Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV01244, Date: 2024-07-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01244    Hearing Date: July 9, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motion Filed: 4/17/24                                                                               JURY TRIAL: 8/5/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Christopher Johnson; and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (collectively, “Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Maryam Haidari (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 5/29/22, while riding her bicycle, she was injured in a collision with Defendant Johnson’s vehicle at the intersection of Oso Avenue and Saticoy Street, Los Angeles, California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at the time of the subject collision. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.)

On 4/28/23, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging a sole cause of action for Negligence. On 6/27/23, Defendants filed their answers.

On 4/17/24, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 6/25/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 7/3/23, Defendants filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381–382.) 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519–1520.)  

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

A.    Evidentiary Objections

The court has reviewed the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties. While all objections have been considered, due to their extensive nature, the Court will not address each objection individually in this tentative ruling. Instead, the Court's analysis will focus on the substance of the objections raised and their relevance to the determination of the motion at hand.

B.     Negligence

Plaintiff’s sole cause of action against Defendants is Negligence. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

Here, Defendants argue that they “are not liable to Plaintiff under a Motor Vehicle Negligence theory because it is Plaintiff who caused the incident as a matter of law by running a red light and driving on the wrong side of the roadway, and Defendant Johnson, in stark contrast, drove through the intersection pursuant to a green light after looking both ways, exercising due care.” (MSJ 8:14–17.) Defendants contend that Johnson, exercising due care in driving through the intersection, was legally stopped at his red stoplight, and when the light turned green, saw that the intersection was clear to proceed through, and only first saw Plaintiff at the moment just before impact. (Id. at 4:12–16, 5:6–9.)

1.      Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence

Defendants argue that Plaintiff ran a red light, on the wrong side of the roadway, as corroborated by four independent third party witnesses and the police report. (MSJ 10:6–11:14.) Defendants therefore contend that “Plaintiff’s act of running a red light caused the impact, which caused Plaintiff’s physical injuries. Had Plaintiff not run a red light, she would not have been in the roadway with oncoming traffic coming towards her, and no impact or injury would have occurred.” (Id. at 11:16–19.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “in comparative negligence cases (such as this one), a plaintiff’s purported negligence cannot, as a matter of law, obliviate Defendant’s own negligence.” (Pl.’s Opp. 1:8–9.) Plaintiff further asserts that “this case presents material factual disputes that must necessarily be decided by a jury to appropriately apportion liability: (1) whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe Plaintiff in the crosswalk and (2) whether Plaintiff had the right of way under Vehicle Code § 21451.” (Id. at 6:4–7.)

“Courts are very reluctant to uphold a summary judgment in comparative negligence cases. … Ordinarily, issues of negligence are jury questions and the court may rarely decide comparative negligence questions without submitting them to the jury. … In short, negligence is a question of fact if different conclusions can be rationally drawn from the evidence.” (Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 186 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

Plaintiff argues that “whether or not a vehicle with a green light [has the right of way] depends upon whether another vehicle or pedestrian was lawfully in the intersection previously.” (Pl.’s Opp. 7:24–26, citing Veh. Code § 21451, subd. (a); People v. Hahn (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d Supp. 841, 843–844; Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 459.) Here, Plaintiff proffers her own deposition testimony, and an expert declaration (albeit lacking foundation in many areas) and surveillance camera footage purporting to show that Plaintiff began crossing the intersection during her green light, while Defendant was stopped at his red light, turned around to retrieve a sweater she had dropped, before again proceeding to cross the intersection while her light was still green. (Ex. 1 to Decl. of Colleen M. Mullen, 52:20–56:9; Exs. 4–10 to Decl. of Jon B. Landerville, MSME, P.E.)

Plaintiff therefore contends that “here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff, who lawfully entered the intersection with a green light, had the right of way pursuant to Vehicle Code § 21451(a).” (Pl.’s Opp. 8:4–5.) The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to Plaintiff’s own potential comparative negligence, as different conclusions as to whether Plaintiff ran a red light can be rationally drawn from the evidence.

2.      Defendant’s Breach of the Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care

“The general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of one’s activities … indisputably applies to the operation of a motor vehicle.” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) Here, Defendants argue that Johnson exercised reasonable care at all relevant times as he drove through the intersection. (MSJ 12:16–19.) Defendants support their contentions with Johnson’s deposition testimony, third-party witness declarations, and LAPD Officer Solis’ deposition testimony.

In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that “it is for the jury to decide whether the reliance upon another’s due care is reasonable.” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:23–24, citing Hendricks v. Pappas (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 774, 778.) Plaintiff argues that “here, there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe and account for Plaintiff crossing the intersection when he had a green light.” (Id. at 6:27–28.) Plaintiff asserts that there was nothing obstructing Defendant’s field of vision, and thus his view of the intersection, through which Plaintiff was crossing prior to the collision. (Id. at 7:1–3.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff proffers the deposition testimony of both Johnson and LAPD Officer Solis, and her expert’s declaration. Plaintiff argues that “under these circumstances, a jury may find that Defendant Johnson’s negligence – in failing to observe Plaintiff for over ten seconds in the crosswalk directly in front of him – rather than Plaintiff’s purported negligence in continuing to cross an intersection she lawfully entered caused Plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id. at 9:22–25.)

The Court agrees. While Defendants dispute the credibility of Plaintiff’s expert declaration, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue exists as to whether Johnson breached his duty of reasonable care, and likewise whether his conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

C.    Vicarious Liability

“An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees committed within the course or scope of their employment.” (Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 138–139.) As the Court finds that triable issues exist as to the nature and degree of each party’s comparative negligence, and the parties have not raised any issues regarding whether Johnson’s conduct was committed within the scope of his employment, it finds that a triable issue remains as to whether JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is vicariously liable for Johnson’s conduct.

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied.