Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV01623, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01623    Hearing Date: April 10, 2024    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51¿¿ 

Date: 4/10/24 

Case #23CHCV01623

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

DEMURRER

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Demurrer filed: 11/1/23

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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Danielle Mae Longboy (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Deokja O; and Sehong O (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

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RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs’ entire first amended complaint (“FAC).

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TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled. Defendant to file and serve her answer to Plaintiffs’ FAC within 30 days.

BACKGROUND¿ 

This is a quiet title action in which Plaintiffs, a married couple and parents to defaulted defendant Heasuk O, allege that Defendant and Heasuk (collectively, “Defendants”) were in a romantic relationship together since 2004. (FAC ¶¶ 4, 7, 14.) On 9/20/13, Plaintiffs purchased the subject property, located at 10973 Beckford Ave., Northridge, CA 91326, for which they paid the down payment, and all mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance until 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 21–22.)

Plaintiffs allege that on 9/18/18, they transferred ownership of the subject property to Defendants, “as husband and wife, as community property with right of survivorship” with the expectation that the two would get married. (Id. at ¶¶ 25–26.) However, Defendants ended their romantic relationship in 2023 and signed a private settlement agreement stating, in relevant part, that Defendants “currently hold title in the Beckford Residence as HEASUK O and DANIELLE MAE LONGBOY, as husband and wife as community property with the right of survivorship. The Parties shall sign a corrective grant deed as tenants in common.” (Id. at ¶¶ 32–33, citing Ex. 6 to FAC.)

On 6/2/23, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Cancellation of Instruments; and (2) Quiet Title. On 10/2/23, Plaintiffs filed their FAC, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Cancellation of Instruments; (2) Constructive Trust; (3) Quiet Title; (4) Slander of Title; (5) Partition by Sale and Accounting. On 9/29/23, default was entered against Heasuk.

On 11/1/23, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On 3/22/24, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. No reply has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

Here, Defendant¿demurs to Plaintiffs’ entire FAC on the basis that Plaintiffs fail¿to allege facts sufficient any of the causes of action contained therein.

A.    Meet-and-Confer

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares on 10/24/23, he emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter discussing the issues raised in the instant demurrer, (Decl. of Omar Gastelum ¶ 3.) On 10/27/23, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by email, but the parties were unable to come to a resolution. (Ibid.) Therefore, counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

B.     Cancellation of Instruments

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action seeks to void the 9/18/18 Grant Deed from Plaintiffs to Defendants. (FAC ¶ 47.) A “written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.” (Civ. Code § 3412.)¿“To prevail on a claim to cancel an instrument, a plaintiff must prove (1) the instrument is void or voidable due to, for example, fraud, and (2) there is a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alternation of one's position.” (Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 294.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that the grant deed contained a condition precedent to the transfer of title from Plaintiffs to Defendants, namely that Defendants were to take ownership has “‘husband and wife’ … Plaintiffs never imagined - nor were they adequately informed of the possibility - that DEFENDANTS would have claim to the Property without completing their part of the bargain or receiving anything in return for their investment.” (FAC ¶¶ 37–40.)

Defendant argues that “here, the Deed transferring title of the Property to Defendant was not void or voidable, and at the time of the transfer, Plaintiffs were well aware that Defendant and Heasuk were not married and had no plans to get married.” (Dem. 6:16–18.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “the fact that Defendants were not and have never been married is unquestioned. Rather, the heart of the issue is: the validity of the 2018 Deed” and the parties’ intent at the time of execution. (Pls.’ Opp. 4:20–21.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs, and notes that in a demurrer proceeding, the Court assumes the truth of a plaintiff’s properly pled factual allegations. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that they “made a sizeable investment to purchase the property and never intended to freely relinquish control of the Property,” and that “transfer of the Property from Plaintiffs … to Defendant HEASUK O and Defendant DANIELLE MAE LONGBOY was intended to take place upon the marriage of” Defendants. (FAC ¶¶ 39, 42.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action is overruled.

C.    Constructive Trust

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action against Defendant alleges Constructive Trust. “One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.” (Civ. Code § 2224.)  “The case law explains that in order to create a constructive trust as defined in section 2224, three conditions must be satisfied: the existence of a res (property or some interest in the property); the plaintiff’s right to that res; and the defendant’s acquisition of the res by some wrongful act.” (Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1402.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that “DEFENDANTS were aware that PLAINTIFFS never intended to fully relinquish the rights to the Property and considered it part of their financial portfolio,” and that “both Defendant Danielle and Heasuk colluded during their private mediation to wrongfully claim Plaintiffs[’] property.” (FAC ¶ 51; Pls.’ Opp. 5:13–14, citing Ex. 6 to Compl.)

Defendant argues that “here, Defendant’s acquisition of the property is not wrongful by any means. Plaintiffs voluntarily gave the Property to her and Heasuk.” (Dem. 7:12–14.) Again, the Court finds that Defendant misinterprets the standard on demurrer and that Plaintiffs’ properly pled factual allegations state that Plaintiffs conditioned the transfer of title to the subject property to Defendants on the condition precedent that Defendants got married. (FAC ¶¶ 37–40.) Plaintiffs therefore contend that as Defendants ended their romantic relationship instead of getting married, they can no longer become the owners of the subject property and title rescinds to Plaintiffs. (FAC ¶¶ 42–43.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Constructive Trust. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is overruled.

D.    Quiet Title

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action against Defendant alleges Quiet Title. An action for quiet title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) In an action for quiet title, a plaintiff must plead (1) “[a] description of the property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,” (3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they “seek judicial declaration that they have a superior claim and hold title to the [subject] Property over the claims of the Defendants,” because the unmarried Defendants “cannot hold title as ‘Community Property’ or ‘husband and wife.’” (FAC ¶¶ 59, 62.) Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs are not currently on title to the Property. As such, this cause of action fails.” (Dem. 8:3.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that they have sufficiently alleged that they “seek to invalidate the most recent Deed as never fully delivered and executed due to Defendants’ failure to perform.” (Pls.’ Opp. 6:2–3.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and finds that based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Quiet Title. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is overruled.

E.     Slander of Title

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action alleges against Defendant Slander of Title. “The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are ‘(1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss.’” (RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 433, fn. 14.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ malicious attempts at circumventing the Court and normal Quiet Title Process is evident by their Settlement Agreement,” which states in relevant part that Defendants “currently hold title in the Beckford Residence as HEASUK O and DANIELLE MAE LONGBOY, as husband and wife as community property with the right of survivorship. The Parties shall sign a corrective grant deed as tenants in common.” (FAC ¶ 67; Ex. 6 to FAC.) Plaintiffs further allege that “the property cannot be sold due to this Cloud on the Title,” and that they “have incurred expenses in order to clear title to the Property.” (FAC ¶¶ 68–69.)

Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs executed the Grant Deed transferring ownership of the Property to Defendant and Heasuk, and Plaintiffs have not suffered direct or immediate pecuniary loss since title has remained in the names of Defendant and Heasuk for the last five years.” (Dem. 8:10–13.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “this, ignores the more than $425,000.00 (four-hundred and twenty-five thousand dollar) down-payment on the property and 5 years of mortgage and tax payments by the Plaintiffs, as well as, the increase in property value.” (Pls.’ Opp. 6:13–16.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and notes that Plaintiffs’ factual allegations dispute whether the 2018 grant deed did in fact transfer ownership of the subject property to Defendants.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Slander of Title. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is overruled.

F.     Partition by Sale and Accounting

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action alleges against Defendant Partition by Sale and Accounting. “A co-owner of property has an absolute right to partition unless barred by a valid waiver.” (LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 872.710, subd. (b).)

Defendant argues that “here, Plaintiffs are not owners of the Property; therefore, this cause of action fails.” (Dem. 8:20.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “ownership rests on the determination of the validity of the 2018 Deed, which is currently at issue.” (Pls.’ Opp. 7:2–3.) The Court agrees, and finds that at the demurrer stage, and as outlined above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they are entitled to seek a partition by sale of the subject property. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is overruled.

The Court takes note of the parties’ arguments concerning the return of property in anticipation of marriage pursuant to Civil Code section 1590. To the extent that Plaintiffs intend for this to be a separate cause of action in their FAC, it has not properly been alleged as such. Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the parties’ arguments as to this issue.

CONCLUSION¿ 

The demurrer is overruled. Defendant to file and serve her answer to Plaintiffs’ FAC within 30 days.