Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV01623, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV01623    Hearing Date: February 19, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

DEMURRER

Demurrer filed: 12/6/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Deokja O; and Sehong O (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Danielle Mae Longboy (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Plaintiffs demur to Defendants’ entire first amended cross-complaint (“FAXC”).

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled as to Defendant’s third and sixth causes of action and sustained as to Defendant’s second and fourth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND 

This is a quiet title action in which Plaintiffs, a married couple and parents to defaulted defendant/cross-defendant Heasuk O, allege that Defendant and Heasuk (collectively, “Defendants”) were in a romantic relationship together since 2004. (FAC ¶¶ 4, 7, 14.) On 9/20/13, Plaintiffs purchased the subject property, located at 10973 Beckford Ave., Northridge, CA 91326, for which they paid the down payment, and all mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance until 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 21–22.)

Plaintiffs allege that on 9/18/18, they transferred ownership of the subject property to Defendants, “as husband and wife, as community property with right of survivorship” with the expectation that the two would get married. (Id. at ¶¶ 25–26.) However, Defendants ended their romantic relationship in 2023 and signed a private settlement agreement stating, in relevant part, that Defendants “currently hold title in the Beckford Residence as HEASUK O and DANIELLE MAE LONGBOY, as husband and wife as community property with the right of survivorship. The Parties shall sign a corrective grant deed as tenants in common.” (Id. at ¶¶ 32–33, citing Ex. 6 to FAC.)

On 6/2/23, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Cancellation of Instruments; and (2) Quiet Title. On 10/2/23, Plaintiffs filed their FAC, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Cancellation of Instruments; (2) Constructive Trust; (3) Quiet Title; (4) Slander of Title; (5) Partition by Sale and Accounting. On 9/29/23, default was entered against Heasuk.

On 5/10/24, Defendant filed her answer and cross-complaint, alleging against Plaintiffs and Heasuk the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Quiet Title; (3) Fraud; (4) Enforcement of Settlement Agreement; (5) Indemnification; and (6) Declaratory Relief.[1] On 11/7/24, after the Court sustained Plaintiffs’ demurrer against the cross-complaint, Defendant filed her FAXC, alleging the same causes of action.

On 12/6/24, Plaintiffs filed the instant demurrer. On 2/4/25, Defendant filed her opposition. On 2/10/25, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the pleading’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the pleading, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

Here, Plaintiffs demur to Defendant’s entire FAXC on the basis that Defendant fails¿to allege facts sufficient any of the causes of action alleged against Plaintiffs.

A.    Meet-and-Confer

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Plaintiffs do not submit any declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts with Defendant. Therefore, the Court finds that the parties failed to sufficiently meet and confer. Nevertheless, “a determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Id. at subd. (a)(4).)

B.     Breach of Contract

Defendant’s second cause of action alleges against Plaintiffs a Breach of Contract. To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) A written contract may be pleaded either verbatim or generally “according to its legal intendment and effect.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198–199.) “An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Here, Defendant has amended her cross-complaint to add the following allegation: “In or about 2018, Deokja and Sehong entered into an agreement with Danielle and Heasuk based on the following terms: Deokja and Sehong would transfer ownership of the Property to Danielle and Heasuk, Danielle and Heasuk would pay off the loan on the Property in the name of Deokja and Sehong, and would then pay all costs associated with the Property upon the change in ownership.” (FAXC ¶ 24.) Defendant further alleges that Plaintiffs “breached the contract with Danielle by filing the instant action and seeking adverse claims to title after Cross-Complainant fulfilled all of her obligations to the agreement.” (Id. at ¶ 30.)

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant “fails to identify the contract and the specific terms. The only reference to a contract is vague and conclusory, alleging that Cross-Defendants ‘agreed to transfer ownership of the Property’ without identifying the terms, conditions, or scope of the alleged agreement.” (Dem. 5:23–26.) As such, “Cross-Complainant does not allege any acts or omissions by Cross-Defendants that would constitute a breach under the purported agreement.” (Id. at 6:9–10.)

Defendant maintains that the terms of the agreement are adequately alleged. (Opp. 6:14–17.) Plaintiffs argue in reply that Defendant fails to allege whether the purported agreement was written or oral, noting that “any agreement for the transfer of real property must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. The FACC fails to identify any written contract apart from the 2018 Grant Deed.” (Reply 5:8–10.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant has failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Breach of Contract. Accordingly, the demurrer to Defendant’s second cause of action is sustained.

C.    Quiet Title

Defendant’s third cause of action alleges Quiet Title against Plaintiffs. An action for quiet title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) In an action for quiet title, a plaintiff/cross-complainant must plead (1) “[a] description of the property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,” (3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

Here, the Court sustained Plaintiffs’ previous demurrer to Defendant’s third cause of action to provide Defendant an opportunity to correct the address of the subject property in the cross-complaint. As Defendant has now alleged the correct address of the subject property in her FAXC, the Court finds that Defendant has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Quiet Title. Accordingly, the demurrer to Defendant’s third cause of action is overruled.

D.    Fraud

Defendant’s fourth cause of action alleges Fraud against Plaintiffs. “The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact.” (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.)  The particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Here, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs “falsely stated that the Danielle and Heasuk would be the sole owners of the Property.” (FAXC ¶ 46.) “By filing the instant action, it’s clear that Deokja and Sehong never intended to give the Property to Danielle, despite the fact that she and Heasuk obtained a loan to relieve Deokja and Sehong of the obligation, made the property payments and repairs on the Property.” (Ibid.) “The above fraudulent representations were a material inducement for Cross-Complainant to make the Property a home for Heasuk and their minor children.” (Id. at ¶ 47.)

Plaintiffs argue that “Cross-Complainant does not allege any specific statements made by Cross-Defendants that were knowingly false at the time they were made. Instead, the fraud claim merely asserts that Cross-Defendants ‘never intended’ to honor their alleged agreement.” (Dem. 8:16–18.) “Cross-Complainant’s fraud allegations amount to nothing more than a claim that Cross-Defendants failed to perform their alleged contractual obligations, which is insufficient to establish fraud.” (Id. at 9:1–2, citing Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30–31.)

In opposition, Defendant does not address Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant’s fraud cause of action is duplicative of her breach of contract cause of action. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Fraud. Accordingly, the demurrer to Defendant’s fourth cause of action is sustained.

E.     Declaratory Relief

Defendant’s sixth cause of action alleges Declaratory Relief against Plaintiffs. “To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.)

The Court previously overruled the demurrer against Defendant’s Declaratory Relief cause of action. (10/9/24 Min. Order.) The Court finds that Defendant has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Declaratory Relief. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Defendant’s sixth cause of action.

F.     Leave to Amend

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Here, the Court notes that Defendant requests leave to amend in the event the Court sustains the demurrer as to any of her causes of action. (Opp. 11:2–15.) Therefore, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, Defendant is granted 30 days leave to amend the complaint to cure the defects set forth above.

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled as to Defendant’s third and sixth causes of action and sustained as to Defendant’s second and fourth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend.