Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV01080, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01080    Hearing Date: February 9, 2024    Dept: F51

DEMURRER

Demurrer Filed: 9/29/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Raymundo Galvan, Sr. (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Edgar Galvan (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant demurs against Plaintiff’s entire first amended complaint (“FAC”).

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, and sustained as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action with 30 days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND 

This is a quiet title action in which Plaintiff alleges that in October 2013, he entered into an oral agreement with Defendant, his father, “that the subject property located at 14316 Raven Street, Sylmar, CA 91342 (“Property”) would be purchased in Defendant’s name, given Plaintiff’s poor credit score, but that despite being in Defendant’s name, would be considered to be Plaintiff’s house for all purposes.” (FAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that the parties “agreed that Plaintiff would live in the Property, would pay the Property’s taxes, mortgage and all other costs associated with owning a Property.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges “that Defendant would not be responsible for any of the costs or expenses given that it would merely be in his name for Title purposes.” (Ibid.) “However, just recently, in December 2022, Plaintiff was suddenly told by Defendant that he needs to vacate the Property as Defendant intends to sell it.” (Id. at ¶ 24.)

On 4/13/23, Plaintiff filed his original complaint against Defendant, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Fraudulent/Intentional Misrepresentation; (4) False Promise; and (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. On 08/25/23, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), adding a cause of action for Quiet Title against Defendant.

On 9/29/23, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC. On 1/29/24, Plaintiff filed his opposition. No reply has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer based on any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

Here, Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s entire FAC on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege facts to constitute any of the causes of action contained therein.

A.    Meet and Confer

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that on 9/18/23, 9/20/23, 9/28/23, and 9/29/23, he attempted to contact Plaintiff’s counsel to meet and confer regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer, but the parties were unable to come to an informal resolution. (Decl. of Wilfred Trivino-Perez ¶¶ 4–5.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

B.     Quiet Title

An action for quiet title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) In an action for quiet title, Plaintiff must plead (1) “[a] description of the property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,” (3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

Here, Defendant argues that “this cause of action is devoid of the required information to constitute a valid cause of action.” (Dem. 9:13.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that the “FAC describes the subject Property to be ‘located at 14316 Raven Street, Sylmar, CA 91342’ (FAC, ¶ 12), and describes in detail the method of vesting of title to the Plaintiff (FAC, ¶¶ 13-23), the adverse claims to Plaintiff’s title (id.), and further identifies October 2013 as the approximate month/year at which time Plaintiff bought the subject Property from his aunt and took on all financial and non-financial responsibilities related to owning said Property.” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:4–8, citing FAC ¶¶ 12–23.)

Upon review of the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the description of the subject property, that the title thereto vested to Plaintiff, and Defendant’s adverse claims to Plaintiff’s title. (FAC ¶¶ 12–23.) The Court notes that Defendant failed to file a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Quiet Title. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is overruled.

C.    Breach of Contract

The second cause of action in Plaintiff’s FAC alleges Breach of Contract against Defendant. To state this cause of action, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “allegations are simply insufficient to describe the alleged agreement at issue and fail to constitute a valid cause of action.” (Dem. 10:17–19.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that the requisite elements are pled in paragraphs 28, 30, 32, and 33 of the FAC, where Plaintiff alleges that “in or around October 2013, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral agreement and agreed amongst themselves that the subject Property would stay in Defendant’s name, given Plaintiff’s poor credit score, but that despite being in Defendant’s name, would be considered to be Plaintiff’s house for all purposes.” (FAC ¶ 28.) “During the entire time in question, Plaintiff paid all taxes, utilities, maintenance and any other costs associated with the subject Property. … Additionally, Plaintiff has continuously exercised 100% ownership of the subject Property since the date of acquisition.” (Id. at ¶¶ 32–33.) “In December 2022, close to ten years after the oral contract had been entered into between the parties, Plaintiff was suddenly told by Defendant that he needs to vacate the Property as Defendant intends to sell it, breaching the oral agreement between the parties” and causing Plaintiff harm. (Id. at ¶¶ 40–41.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to satisfy each element constituting a cause of action for Breach of Contract.

1.      Statute of Frauds

An oral agreement made “for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein” is invalid absent a written and signed “note or memorandum thereof.” (Civ. Code § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) “No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by the party’s lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1971.)

Here, Defendant argues that “any oral agreement of rightful ownership to Plaintiff was invalid because such an agreement would have to be in writing pursuant to the statute of frauds.” (Dem. 10:2–3.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that “exceptions to the Statute of Frauds exist here and Defendant is equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds. Moreover, the part performance exception also applies here.” (Pl.’s Opp. 7:7–8.)

“The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would result from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract, or in the unjust enrichment that would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other's performance were allowed to rely upon the statute.” (Monarco v. Lo Greco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623–624 [internal citations omitted].)

Part performance of an agreement takes the agreement out of the statute of frauds, at least in part, for purposes of equitable enforcement of the agreement. (Matheron v. Ramina Corp. (1920) 49 Cal.App. 690, 694.) Part performance is founded in estoppel and looks to estoppel principles for its application. (Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422.) “Under the doctrine of part performance, the oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property is enforced when the buyer has taken possession of the property and either makes a full or partial payment of the purchase price, or makes valuable and substantial improvements on the property, in reliance on the oral agreement.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that “Defendant is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of frauds defense, because Plaintiff made valuable and substantial improvements to the Property, made mortgage payments each month on the Property, made $30,000 in late mortgage payments that the prior owner had not paid to the bank and was behind on, paid all taxes and insurance costs on the Property, . . . etc., all based solely on the oral contract for the sale of the Property.” (Pl.’s Opp. 7:19–23, citing FAC ¶ 39.) Plaintiff further argues that “as Plaintiff performed the part of the contract that he was obligated to do, the Court must deem the oral agreement between the parties enforceable.” (Id. at 8:13–14, citing FAC ¶ 58.)

The Court agrees, and finds that as outlined above, Plaintiff has alleged facts to support exceptions to the statute of frauds based on both doctrines of estoppel and part performance. The Court again notes that Defendant failed to offer a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Breach of Contract against Defendant. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is overruled.

D.    Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges against Defendant a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything to interfere with the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement. (Howard v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498, 528.) The precise nature and extent of the duty depends on the nature and purpose of the underlying contract and the parties’ legitimate expectations arising from the contract. (Ibid.) “A breach of the implied covenant of good faith is a breach of the contract … and breach of a specific provision of the contract is not … necessary to a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1244.)

However, “if the allegations [of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing] do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that by breaching the oral agreement between the parties, “Defendant’s conduct has prevented Plaintiff from receiving the benefits under the agreement. In engaging in the conduct abovementioned, Defendant did not act fairly and in good faith.” (FAC ¶ 47.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails because “plaintiff has once again mirrored the same conduct that Plaintiff claims constitutes a breach of contract in the context of the Second Cause of Action.” (Dem. 10:27–28.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that “Defendant’s actions in trying to evict Plaintiff from his own Property, and the need to file the subject lawsuit, has certainly injured Plaintiff from fully receiving the benefits of the agreement.” (Pl.’s Opp. 8:28–9:2.)

Upon review of the FAC, the Court finds that the underlying factual allegations relied upon in Plaintiff’s third of action are identical those alleged in his second cause of action for Breach of Contract. (FAC ¶¶ 37–40, 43–47.) Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action.

E.     Fraudulent/Intentional Misrepresentation; False Promise

Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action respectively allege Fraudulent/Intentional Misrepresentation and False Promise against Defendant. “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civ. Code § 1709.) The elements that must be pleaded in a cause of action for fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of its falsity (or “scienter”); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 347, 363.) Fairness requires that allegations of fraud be pled “with particularity” so that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions before a defendant is required to answer. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that in October 2013, “Defendant made false representations to Plaintiff that the Property would stay in Defendant’s name, given Plaintiff’s poor credit score, but that despite being in Defendant’s name, would be considered to be Plaintiff’s house for all purposes” (FAC ¶¶ 20, 49.) Plaintiff further alleges “when Defendant made the representations that it [sic] understood that it [sic] did not have any right in the ownership of the Property, he knew that the representations were false when they were made, or that these representations were being made recklessly and without regard for its truth.” (Id. at ¶ 51.) “Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendant’s representations and has been making all mortgage payments, as well as all other costs associated with owning the subject Property since an Agreement was entered into,” and was thereby harmed by Defendant’s alleged false representations. (Id. at ¶¶ 53–54.)

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has not alleged with specificity, detail and free from ambiguity. Moreover, he has failed to assert any factual allegations with sufficient detail, including the substance of misrepresentation.” (Dem. 13:16–19.) Based on the factual allegations, the Court disagrees, and finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts with sufficient particularity to constitute causes of action for Fraudulent/Intentional Misrepresentation and False Promise against Defendant. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action.

F.     Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges Defendant Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. “The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) A mere allegation that a plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering incurred as a result of the defendant's alleged outrageous conduct, does not state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Pitman v. City of Oakland (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047–1048.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct as alleged above, including but not limited to telling Plaintiff that Plaintiff was the owner of the subject Property and that Defendant understood that he had no legal right to it, therefore inducing Plaintiff to pay all mortgage payments, tax payments, and all other related costs necessitated by the ownership of the Property as he was under the assumption that he owned the Property, only to be told that he had to leave his house and his Property would be sold.” (FAC ¶ 68.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant, without Plaintiff’s knowledge, “made deceitful statements to Plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend making her believe that Plaintiff no longer wished to have her on the title of his Property” while she was a co-title holder to the subject property. (Ibid.) “As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, extreme mental anguish, embarrassment, extreme emotional and physical distress and has suffered sleeplessness, anxiety, headaches, depression and other physical discomforts.” (Id. at ¶ 66.)

Defendant argues that “here, Plaintiffs’ [sic] allegations are insufficient to show outrageous conduct or the required intent. Rather, the allegations appear to be in the vein of a breach of contract that was alleged to have taken place resulting in economic damages.” (Dem. 14:15–17.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that he sufficiently alleged Defendant’s outrageous conduct by alleging that “Plaintiff purchased a home and complied with all of his obligations, including making mortgage payment, taking care of the Property, paying its taxes and other costs, etc. only to be told that he has no right in the Property and must vacate it. Statements made by not a stranger, but rather his own father.” (Pl.’s Opp. 11:4–6.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that at the demurrer stage, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendant. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action.

G.    Leave to Amend

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that “to the extent that the Court considers any of Defendant’s arguments to be viable, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the FAC in order to plead additional facts in support of his allegations.” (Pl.’s Opp. 11:27–28.) The Court further notes that this is the first demurrer heard against Plaintiff’s operative complaint. Accordingly, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days leave to amend his FAC to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is cautioned that “following an order sustaining a demurrer … with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. … The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.)

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, and sustained as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action with 30 days leave to amend.