Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV00710, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23CHCV00710 Hearing Date: April 12, 2024 Dept: F51
APRIL 11,
2024
MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER
DISCOVERY RESPONSES
(Special
Interrogatories, Set One)
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 23CHCV00710
Motions
filed: 11/13/23
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants
IComfort Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.; and Luis Anthony Juarez-Vasquez,
Jr. (collectively, “Defendants”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiffs
Omar Amezquita; and Mario Efrain Pineda Juarez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF
REQUESTED: Orders
compelling each Plaintiff’s further responses to Defendants’ Special
Interrogatories, Set One, Interrogatory No. 11, within 20 days. Defendants
further request monetary sanctions to be imposed against Plaintiffs and their counsel
in the total amount of $1,560.80.
TENTATIVE
RULING: The
motions are denied. The Court imposes $200.00
in monetary sanctions against Defendants and/or their counsel.
BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiffs allege
that on 6/1/21, they were injured in an automobile collision caused by
defendant Luis Anthony Juarez-Vasquez, Jr., who was driving a vehicle owned and
operated by defendant IComfort Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.
(“IComfort”) within the scope of his employment with IComfort. (Compl. p. 4.)
On 3/10/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging
against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence;
and (2) General Negligence. On 7/11/23, Defendants filed their answer thereto.
On 7/12/23, Defendants served their first set of Special
Interrogatories on Plaintiffs. (Decl. of El Mahdi Young ¶ 3.) On 9/13/23, Plaintiffs
served their responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
On 11/13/23, Defendants filed the instant motions to compel further
responses to their first set of Special Interrogatories. On 3/28/24, Plaintiffs
filed their oppositions. On 4/3/24, Defendants filed their reply.
ANALYSIS
“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded
shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of
the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be
discovered; (2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings; or (3)
An objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.210,
subd. (a).) “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete
and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding
party permits.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.220.) “If an objection is made to an
interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the
objection shall be set forth clearly in the response. If an objection is based
on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be clearly
stated.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.240, subd. (b).)
A propounding party may move for an order compelling
further responses to interrogatories if any of the following apply: “(1) An
answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise
of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the
required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) An objection to
an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300,
subd. (a).)
Here, Defendants seek to
compel Plaintiffs’ additional responses to Special Interrogatory No. 11, arguing that Plaintiffs’ relevance objections thereto are
without merit.
A.
Meet and Confer
A motion to compel further interrogatory
responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an
informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§
2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2016.040.)
Here, Defendants’ counsel declares
that on 10/20/23, 11/2/23, and 11/7/23, counsel for both parties met and
conferred regarding the issues set forth in the instant motion but were unable
to come to a resolution. (Young Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, 8.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel
has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil
Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (b)(1).
B. Scope/Relevance
Discovery is relevant if it
is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may
relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other
party to the action.” (Ibid.)
Patients have a right to privacy in their medical
information under the California Constitution, although this right is not
absolute. Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the California
constitutional right to privacy when the invasion is justified by a competing
interest. (Fett v. Medical Bd. of Cal. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 211, 221.)
Matters that would otherwise be protected by the constitutional right to
privacy are discoverable only if they are directly relevant to the plaintiff's
claim and essential to a fair resolution of the action. (Vinson v. Superior
Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)
A party seeking access to
constitutionally protected information has the burden of proving direct
relevance. (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.)
“Even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the
issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must
then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against
the fundamental right of privacy.” (Id. at 1014.) “The scope of any
disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and
must proceed by the least intrusive manner.” (Ibid.)
Here, Defendants’ Special Interrogatory
No. 11 asks each Plaintiff to “state the name, address and telephone
number of your regular personal physician and/or health care provider and/or
primary health care provider for the past fifteen years.” (Defs.’ Sep. Stmt. 2:3–5.)
Plaintiffs’ responses set
forth a number of objections, including that “this interrogatory seeks
to discovery Plaintiff’s medical history and/or treatment which is completely
unrelated to the issues in this litigation in violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutionally protected right to privacy.” (Id. at 2:13–15.) “The
requested records are beyond the permissible scope of discovery in this matter
as they are neither relevant nor likely to lead to the discovery of relevant
information. Discovery and investigation are ongoing. Plaintiff reserves the
right to amend, supplement, or augment this response at a later time.” (Id. at
3:1–4.)
Defendants argue that a further response is warranted
because “the information sought is relevant and discoverable as plaintiff is
asserting personal injury and medical care as a result of those injuries, and
as such, has placed his medical history at issue.” (Pl.’s Mot. 4:26–28.) “Determining
who plaintiff’s primary care provider leads to discoverable information given
that whether or not plaintiff sought treatment from this medical provider would
be relevant. Moreover, determining whether plaintiff complained of any residual
pain or if plaintiff treated for similar injuries prior to the incident are
also all relevant information.” (Id. at 4:28–5:4.)
Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Special
Interrogatory No. 11 is overly broad because “by way of this motion, Defendants
seek to force Plaintiff to disclose every ‘regular doctor’ – as vague as the
description may be – that Plaintiff has sought the past 15 years without any
limitation. Based upon Defendants’ interpretation, Plaintiff should be forced
to disclose every specialist or other doctors who he may have seen ‘regularly’
for concerns that are completely unrelated to the injuries and conditions placed
at issue in this lawsuit.” (Pl.’s Opp. 4:24–5:1, citing Hallendorf v.
Superior Court (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 553.)
In Hallendorf, the Court of Appeal held that
the trial court’s order requiring a personal injury plaintiff to disclose his
entire lifetime medical history was overbroad because it was not limited to the
medical condition that the plaintiff had put in issue. (85 Cal.App.3d at 557.)
Here, Plaintiffs assert that the interrogatory is similarly overbroad because
each “Plaintiff never treated with his primary care provider, for the injuries
or for the body parts at issue in this case, and Plaintiff does not want others,
including Defendants and their counsel, to know which doctors he’s been
treating with outside this context. It is private medical information which the
law affords him the right to maintain.” (Id. at 5:23–27.) To this
extent, “Plaintiff has responded to Form Interrogatories, Series 10.0,
attesting that he has not seen prior related injuries, including his ‘regular
personal physician,’ for any injuries that are placed at issue in this lawsuit
as evidenced in response to Form Interrogatories, Series 6.0.” (Id. at
5:20–23.)
Defendants argue in reply that they are nevertheless “entitled
to the information sought as it is proper to seek the identity of plaintiff’s
primary care provider regardless of whether there are prior injuries or not, in
this personal injury matter, where plaintiff is putting plaintiff’s health at
issue. Plaintiff is asserting personal injury and medical care as part of the
damages in this case, and as such, has placed plaintiff’s medical history at
issue.” (Defs.’ Reply 1:28–2:4.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs
that the subject interrogatory, as written, is overly broad in scope, as it is
not reasonably limited to the injuries at issue in this litigation,
particularly where Plaintiffs assert in other discovery responses that they
were not treated by their primary healthcare provider(s) for the subject
injuries. Accordingly, the Court sustains Plaintiffs’ objections thereto and
denies Defendants’ motion to compel Plaintiffs’ further responses to Defendants’
Special Interrogatory No. 11.
C.
Sanctions
“The court shall impose a
monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully
makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it
finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification
or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code
Civ. Proc. § 2030.290, subd. (c).)
Here, as the Court denies
the instant motions, the Court finds it reasonable to impose $200.00 in
monetary sanctions against Defendants and/or their counsel.
CONCLUSION
The motions are denied. The Court imposes $200.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendants and/or
their counsel.
The Court is not requesting oral argument on
this matter. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1)
notice of intent to appear is required. Unless the Court directs argument
in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies
all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the
hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue. “The tentative
ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”
Notice may be given either by email at CHAdeptF51@LACourt.org or by
telephone at (818) 407-2233.