Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV01357, Date: 2024-03-01 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV01357    Hearing Date: March 1, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 10/10/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Freddy Alvarez; and Kathy Alvarez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order striking Defendant’s objections and

compelling further responses, within 10 days, to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 1, 3, 7, 17, 23–25, 37–45, 50–53, 58–59, 68, 76, 78–79, 86, and 91–94. Plaintiffs also request monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $3,160.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Request Nos. 1, 3, 7, 17, 23–25, 37–45, 50–53, 58–59, 68, 76, 78–79, 86, and 91–94 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $790.00.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS: Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections are overruled.

Plaintiffs are reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 3/23/21, which was manufactured and distributed by Defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that “defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, engine defects; suspension defects; transmission defects; among other defects and non-conformities,” but “Defendant GM has failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.” (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 15.)

On 5/9/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; and (5) Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. On 6/9/23, Defendant filed its answer.

On 6/29/23, Plaintiffs served their Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, on Defendant. (Decl. of Rosario Stoliker, ¶ 18.) On 7/28/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 20.) On 9/15/23, the parties entered into a Stipulated Protective Order regarding documents designated as confidential.

On 10/10/23, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel further responses to their Requests for Production, Set One. On 2/16/24, Defendant filed its opposition. On 2/26/24, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard 

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) 

If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id., subd. (b).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete”; “(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive”; or “(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) 

Here, Plaintiffs seek to compel additional responses to their first set of RFPs, specifically to request Nos. 1, 3, 7, 17, 23–25, 37–45, 50–53, 58–59, 68, 76, 78–79, 86, and 91–94, which relate to “Defendant’s internal investigation and analysis of the Defects plaguing Plaintiffs’ vehicle.” (Pl.’s Not., 1:22–23.) Plaintiffs argue that the motion is warranted because Defendant unjustifiably failed to respond to the requests as written and made meritless, boilerplate objections thereto.

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A.    Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.) 

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that beginning on 6/29/23, she began meeting and conferring with Defendant’s counsel regarding raising the issues in the instant motion. (Stoliker Decl., ¶ 26.) The parties further discussed these issues on 7/6/23, 9/14/23, 10/4/23, 10/9/23, and 10/10/23, but were unable to come to an informal resolution. (Id. at ¶¶ 27–33.) While the parties each dispute the good-faith nature of opposing counsel’s meet and confer efforts, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). 

B.     Defendant’s Objections

Here, Plaintiffs argue, in part, that Defendant’s objections to their first set of RFPs are without merit. (Pl.’s Mot. 10:15–17; Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) Defendant objected to each request at issue as follows: 

“GM objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited to the issues in this action. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. GM further objects this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine.”

(Exhibit 6 to Stoliker Decl.) 

a.                   Scope/Relevance 

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant’s objections to the subject RFPs on the basis that they seek irrelevant matter are meritless because “the information and documents sought show whether and the extent to which the Subject Vehicle failed to conform to the applicable warranties and whether Defendant knew or should have known of the alleged defects and its inability to repair them.” (Pl.’s Mot. 2:8–10.) Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.) 

Here, the RFPs at issue seek “whether: (1) the Subject Vehicle suffered from a defect; (2) its internal testing and investigation GM could repair it to conform to warranty within a reasonable number of opportunities; (3) GM provided its repair facilities with sufficient literature and parts to complete repairs during the warranty period; (4) GM knew it could not repair the Subject Vehicle but refused to repurchase it nonetheless; and (5) GM knew prior to Plaintiffs’ acquisition of the Subject Vehicle that the vehicle and its Transmission as well as its component parts are defective and susceptible to sudden, premature, and catastrophic failure.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5:15–21.)

Plaintiffs argue that “the requested documents are relevant to the issues related to GM’s good faith compliance with the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, including the breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.” (Pl.’s Mot. 13:17–19.) “Plaintiffs’ requests here are targeted to elicit admissible evidence of similar prior instances of prohibited conduct,” and “seek documents relating to GM’s internal investigation and analysis of the Transmission Defects plaguing the Subject Vehicle, establishing that GM previously knew of such Defects but nevertheless refused to repurchase the Subject Vehicle.” (Id. at 14:2–4, 15:5–7.)

Defendant argues in opposition that “documents about other vehicles or the design of the Camaro are irrelevant to the pending claims.” (Def.’s Opp. 7:4–5.) “This breach of warranty case is about Plaintiffs’ Camaro and repairs to that Camaro under warranty. GM will produce all of the documents relevant to Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims. GM maintains its objections that documents about other vehicles, complaints from or by other consumers, or the design of specific component systems or parts are not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim that GM failed to repair their Camaro within a reasonable number of attempts.” (Id. at 5:25–6:2 [emphasis in original].) Defendant maintains that the RFPs which seek documents pertaining to vehicles other than Plaintiff’s “go well-beyond the handling of Plaintiffs’ specific claims and are not specifically-tailored to the claims and defenses at issue in this individual case.” (Id. at 8:20–21.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have provided sufficient facts to establish the requisite good cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may be based on the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiffs’ is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiffs in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects. While the cases relied on by Plaintiff (i.e., Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967) may not involve the exact circumstance before this Court, they are sufficient to show that the requested information could itself be admissible or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s relevance objections to the subject RFPs are without merit.

b.                   Undue Burden

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant’s objections to their first set of RFPs on the basis that they are unduly burdensome and oppressive are meritless without any additional showing of any such undue burden or oppression. (Pl.’s Mot., 11:2–7.) The party objecting to a discovery request on this basis bears the burden of supplying evidence of “the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) 

“If a party objects to the discovery of electronically stored information on the grounds that it is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense and that the responding party will not search the source in the absence of an agreement with the demanding party or court order, the responding party shall identify in its response the types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that it asserts are not reasonably accessible. By objecting and identifying information of a type or category of source or sources that are not reasonably accessible, the responding party preserves any objections it may have relating to that electronically stored information.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (d) [emphasis added].)

In opposition, Defendant observes that Plaintiffs have propounded 308 discovery requests, and Defendant has already produced various requested documents in response to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs. (Def.’s Opp. 1:4–22.) However, the Court notes that Defendant has not supplied evidence to show the “quantum of work required” to respond in full to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, nor has Defendant stated the categories of sources of ESI that are not reasonably accessible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to the requests to the extent that they are unduly burdensome or oppressive are without adequate support and agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant has waived any objections it may assert relating to ESI.

c.                   Trade Secrets 

Defendant objected to the subject RFPs to the extent that each request “seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information.” (Ex. 6 to Stoliker Decl.) Evidence Code § 1060 provides that the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret and to prevent others from disclosing it, unless allowing the privilege will conceal fraud or result in injustice. A party that is claiming the trade secret privilege has the burden of proving the party's entitlement to that privilege. (Amgen Inc. v California Correctional Health Care Servs. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 733.)

“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civ. Code § 3426.1, subd. (d).)

Here, Defendant argues that “the documents Plaintiffs seek may relate to and contain confidential communications between GM employees and GM’s suppliers and/or sub-suppliers concerning technical, mechanical, and commercial issues and analyses.” (Def.’s Opp. 10:15–17.) “Because the wholesale disclosure of GM’s internal, confidential materials would cause GM competitive harm, GM should not be compelled to produce any additional documents without Plaintiffs having satisfied his heightened burden to show why he needs the documents in this breach of warranty case, which Plaintiffs have not done.” (Id. at 11:7–10.)

In support of its argument, Defendant offers the sworn declaration of Huizhen Lu, a Senior Manager/Technical Consultant of Engineering Analysis employed with Defendant, attesting that the documents sought may include, “design specifications, evaluations, and performance analysis relative to specifications, material selection, cost, and quality. Such information is not generally available to the public. GM LLC derives value from this information’s confidentiality and would be harmed by the loss of confidentiality. Consequently, GM LLC makes considerable effort to keep this information confidential.” (Ex. A to Decl. of Ryan Kay, ¶ 11.)

The Court notes that the parties have already stipulated to a protective order, which would protect against the disclosure of any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information. Moreover, Plaintiffs filed 35 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Huizhen Lu, primarily arguing that the witness fails to state that she reviewed the specific documents requested by Plaintiff, instead declaring only that she is familiar with the general type of documents sought in these types of cases.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown adequate cause why the specific documents requested by Plaintiffs are protected trade secrets. Further, any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information may be adequately protected by the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order entered on 9/15/23.

C.    Sanctions 

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).) 

Here, Plaintiffs request sanctions in the total amount of $3,160.00 to be imposed on Defendant and/or its counsel. This amount includes 8 hours of Plaintiffs’ attorney’s time working on this motion, at her hourly billing rate of $395.00 per hour. (Stoliker Decl. ¶ 43.) Defendant argues in opposition that it acted with substantial justification in objecting to the overbroad requests. (Def.’s Opp. 12:13–14.)

In granting the instant motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff sanctions against Defendant and in the amount of $790.00.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Request Nos. 1, 3, 7, 17, 23–25, 37–45, 50–53, 58–59, 68, 76, 78–79, 86, and 91–94 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $790.00.