Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 23CHCV01382, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251. Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

JANUARY 27, 2025

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV01382

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Diana Glasgow; Cole Robert Sliwoski; and Amy Marie Sliwoski (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Christopher Eric Reichel, in pro per (“Defendant”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: Plaintiffs demur to Defendant’s entire second amended cross-complaint (“SAXC”).

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled and the motion to strike is denied. Plaintiffs to file their answer to Defendant’s SAXC within 20 days.

Despite having been previously warned to comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” set forth in the 5/13/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil, Plaintiffs’ counsel has again failed to number each page of the demurrer. (8/26/24 Min. Order, p. 1.) “Each page must be numbered consecutively at the bottom unless a rule provides otherwise for a particular type of document.” (CRC 2.109.)

Accordingly, the Court imposes $100.00 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel payable to the Court within 45 days. In the future, the Court will refuse to consider papers which do not comply with the foregoing requirements.

This is a property dispute in which Plaintiffs, a mother and her two children, allege that plaintiff Diana Glasgow, and Defendant, her close friend, agreed to move into a home located at 22579 Seaver Court, Santa Clarita, California 91350 “with a mutual understanding that both parties would contribute towards the mortgage and maintenance of the premises.” (Compl. ¶¶ 10–11.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant continually harassed Glasgow, and on 7/18/22, Defendant served Glasgow with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit, alleging a nonpayment of rent, although no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Defendant allegedly continued to accept mortgage payments before filing an unlawful detainer action against Glasgow on 8/2/22. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs further allege that several rooms on the premises were not in compliance with building codes, thereby causing Plaintiffs harm. (Id. at ¶¶ 25–27.) On 3/8/23, Plaintiffs vacated the property. (Id. at ¶ 21.)

On 5/10/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Oral Agreement; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Negligence; (4) Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud); (5) Accounting; (6) Conversion; (7) Declaratory Relief; (8) Americans with Disabilities; (9) California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act; (10) California’s Disabled Persons Act; (11) Constructive Trust; and (12) Quiet Title.

On 12/1/23, after the Court partially sustained Plaintiffs’ demurrer against the cross-complaint, Defendant filed his FAXC, alleging against Plaintiffs the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Oral Agreement; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Negligence; (4) Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud); and (5) Conversion. On his form FAXC, Defendant also indicated that he is alleging causes of action for Indemnification, Apportionment of Fault, and Declaratory Relief.

On 9/24/24, after the Court sustained Plaintiffs’ demurrer against Defendant’s first cause of action with leave to amend, Defendant filed his SAXC, alleging against Plaintiffs the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Oral Agreement; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud); and (4) Conversion. On his form SAXC, Defendant also indicated that he is alleging causes of action for Indemnification, Apportionment of Fault, and Declaratory Relief.

On 10/15/24, Plaintiffs filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against Defendant’s SAXC. On 10/21/24, Defendant filed his opposition. On 1/21/25, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿However, a “court cannot by means of judicial notice convert a demurrer into an incomplete evidentiary hearing in which the demurring party can present documentary evidence and the opposing party is bound by what that evidence appears to show.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp., 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114–115.)

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Here, Plaintiffs demur to Defendant’s entire SAXC, arguing that Defendant fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any of the causes of action therein.

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that he called and emailed Defendant in an attempt to meet and confer regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer. (Decl. of Akabi Danielian ¶ 4.) The Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

Defendant’s first cause of action against Plaintiffs alleges Breach of Oral Agreement. To state this cause of action, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Here, in sustaining Plaintiffs’ previous demurrer against this cause of action, the Court found that “Defendant has not sufficiently alleged any damages stemming from Plaintiffs’ alleged breach of the parties’ 3/30/21 oral agreement, and therefore has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action for Breach of Oral Contract.” (8/26/24 Min. Order, p. 6.)

In response, Defendant amended the pleading to add the following allegation: “Cross-Complainant was detrimentally harmed as Cross Complainant relied on the oral contract and prior statements made by Cross-Defendant Diana Glasgow to pay an amount of $1500.00 per month to Cross Complainant for the use of three bedrooms and shared bathroom by the Cross Defendants along with full use of the house and property.” (Add. to SAXC, ¶ 45.) Defendant further alleges that Plaintiffs’ conduct in breaching of the alleged oral agreement, and the litigation that followed, “ran up Cross Complainant[’s] credit card bills and all but eliminated any safety net the Cross Complainant had started with when purchasing the home.” (Ibid.)

As in their previous demurrers, Plaintiffs again argue that “there is no support for [Defendant’s] claim that the Cross-Defendants breached the alleged agreement nor what damages Cross-Plaintiff has suffered.” (Dem. 8:24–9:1.)[1] Plaintiffs again repeat their previous arguments that Defendant has no supporting documentation to support his allegations, and that he has misrepresented the facts of the case. (Id. at 9:3–10.) Once again, Plaintiffs then dispute the facts alleged by adding their own factual allegations. (Id. at 9:11–10:3.)

As the Court previously twice ruled against these identical arguments, “to the extent that Plaintiffs intend to argue the merits of the case by way of their demurrer, this tactic is improper at the demurrer stage. … in a demurrer proceeding, the Court is to assume the truth of properly pleaded factual allegations. (10/16/23 Min. Order, p. 4, citing E-Fab, Inc., 153 Cal.App.4th at 1315; see also 8/26/24 Min. Order, p. 6.)

Based on the foregoing amendment, the Court finds that Defendant has alleged facts sufficient to support a cause of action for Breach of Oral Contract. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Defendant’s first cause of action.

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant defied this Court’s orders by asserting his second, third, and fourth causes of action for (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud); and (4) Conversion. However, as Defendant observes, “the [previous] hearings were ‘Demurrer Hearings’ and thus rulings of sustained or overruled were directed towards the objections raised in the Demurrer of the Amended Cross Complaint and NOT the Amended Cross Complaint itself.” (Def.’s Opp. 7:21–24.)

It appears to the Court that Plaintiffs’ counsel is unfamiliar with the fundamentals of demurrer proceedings, confusing the Court’s previous orders overruling Plaintiffs’ previous demurrer against the subject causes of action. Plaintiffs’ counsel mischaracterizes the prior orders as judgments and misinterprets the rulings as striking the subject causes of action from the cross-complaint. (Dem. 8:3–16.) The Court directs Plaintiffs to its previous findings that Defendant has alleged facts sufficient to constitute his causes of action for (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud); and (4) Conversion. (8/26/24 Min. Order, pp. 6–9.)

Defendant argues that “the filing of the Demurrer and the motion to strike must be viewed as frivolous and intentionally designed to delay the legal process in violation of CCP 128.7 (b).” (Def.’s Opp. 8:19–21.) However, the Court notes that “a motion for sanctions under this section shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b).” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).)

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ demurrer and denies Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the entire SAXC.

The demurrer is overruled and the motion to strike is denied. Plaintiffs to file their answer to Defendant’s SAXC within 20 days.

[1] As noted above, Plaintiffs have again failed to paginate their demurrer. As such, the Court references the document’s page numbers in accordance with the total number of pages in the e-filing.