Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV00418, Date: 2023-07-11 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 23CHCV00418    Hearing Date: February 22, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

(Requests for Production of Documents, Set One)

Motion filed: 10/3/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Emmanuel Gutierrez-Munoz; Kevin Zaguilan; and Reyna Espino (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: A protective order, as proposed, applicable to Defendant’s documents produced in response to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. The Court enters the proposed protective order without Defendant’s modifications:

(1)   Requiring non-lawyer personnel to sign and execute Exhibit A to the protective order;

(2)   Removing Paragraph 7f. regarding mock jury participants from the protective order; and

(3)   All modifications to Paragraph 21 of the protective order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 7/14/19, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 15.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to structural, engine, brakes, interior, SRS, engine, transmission, and exterior.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed “to conform the Subject Vehicle to the express warranty, or to promptly issue restitution pursuant to the Song Beverly Act, [therefore] Defendant is in violation of the Song Beverly Act.”  (Id. at ¶ 22.)

On 2/15/23, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, alleging against the dealership and manufacturer defendants the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (3) Negligent Repair (against the dealership defendant). On 8/10/23, Plaintiffs filed their operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging the same causes of action against the same defendants.

On 5/3/23, Plaintiffs served their first set of Requests for Production of Documents on Defendant. (Decl. of Zachary Powell ¶ 3.) On 6/6/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 4.) On 9/29/23, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel further responses to their first set of RFPs.

On 10/3/23, Defendant filed the instant motion for a protective order. On 2/7/24, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 2/14/24, Defendant filed its reply.

ANALYSIS

When document requests have been propounded, the responding party may promptly move for a protective order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.060, subd. (a).) “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Id. at subd. (b).)

Here, Defendant “seeks the entry of a Protective Order to protect Ford’s confidential, proprietary and trade secret information and materials, which are the subject of certain discovery requests in this case. Plaintiffs do not dispute the need for a protective order; they only disagree over the form of the protective order that should be entered for use in this case.” (Def.’s Mot. 4:3–6.)

A.    Meet and Confer 

A motion for protective order must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.060, subd. (a); 2016.040.)

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that on 1/10/22, the parties began their meet and confer efforts regarding a proposed protective order. (Decl. of Hannah M. Biemann ¶ 3.) The parties continued their discussions but were unable to come to a resolution. (Id. at ¶¶ 3–6.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.090.

B.     Timeliness

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s motion should be denied because Defendant “failed to promptly move for a protective order.” (Pls.’ Opp. 3:8, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.060, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs argue that Defendant “unilaterally conditioned production of responsive documents on the entry of a protective order yet delayed in filing any motion.” (Id. at 3:11–12.)

On reply, Defendant observes that Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.060 “is not a mandate that a party ‘must’ or ‘shall’ move for protective order,” but that it may promptly do so. (Def.’s Reply 2:14–15.) The Court agrees. Defendant further notes that “‘the promptness of the request [for protective order] turns on the facts.’” (Id. at 2:16, quoting Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 317.) As Defendant observes, “here, Ford attempted to negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs’ counsel in an effort to reach agreement on a protective order.” (Id. at 2:18–19.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant motion is not untimely.

C.    Defendant’s Proposed Modifications

Defendant’s proposed protective order makes the following modifications to the Los Angeles Superior Court Model Protective Order:

·         “Paragraph 7: Ford’s revisions clarify sub-section (b), confirming that the term ‘affiliated attorneys’ mean attorneys in the same firm. Ford’s revision also provides that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office personnel who have access to Ford’s confidential documents must sign Exhibit A. Ford proposes a revision to sub-section (d) to include videographers and litigation support companies (along with court reporters), who may have access to Ford’s confidential documents by virtue of their retention in a case. Ford removed sub-section (f), which permitted mock jurors to access Ford’s confidential documents because Ford has no ability to identify such persons or ensure (or confirm) their compliance. Ford also revised sub-section (g) to include nonattorneys with experts, and to provide that Ford’s confidential documents may not be shown to competitors of Ford.

·         Paragraph 8: Ford’s revisions provide that the receiving party may not post Ford’s confidential documents to any website or advertise Ford’s documents for sale. These provisions are reasonable and necessary to protect Ford’s documents from improper dissemination.

·         Paragraph 21: Ford’s revisions clarify the process for Plaintiffs’ counsel to return or destroy Ford’s confidential documents at the conclusion of the case and require that all of Ford’s confidential documents be returned or destroyed when the case is over.” (Def.’s Mot. 6:25–7:15 [emphasis in original].)

Plaintiffs argue that the instant motion is unnecessary because “previously, Ford proposed and agreed to the model protective order in another case that was litigated between Plaintiffs’ counsel and Ford.” (Pl.’s Opp. 4:2–3.) Plaintiffs argue that therefore, “Ford does not provide good cause showing that the lack of additional modifications would cause any harm or prejudice to Ford.” (Id. at 4:11–12.)

However, as Defendant observes, “Plaintiffs’ claim that Ford previously agreed to the model protective order ‘in another case,’ in November of 2021, is immaterial.” (Def.’s Reply 3:11–12.) The Court agrees with Defendant that “whether Ford entered into a protective order in another case is governed by the facts of that particular case,” and is therefore not relevant to the Court’s below analysis of the instant motion. (Id. at 3:14–15.)

1.      Paragraph 7

a.       Affiliated Attorneys

“Ford’s revisions clarify sub-section (b) [of Paragraph 7], confirming that the term ‘affiliated attorneys’ mean attorneys in the same firm.” (Def.’s Mot. 6:25–26.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “this limitation could conceivably prevent Plaintiffs’ counsel from disclosing the documents to any other attorneys that serve as Plaintiffs’ co-counsel” or outside trial counsel. (Pls.’ Opp. 4:24–28.) “Plaintiffs’ co-counsel—whether in the same firm or not—should be permitted to use the documents subject to the terms of the LASC model protective order.” (Id. at 5:6–8.)

Defendant argues on reply that Plaintiffs’ concerns are moot because “any co-counsel is by definition counsel of record. If the attorneys are of record, then they are bound by the protective order as revised by Ford.” (Def.’s Reply 4:9–11.) Defendant further argues that the subject modification is necessary because “without further clarification, Ford’s documents could be shared with multiple attorneys who have no responsibility to protect Ford’s documents.” (Id. at 4:16–17.)

The Court agrees with Defendant and finds that the additional language does not prohibit the dissemination of the protected documents from Plaintiffs’ co-counsel or trial counsel, as they are considered “attorneys of record” within the scope of the protective order.

b.      Office Personnel

“Ford’s revision [to Paragraph 7] also provides that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office personnel who have access to Ford’s confidential documents must sign Exhibit A.” (Def.’s Mot. 6:26–28.) The form attached as Exhibit A to the proposed protective order appears to be an acknowledgment and confidentiality agreement. (Ex. G to Biemann Decl., Ex. A.)

Plaintiffs argue that “because the confidential documents would be stored within the individual case file and all litigation employees have access to cases [sic] files,” requiring each of the firm’s employees to sign the acknowledgment form would result in a burdensome “logistical nightmare.” (Pls.’ Opp. 5:16–21.) Plaintiffs further argue that “the protective order already provides that Plaintiffs’ counsel and the firm, as a whole, agree to be bound by the protective order. Ford gains no additional protection by then requiring all attorneys to sign the Exhibit A form.” (Id. at 6:2–4.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and finds that the burden of requiring every employee at Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm to sign the acknowledgment form is overly burdensome, particularly where the protective order already applies to “paralegals, clerical and secretarial staff employed by such attorneys who are actively involved in the Proceedings and are not employees of any Party.” (Ex. G to Biemann Decl.) Accordingly, the Court strikes the following language from Paragraph 7b. of the proposed protective order: “and required to execute Exhibit A agreeing to be bound by the terms of this protective order prior to disclosure.” (Ibid.)

c.       Mock Jurors

Defendant “removed mock jury participants from this list because Ford has no ability to confirm the identity of such persons or to track or trace their access if Ford’s documents were to become public because of disclosure in this case.” (Def.’s Mot. 9:15–18.)

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “the modifications would cause undue burden on Plaintiffs’ ability to prepare for trial if they wished to use mock jury participants.” (Pls.’ Opp. 7:7–9.) “The LASC model protective order requires that mock jury participants sign the Exhibit A attachment, which requires them to provide their address and telephone number. So it is unclear how Ford would be unable to identify these people if confidential materials were disclosed to them.” (Id. at 6:21–23.)

Defendant argues in opposition that mock jurors should be prohibited from accessing the subject documents because “Ford has no way to confirm the accuracy of their contact information if a problem arises.” (Def.’s Reply 5:7–8.) The Court finds this argument immaterial and agrees with Plaintiffs that restricting mock jury participants from accessing the confidential documents would improperly burden Plaintiffs’ ability to prepare their case for trial. Accordingly, the Court reincorporates the following language Defendant removed from Paragraph 7 of the proposed protective order: “f. mock jury participants, provided, however, that prior to the Disclosure of Confidential Materials to any such mock jury participant, counsel for the Party making the Disclosure shall deliver a copy of this Stipulation and Protective Order to such person, shall explain that such person is bound to follow the terms of such Order, and shall secure the signature of such person on a statement in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.” (Ex. G to Biemann Decl.)

2.      Paragraph 8

Paragraph 8 of the original protective order states the following: “Confidential Materials shall be used by the persons receiving them only for the purposes of preparing for, conducting, participating in the conduct of, and/or prosecuting and/or defending the Proceeding, and not for any business or other purpose whatsoever.” (Id. at ¶ 8 [emphasis added].) Defendant added language to this paragraph prohibiting the dissemination of the protected documents on any website, or by sale. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed language is unnecessary because “the LASC model protective order already provides that” the confidential materials shall not be used “for any business or other purpose whatsoever.” (Pls.’ Opp. 7:17–20, citing Ex. G to Biemann Decl., ¶ 8.) Defendant argues in reply that “Paragraph 8 does not address the posting of or sale of Ford confidential documents. As such, Ford’s revisions are necessary.” (Def.’s Reply 5:20–21.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s added language “does not inhibit Plaintiffs’ ability to litigate this matter in any way because it continues to allow for disclosure to counsel for use in this case and are necessary given Ford’s interest in protecting its confidential business and trade secret information from unfettered disclosure.” (Def.’s Mot. 7:16–19.)

3.      Paragraph 21

Defendant’s modifications to Paragraph 21 of the proposed protective order “require that all of Ford’s confidential documents be returned or destroyed when the case is over.” (Id. at 7:13–15.) Plaintiffs oppose this modification, arguing that “Plaintiffs’ counsel should be entitled to a complete copy of the case file. Because these documents would still be subject to the protective order, Ford cannot articulate any benefit that it obtains through this modification.” (Pls.’ Opp. 8:1–3.) Defendant argues in reply that “without this provision, Plaintiffs’ counsel can keep Ford’s confidential documents in perpetuity, which affords Ford no ability to track their location and use over time.” (Def.’s Reply 5:27–28.)

The Court finds that the language in the original Model Protective Order sufficiently provides for a procedure to return or destroy the confidential materials following the conclusion of the litigation. Any remaining documents may, upon, written request, be returned or destroyed, with the exception “that counsel for each Party may maintain in its files, in continuing compliance with the terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order, all work product, and one copy of each pleading filed with the Court.” (Ex. Ex. G to Biemann Decl., ¶ 21.) Because any remaining work product or pleading is still subject to the terms of the protective order, the Court finds that Defendant’s interests in its confidential materials are sufficiently protected.

Based on the foregoing, the Court strikes Defendant’s proposed modifications to Paragraph 21 of the protective order.

D.    Sanctions 

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order under this section, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2025.420, subd. (h), 2030.090, subd. (d), 2031.060, subd. (h).) Additionally, “the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Here, as the Court finds that neither party has succeeded in bringing or opposing the instant motion, the Court declines to impose monetary sanctions against either party.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted in part. The Court enters the proposed protective order without Defendant’s modifications:

(4)   Requiring non-lawyer personnel to sign and execute Exhibit A to the protective order;

(5)   Removing Paragraph 7f. regarding mock jury participants from the protective order; and

(6)   All modifications to Paragraph 21 of the protective order.

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 9/29/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Emmanuel Gutierrez-Munoz; Kevin Zaguilan; and Reyna Espino (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling further responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, specifically: Request Nos. 16, 19–29, and 31. Plaintiffs further request monetary sanctions to be imposed against Defendant and its counsel in the total amount of $2,865.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Request Nos. Request Nos. 16, 19–29, and 31 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $500.00.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 7/14/19, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 15.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to structural, engine, brakes, interior, SRS, engine, transmission, and exterior.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed “to conform the Subject Vehicle to the express warranty, or to promptly issue restitution pursuant to the Song Beverly Act, [therefore] Defendant is in violation of the Song Beverly Act.”  (Id. at ¶ 22.)

On 2/15/23, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, alleging against the dealership and manufacturer defendants the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (3) Negligent Repair (against the dealership defendant). On 8/10/23, Plaintiffs filed their operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging the same causes of action against the same defendants.

On 5/3/23, Plaintiffs served their first set of Requests for Production of Documents on Defendant. (Decl. of Zachary Powell ¶ 3.) On 6/6/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

On 9/29/23, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions to compel further responses to their first set of RFPs. On 1/24/24, Defendant filed its opposition. On 1/30/24, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) 

If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id., subd. (b).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a request for production if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant’s additional responses to Request Nos. 16, 19–29, and 31, arguing that Defendant’s objections thereto are without merit. The subject requests seek Defendant’s internal policies, procedures, and guidelines with respect to warranty claims and vehicle repurchasing under the Song-Beverly Act. (Ex. A to Powell Decl.)

A.    Meet and Confer 

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.) 

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that on 8/22/23, 9/8/23, 9/13/23, 9/14/23, and 9/21/23, counsel for both parties met and conferred regarding the issues set forth in the instant motions but were unable to come to a resolution. (Powell Decl. ¶¶ 5–10.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (b)(1) and 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).

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B.     Defendant’s Objections

Here, Defendant responded to the subject Requests with a statement of partial compliance, and partial objection “as seeking irrelevant documents, particularly because it is not limited to a reasonable or relevant timeframe, to any particular warranty claim at issue, to Plaintiffs, to the subject vehicle, or to any particular vehicle, and because there is no allegation regarding the warranty policy and procedure manuals in this case.” (Ex. B to Powell Decl.) “Ford further objects to this Request because it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine.” (Ibid.)

1.      Scope/Relevance

Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonable calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiffs argue that the “requests seeking documents evidencing Ford’s policies, procedures, and instructions are relevant because they would show whether Ford’s policies are meant to hinder consumers from seeking their statutory remedies, whether they comport with Ford’s duties under the Song-Beverly Act including whether they seek to provide an inferior remedy than Ford is required to provide, what criteria Ford uses for determining whether a vehicle qualifies for repurchase or replacement, or whether Ford has even enacted any policies or procedures for dealing with its affirmative obligations under the Act.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5:16–22.)

Defendant argues in opposition that “Plaintiffs also have failed to demonstrate that the documents they seek are relevant to their claims, much less good cause requiring Ford to produce information that has no relationship to the repairs performed on the subject vehicle.” (Def.’s Opp. 11:10–12.) Plaintiffs argue on reply that Defendant improperly and “unilaterally decided which documents it would produce without indicating that it is producing the whole universe of responsive documents. For some requests, it has unilaterally limited the years for which it is willing to produce responsive documents. Plaintiffs’ requests are already reasonably tailored to certain years to avoid undue burden on Ford.” (Pl.’s Reply 2:18–23.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may be based on the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiff’s is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiff in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s relevance objections to Plaintiffs’ Request Nos. 16, 19–29, and 31 are without merit.

2.      Privilege

“If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (c)(1).)

Here, Defendant objected to the subject document requests on the bases of attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. However, as Plaintiff observes, Defendant’s responses do not mention any factual information supporting its claims of privilege, nor has Defendant produced a privilege log. (Pl.’s Mot. 7:20–23.) Plaintiff therefore argues that “Ford’s privilege and privacy objections should be overruled or Ford should be compelled to provide a privilege log for each of those responses.” (Id. at 8:1–3.)

Defendant argues in opposition that “because Plaintiffs’ Requests are so broad that they implicate information protected from discovery by the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine, Ford properly objected on this basis.” (Def.’s Opp. 13:13–15.) However, as Plaintiffs observe on reply, “because Ford failed to produce a declaration supporting these claims of privilege or a privilege log, Ford’s objections are insufficient.” (Pl.’s Reply 3:11–13.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that to the extent that Defendant intends to withhold any responsive documents on the basis of any privilege, Defendant is ordered to produce a privilege log providing further details.

C.    Protective Order

In its responses to the subject requests, Defendant agreed to produce certain responsive documents subject to a protective order. Plaintiffs assert that “Ford has failed to move for the entry of a protective order and cannot unilaterally condition production of responsive documents on a protective order.” (Pl.’s Mot. 8:16–18.) On 10/3/23, after Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel, Defendant filed its motion for protective order. Defendant contends that “the documents identified by Ford contain Ford’s sensitive, confidential, and proprietary information.” (Def.’s Opp. 12:9–11.)

            See Court’s Tentative Ruling regarding the Protective Order dated February 21, 2024.

D.    Sanctions 

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).) 

Here, Plaintiffs request sanctions in the total amount of $2,865.00 to be imposed on Defendant and its counsel. This amount includes: (1) 2.6 hours of Plaintiffs’ attorney’s time working on this motion, at his hourly billing rate of $425.00 per hour; (2) an anticipated 2 hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition and drafting a reply; (3) an anticipated 2 hours preparing for and attending the instant hearing; and (4) a $60.00 filing fee. (Powell Decl. ¶¶ 12–14.) Defendant argues in opposition that it acted with substantial justification in objecting to the overbroad requests. (Def.’s Opp. 14:14–18.)

In denying the instant motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiffs sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $500.00.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Request Nos. Request Nos. 16, 19–29, and 31 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $500.00.