 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00172    Hearing Date: September 30, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion Filed: 2/6/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ignacio Suarez (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Ford Motor Company; and Autonation Ford Valencia (collectively, “Defendants”)¿ 

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Plaintiff attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $36,393.48.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. Plaintiff is awarded $19,523.33 in attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence, but not the substance, of Exhibits 1–17.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS: Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are overruled.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff bring this action against Defendants under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on 1/13/17, and for which Defendant Ford Motor Company issued the manufacturer’s warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.)

On 1/20/23, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability; and (5) Negligent Repair. On 2/22/23, Defendants filed their answer.

On 9/14/23, the parties executed a settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, settling entire lawsuit by Defendants paying Plaintiff $135,750.00, plus reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses either by written stipulation or by noticed motion. (Ex. 3 to Decl. of Christian R. Castro, ¶¶ 1–2.) On 1/30/24, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement of the entire case.

On 2/6/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. ¿On 7/12/24, Defendants filed their opposition. On 9/20/24, Plaintiff filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

1.      Right to Recovery

An award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, the Song-Beverly Act authorizes a buyer “to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

Moreover, Plaintiff bases the instant motion on the parties’ 9/14/23 settlement agreement, wherein Defendants agreed that “Plaintiff shall retain the right to petition the Court for an award of reasonably and actually incurred attorney fees and costs against Ford recoverable pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1794(d).” (Ex. 3 to Castro Decl., ¶ 2(b).)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant motion is authorized both by contract and statute.

2.      Attorney Fees Incurred

A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable” attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) “The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 169.) In determining a reasonable fee award, the Court begins with the lodestar method of calculation, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.¿(Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095–1096.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover $23,395.00 in attorney fees, encompassing 55.5 hours of his attorneys’ time, billed at the following rates:

a.       Counsel’s Hourly Rate

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider whether the stated rates “are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded [to] comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that the rates charged by his attorneys are commensurate with the experience and skill of the attorneys involved and have been approved by courts in the past. (Pls.’ Mot. 8:11–9:8; Decl. of Payam Shahian ¶¶ 43–60.) In opposition, Defendants present a number of cases where the court elected to reduce hourly billing rates of plaintiff’s counsel in similar cases. (Defs.’ Opp. 6:27–9:12.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates should be reduced to an attorney rate of $275.00 and $350.00 per hour and legal assistant rate at $150.00 per hour. (Id. at 9:3–12.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that his attorneys’ hourly billing rates are commensurate with their experience and fall within the range of reasonable rates charged by attorneys and judicially awarded in similar cases. Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly billing rate.

b.      Hours Expended

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney fees for the 55.5 hours expended by his attorneys on this matter, totaling $23,395.00. Plaintiff proffers an itemized list of time entries detailing his attorneys’ work on this matter. (Ex. 18 to Shahian Decl.)

In addition to the attorney hourly billing rate, Defendants challenge the following specific entries in Plaintiff’s attorneys’ proffered time log: (1) time spent on discovery; (2) post-998 settlement time incurred; (3) time incurred in connection with the instant fee motion; (4) improperly blockbilled time entries; and (5) time spent on clerical tasks.

i.                    Discovery

Defendants argue that the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff in drafting discovery responses to Defendants, and Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendants’ further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production, Set One should be reduced they are essentially the same as other motions and responses served by Plaintiff’s counsel in similar matters. (Defs.’ Opp. 9:20–10:11.) Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects that 23.5 hours (13.5 hours by AR, 2.3 hours by JL, and 7.7 hours by VD) were incurred in these tasks. (Ex. 18 to Shahian Decl.) The Court reduces the hours incurred for these tasks by 11.75 hours (6.75 hours by AR, 1.15 hours by JL, and 3.85 hours by VD), for a total reduction of $4,490.50.

ii.                  Post-998 Settlement

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff’s two time entries, billed on 11/13/23 and 1/30/24, after the execution of the parties’ settlement agreement, must be stricken. The Court notes that Defendants do not cite to any legal authority supporting their position that these time entries are not recoverable. Accordingly, the Court declines to strike these fees.

iii.                Fee Motion

Defendants further argue that the 7.2 hours incurred in bringing the instant motion, and the anticipated $3,500.00 Plaintiff’s counsel expects to incur in reviewing Defendants’ opposition, drafting a reply, and preparing for and attending the instant hearing are unreasonable. (Defs.’ Opp. 10:12–11:5.) In reply, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that he actually spent “spent 7.8 hours drafting the instant Reply brief, this declaration, Objections to Evidence, and Reply Chart,” in excess of the anticipated $3,500.00 sought for these tasks. (Suppl. Castro Decl. ¶ 6.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to reduce the time incurred for these tasks.

iv.                Blockbilling

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s “counsels’ 3.60 block-billed hours cannot be separated. As such, it is impossible to evaluate the reasonableness or necessity of each task, or the time spent on each.” (Defs.’ Opp. 11:19–21.) The Court agrees that several of the entries constitute impermissible block-billing, and reduces those entries by 20 percent, for a total reduction of $393.90.

v.                   Clerical Tasks

Defendants argue that throughout the billing records, there are entries for clerical tasks that are considered overhead. Defendants challenge a total of 2.10 hours of Plaintiff’s attorney’s time spent on various tasks, including client communications, drafting process papers, receipt of filing confirmations, and court filings. (Id. at 6:7–7:4.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s billing statement reflects 0.7 hours (0.7 hours by NS) incurred for purely administrative tasks. (Ex. 18 to Shahian Decl.) The Court finds that the above fees were not reasonably incurred, and therefore reduces the fee demand for these associated tasks by 0.7 hours for a total reduction of $297.50.

3.      Multiplier

“Once the lodestar has been calculated, the second step is to apply any positive or negative multipliers. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351 [internal quotations omitted].) “Perhaps the most common multiplier applied, at least where a plaintiff prevails, is a modifier for the contingent nature of the representation.” (Ibid.) Whether a multiplier is applied to adjust the lodestar amount based on the contingent nature and risk associated with the action and other factors, such as degree of skill required and ultimate success achieved is within the discretion of the trial court.

Here, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to recover a 1.35 multiplier enhancement because his attorneys obtained a favorable outcome, counsel works on a contingency basis, and Defendant has delayed in payment of settlement monies. (Pls.’ Mot. 12:1–13:11.) Defendants argue in opposition that “here, this case lasted a little over eight months, and had very minimal motion practice. There was nothing novel or complex about this case, it involved no special skill or ability, and it did not result in an extraordinary award.” (Defs.’ Opp. 14:5–7.) Moreover, Defendants observe that “the Act contains a provision to recover attorneys’ fees, thus reducing the chance that Plaintiff’s counsel would not recover for its work.” (Id. at 13:13–14.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a multiplier enhancement is not warranted in this case. While Plaintiff ultimately prevailed, the action appears to have been a relatively straightforward Song-Beverly case. As such, the Court finds the lodestar fee award sufficient to compensate Plaintiff’s counsel.

4.      Costs Incurred

Plaintiff asserts that he incurred costs and expenses totaling $1,310.23. As Defendants observe, Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum of costs summarizing the costs incurred in this action. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has provided an itemized list of his costs, attached to the instant motion, and stating that the cost total encompasses: (1) $794.23 in electronic filing fees; (2) $156.00 in process server fees; (3) $330.00 in mediation fees; and (4) $30.00 in electronic service fees. (Ex. 18 to Shahian Decl., p. 2.) As such, the Court declines to reduce the cost award.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff $19,523.33 in attorney fees and costs, as outlined below:

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $19,523.33 in attorney fees and costs.