Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV00897, Date: 2023-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00897    Hearing Date: September 29, 2023    Dept: F51

MOTION TO ADVANCE HEARING DATE

Motion Filed: 9/6/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendants/Cross-Complainants Aju Philips and Rini Jose (collectively, “Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Daniel Blumel (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order advancing the hearing date for Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, set for 11/28/23, to this date, or to a date as early as the matter may be heard.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are sustained.

Defendants are reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Moreover, “the document must be text searchable when technologically feasible without impairment of the document's image.” (CRC 2.256(b)(3).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

On 9/6/23, Defendants filed the instant motion. On 9/15/23, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 9/21/23, Defendants filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

A.    Legal Authority

Defendants bring the instant motion under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1335. (Defs.’ Mot. 2:1–2.) This rule states that “a party seeking to advance, specially set, or reset a case for trial must make this request by noticed motion or ex parte application under the rules in chapter 4 of this division.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1335(a).)

As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that this Court Rule unambiguously relates to a motion to advance a case for trial and is silent as to a party’s right to bring a motion to advance a hearing date for a motion for preliminary injunction. (Pl.’s Opp. 5:9–12.) The Court notes that Defendants do not address this argument in their reply. Notwithstanding this procedural deficiency, the Court also denies the instant motion for the reasons set forth below.

B.     Reissuance of Building Permit

Defendants argue that the hearing should be advanced because the City of Santa Clarita (the “City”) has since reissued an amended building permit to Defendants, allowing for the construction of an ADU encompassing the entire accessory building. (Defs.’ Mot. 6:15–18.) “Based thereon, Defendants contend that Plaintiff no longer has any need to conduct depositions or investigations regarding any previous ADU as, even if there ever had been a previous ADU on the property.” (Id. at 6:22–24.) Defendants reason that “Plaintiff’s argument that the existence of a previous ADU has become moot. Whether or not an ADU had previously existed in the structure makes no difference. The entire structure has now been permitted as a single ADU.” (Id. at 7:16–18.)

Plaintiff argues in opposition that “none of this changes the fact that Defendants have an existing ADU on their property which they concealed from the City, and the proposed ADU would be a second ADU in violation of the applicable code sections.” (Pl.’s Opp. 2:24–27.) “Defendants assert without citation to any legal authority that the modified plans and permit for the proposed ADU moots Plaintiff’s argument that an ADU already exists on Defendants’ property.” (Id. at 8:3–5.) The Court agrees and declines to decide at this stage that the reissuance of a building permit for a proposed ADU effectively moots Plaintiff’s need for additional discovery.

The Court acknowledges Defendants’ assertion that they “have been delayed in their project to their cost and damage, and to make them wait months more to complete their project, for now no good reason, is not reasonable.” (Defs.’ Mot. 6:28–7:2.) Nevertheless, absent any legal authority that the issuance of a building permit for an ADU effectively moots the need to investigate whether an illegal ADU previously existed in the same building, there is no basis to advance the hearing date on this ground. Accordingly, the motion is denied on this basis.

C.    Equitable Estoppel

Here, Plaintiff cites to principles of equitable estoppel to argue that “the Court should not allow Defendants to unwind a stipulation that they asked for and Plaintiff relied upon.” (Pl.’s Opp. 1:11–12.) “Defendants now bring the instant Motion in an effort to prevent Plaintiff from conducting the Court-authorized discovery that would prove that this permit, like the one before it, was issued based on Defendants’ concealments and misrepresentations to the City.” (Id. at 2:19–21.)

“Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.” (Evid. Code § 623.) “The doctrine [of equitable estoppel] … operates to prevent one from taking an unfair advantage of another but not to give an unfair advantage to one seeking to invoke the doctrine.” (Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632, 636.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that not only did Defendants request the continuance of the relevant deposition and hearing dates, but “Defendants ‘induced’ the Plaintiff into believing that the hearing date on the Application would go forward on the stipulated date of November 28, 2023, following the completion of depositions and supplemental briefing.” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:19–21.) “Now that they have benefited from the continuance of the hearing date on the Application that they requested, they seek to completely change course and ask this Court to now advance the hearing date. Defendants are taking unfair advantage of the additional time allowed to them by the Stipulation to first seek a revised permit, then cancel the deposition of Defendant Aju Philips, and now to advance the hearing date on the Application.” (Id. at 7:11–15.)

The Court agrees, and notes that Defendants do not address this issue on reply. Instead, Defendants assert that Plaintiff is “completely confused as to what is being built.” (Defs.’ Reply 2:19.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants are estopped from bringing the instant motion to advance the stipulated 11/28/23 hearing date. Accordingly, the motion is denied on this basis.

CONCLUSION 

The motion is denied.