Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 23CHCV02040, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251. Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

FEBRUARY 16, 2024

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Prince Hospitality, LLC, dba Homewood Suites Santa Clarita; and Lawrence Barr (collectively, “Defendants”)

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action, and sustained as to Plaintiff’s second and sixth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend.

This is wrongful eviction action in which Plaintiff alleges that she, “her two minor children, and one adult child have resided at 28700 Newhall Ranch Rd., Room 103, Santa Clarita, CA 91355 (hereinafter, ‘the unit’) for more than eighteen (18) months.” (Compl. ¶ 8.) Defendant Prince Hospitality LLC owns and operates the subject property, and defendant Lawrence Barr is employed by Prince Hospitality. (Id. at ¶¶ 3–4, 7.) Plaintiff alleges that on 6/16/23 and 6/22/23, she was unlawfully locked out of her unit, with her personal property removed therefrom. (Id. at ¶¶ 9–17.)

On 7/13/23, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Landlord Self Help; (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Wrongful/Constructive Eviction; (4) Conversion; (5) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On 10/2/23, Defendants filed the instant demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint. On 2/6/23, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 2/13/24, Defendants filed their reply.[1]

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and is uncertain, meaning “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Here, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s entire complaint on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege facts to constitute any of the causes of action contained therein, therefore the complaint is fatally uncertain.

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Defendants’ counsel declares that on 9/14/23, he and Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred telephonically to discuss the issues raised in the instant demurrer, but the parties were unable to come to an informal resolution. (Decl. of Matthew Arnold ¶ 2.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges against Defendants Landlord Self Help in violation of Civil Code section 789.3. “A landlord shall not, with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his or her residence, willfully: (1) Prevent the tenant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks or using a bootlock or by any other similar method or device; (2) Remove outside doors or windows; or (3) Remove from the premises the tenant’s personal property, the furnishings, or any other items without the prior written consent of the tenant, except when done pursuant to the procedure set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1980) of Title 5 of Part 4 of Division 3.” (Civ. Code § 789.3, subd. (b).)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants have willfully prevented Plaintiff from gaining reasonable access to the unit through their actions, including but not limited to deactivating Plaintiff’s key card and removing Plaintiff’s personal property from the unit. … Defendants took said actions with the intent to illegally terminate Plaintiff’s tenancy, as prohibited by Civil Code Section 789.3, and without resorting to the unlawful detainer process available under California law.” (Compl. ¶¶ 19–20.) Plaintiff further alleges that she “has suffered and continues to suffer general damages, emotional harm, and economic loss, all to her general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but no less than $100,000.” (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Defendants argue on demurrer that the subject property is a hotel and not an apartment, therefore Plaintiff cannot invoke the protections of the relevant landlord-tenant laws. Defendants therefore contend that “Plaintiff’s Complaint fails where Defendants[’] alleged Self-help violation is not actionable.” (Dem. 4:12–13.) “Plaintiff states that she is a tenant of the property and should be judged under tenant/landlord statutes when she should in fact be judged under guest/innkeeper laws.” (Id. at 1:3–5.) Defendants further contend that “Plaintiff currently owes Defendants in excess of $20,000.” (Id. at 1:10.)

Plaintiff argues in opposition that “Defendants misconstrue the standard for a demurrer throughout the Memo, staking their claims on extrinsic facts not currently before the Court. Defendants attempt to make much of the allegation that Plaintiff owes a balance of unpaid fees. But Defendants have not answered or asserted counterclaims; no such balance is pleaded in Plaintiff’s complaint, so it has no bearing on Defendants’ Demurrer.” (Pl.’s Opp. 2:7–11.) “Additionally, an exemption based on Section 1940(b)(2) of the Civil Code (“Section 1940(b)(2)”) requires a factual analysis of the services allegedly provided by the Defendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not admit that such services were provided; Section 1940(b)(2) therefore does not provide Defendants with a ground for demurrer.” (Id. at 4:14–17.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff, and notes that at the demurrer stage, its analysis is limited to the facts as alleged in the complaint and matters judicially noticeable. Here, neither party has submitted a request for judicial notice. (Cal Rules of Ct., rule 3.1113(l).) Furthermore, as Plaintiff observes, nowhere in her complaint does she allege that Defendants operate as a hotel within the definition of Civil Code section 1940, subdivision (b)(2) so as to exempt the parties from landlord-tenant laws. The Court notes that Defendants concede that Plaintiff “carefully avoids acknowledging that she was in a hotel and not an apartment.” (Dem. 2:1.)

The Court therefore declines Defendants’ invitation to consider extrinsic facts improper for determination at the demurrer stage. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, and that Defendants engaged in self-help in violation of Civil Code section 789.3. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is overruled.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges against Defendants a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment. The elements of a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are: (1) a lease agreement between plaintiff and defendant; (2) absence of language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession; (3) act or omission of the landlord, or anyone claiming under the landlord, which “substantially interfere[s] with a tenant[’]s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy”; and (4) an applicable remedy. (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588–591.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “through the actions described above, including but not limited to locking Plaintiff out of the subject premises, Defendants have violated Plaintiff’s right to quiet enjoyment. … As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct detailed herein, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer general damages, emotional harm, and economic loss, all to her general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but no less than $100,000.” (Compl. ¶¶ 26–27.)

Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient because this cause of action applies to landlord-tenant relationships only.” (Dem. 5:27–28.) As the Court notes above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she was a tenant at Defendants’ property. However, upon review of the complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to allege any lease agreement between the parties, let alone the absence of language contrary to the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Andrews, 125 Cal.App.4th at 588–591.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Breach of Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment against Defendants. Accordingly, the demurrer against Plaintiff’s second cause of action is sustained.

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges against Defendants Wrongful/Constructive Eviction. “California recognizes the tort of wrongful eviction. … A tenant who is wrongfully evicted by his landlord before the expiration of the lease term may maintain a wrongful eviction action for tort damages and punitive damages, if appropriate.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 293–294.) A cause of action of action for wrongful eviction requires a showing of two elements: (1) plaintiff’s peaceable possession; and (2) defendants’ forcible entry. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1039.) Additionally, “an essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises.” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 900.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she has resided at the subject property for over 18 months, and that “on or about June 16, 2023, Defendants wrongfully evicted Plaintiff by deactivating her key card and removing her personal property from the unit.” (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 30.) As of 6/22/23, “Plaintiff was unable to gain access to the unit.” (Id. at ¶ 17.)

Defendants argue that “California courts have long recognized that hotel guests do not have a possessory interest in their hotel rooms.” (Dem. 6:12–13, citing Erwin v. City of San Diego (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 213, 217.) The Court again notes that this argument relies on facts not properly before this Court at the demurrer stage. Here, the Court is satisfied that the above factual allegations satisfy the requisite elements of a tort cause of action for Wrongful Eviction. Accordingly, the demurrer against Plaintiff’s third cause of action is overruled.

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges against Defendants Conversion. “Conversion is generally described as the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, willfully and without the consent of Plaintiff, deprived Plaintiff of the possession and prevented her from accessing said [personal] property by removing it from the unit and storing it in an unknown location under the exclusive control of Defendants.” (Compl. ¶ 35.) “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct complained of herein, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but no less than $10,000.” (Id. at ¶ 36.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “was a hotel guest not a tenant, and therefore she has no right to store her property in an unpaid hotel room if she is not going to pay the daily room charges owed. When the hotel staff finally cleaned the room after plaintiff had not been to the room in over two weeks, the hotel staff finally entering the unit in June 2023 and removed her few personal items to a secure and safe storage unit, consistent with the duties as an innkeeper.” (Dem. 7:21–25.) Defendants further contend that “Plaintiff cannot allege any cognizable damages. Ms. Johnson’s few personal items were moved to a secure location on the property for her to pick up. She was able (and is still able) to pick up those items whenever she wished.” (Id. at 7:26–28.)

The Court again finds that Defendants’ arguments rely on extrinsic facts improper for determination at the demurrer stage. Here, as shown above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she has suffered damages resulting from Defendants’ removal of her personal property from the unit. Accordingly, the demurrer against Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is overruled.

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges against Defendants Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. “The negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence. The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply. Whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law.” (Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 213.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to not interfere with the tenancy in her peaceable possession. Defendants breached that duty [by locking her out of her unit and removing her personal property] and as a foreseeable, direct and proximate result, Plaintiff suffered mental and emotional anguish.” (Compl. ¶¶ 10–17, 39.) On demurrer, Defendants again rely on facts extrinsic to the four corners of Plaintiff’s complaint and any matters judicially noticeable to attack the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations rather than the factual sufficiency of the complaint itself. Based on the foregoing factual allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendants. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is overruled.

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges against Defendants Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. “The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) A mere allegation that a plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering incurred because of the defendant's alleged outrageous conduct, does not state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Pitman v. City of Oakland (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047–1048.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct in unlawfully locking her out of her unit on two separate occasions and removing her personal property from the unit was “intentional and malicious and were done for the purpose of causing the Plaintiff to suffer mental anguish and emotional and physical distress. Alternatively, Defendants’ acts and/or omissions were recklessly done without regard for Plaintiff’s well-being.” (Compl. ¶ 42.) “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct detailed herein, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer general damages, emotional harm, and economic loss, all to her general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but no less than $100,000.” (Id. at ¶ 43.)

Defendants argue that “the allegations amount to the normal course of business for a Hotel, in removing a patron that has not paid any hotel charges for months, has not even been to the room in weeks, and is committing a felony each day she accumulates another day’s charges and then proceeding to rent the room to a paying customer.” (Dem. 9:17–20.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege severe emotional distress resulting from Defendants’ conduct. (Id. at 9:26.)

The Court again notes that Defendants’ arguments rely on extrinsic facts improper for determination at the demurrer stage. Nevertheless, upon review of the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged that she suffered severe emotional distress resulting from Defendants’ conduct, let alone the nature and extent of such severe emotional distress. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendants. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained as to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action.

The unclean hands defense “demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim. … Any conduct that violates conscience, or good faith, or other equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause to invoke the doctrine.” (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978–979.) “Whether the doctrine of unclean hands applies is a question of fact.” (Id. at 978.)

Here, Defendants argue that the Court should sustain their demurrer based on the unclean hands doctrine because “here there is no question that Plaintiff’s own felonious conduct in defrauding the hotel of room charges relates directly to the transaction upon which Plaintiff’s claim is based. Her refusal to pay the room charges – a felony under California law – prevents her as a matter of law from bring any claims against the hotel sounding in legal, equitable or tort.” (Dem. 11:15–18.)

The Court notes that Defendants’ argument once again relies on facts outside the ambit of the instant demurrer. As the Court declines to make any factual determinations at the demurrer stage, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not allege any liability against defendant Lawrence Barr in his personal capacity. (Dem. 11:26–27, “Other than alleging acts by the Hotel, the Complaint does not allege anything that Barr did or did not do that was outside the scope of his employment as a manager of the Hotel.”)

However, upon review of the complaint, the Court finds it sufficient that Plaintiff has alleged that she “is informed, believes, and alleges that each of the Defendants were at all times mentioned the owner, partner, and/or agent of each of the remaining co-Defendants. Each Defendant did or failed to do the things alleged, with the permission and consent of each other co-Defendants and acted in the course and scope of such agency and/or employment.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) The Court further observes that each cause of action is directed at both Defendants.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ request to dismiss Barr from the instant action at the demurrer stage.

Generally speaking, “demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and thus are strictly construed because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery. Such demurrers are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Cal.Jur.3d § 137.) “Where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (2011) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 fn.2.)

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f). In applying the stringent standard for demurrers filed on this ground, the Court finds that the complaint is not “so incomprehensible” that Defendants cannot respond, especially given the extensive analysis they have argued against the pleading. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that “if the court finds any of Defendants’ arguments have merit, Ms. Johnson should be granted leave to amend her Complaint, her claims have a clear basis in the facts of this case and should be adjudicated according to the evidence.” (Pl.’s Opp. 10:28–11:2.) The Court further notes that this is the first demurrer heard against Plaintiff’s original complaint. Accordingly, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days leave to amend her complaint to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is cautioned that “following an order sustaining a demurrer … with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. … The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.)

[1] The Court notes that both Plaintiff’s opposition and Defendants’ reply were filed one court day late. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005, subd. (b).) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 3.110 of the California Rules of Court, to excuse the untimely-filed documents. The parties are advised to take note of the filing deadlines under the statute, as future filings made past the statutory deadlines may result in the Court declining to consider the late-filed papers at the hearing.¿

FEBRUARY 16, 2024

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Prince Hospitality, LLC, dba Homewood Suites Santa Clarita; and Lawrence Barr (collectively, “Defendants”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: A preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants and their agents from: (1) Preventing Plaintiff from accessing her rental unit; (2) Interfering directly or indirectly with Plaintiff’s free access to the unit; (3) Interfering directly or indirectly with any of Plaintiff’s personal property; (4) Dispossessing Plaintiff from the unit without first obtaining a lawful judgment for possession and writ of possession pursuant to California unlawful detainer law; and (5) Taking any actions that may have the effect of forcing Plaintiff to move from the unit other than complying with the unlawful detainer statutes.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is denied.

Plaintiff is reminded that all documents “must be text searchable when technologically feasible without impairment of the document's image.” (CRC 2.256(b)(3).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

On 7/19/23, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for a preliminary injunction. On 7/25/23, this Court granted Plaintiff a temporary restraining order granting Plaintiff possession of the premises and the above relief requested. On 2/8/23, Defendants filed their opposition to the instant motion.[1] No reply has been filed to date.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court considers two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff will likely suffer if the injunction does not issue as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the injunction does issue. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554; Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749; Brown v. Pacifica Foundation, Inc. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 915, 925; Amgen Inc. v. Health Care Services (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 731.)

In deciding on the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Court must balance the equities between the parties. If denying the requested relief would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendant would suffer little harm if the relief is granted, it is an abuse of discretion to deny relief. (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678 (the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one factor, the less that must be shown on the other to support an injunction).)

Irreparable harm (i.e., inadequate legal remedy) is one of the traditional considerations for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526, subd. (a)(2).) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent and not a mere possibility of harm sometime in the future. (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) However, plaintiffs need not wait until they have suffered actual harm and may seek injunctive relief against threatened infringement of their rights. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305-306.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that she “and her children are currently homeless and are likely to remain homeless throughout the duration of this case if their possession of the Unit is not restored. … Because of her limited income, Ms. Johnson will have an extremely difficult time finding stable housing during the pendency of this action and is therefore likely to remain homeless indefinitely.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5:21–26, citing Decl. of Alicia Johnson ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff further argues that “in contrast, … Defendants will suffer no harm if they are required to follow the lawful process to evict their tenants.” (Id. at 6:1–3.)

In opposition, Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s contention that she and her children are homeless. “Since January 2023, the staff at the Hotel have not seen Plaintiff’s children or dog enter the property. … Further, Plaintiff herself has been sporadically coming in and out of the guestroom since January 2023.” (Defs.’ Opp. 5:1–3, citing Decl. of Lawrence Barr ¶¶ 11–12.) Defendants further contend that “when Defendants had entered the property on June 15, 2023, Defendants have video evidence how there was little to no personal effects of Defendants in the guestroom that were not Hotel property.” (Id. at 5:5–7, citing Barr Decl. ¶ 13.) “As such, Plaintiff’s claims that her family is homeless is unfounded, since January 2023 her children have lived predominantly somewhere else and Plaintiff herself has sporadically used the guestroom being absent for weeks at a time.” (Id. at 5:12–14.)

Defendants further argue that in contrast to the potential harm to Plaintiff should the injunction be denied, “Defendants will suffer major harm if the Court grants an injunction reinstating Plaintiff to the Hotel’s guestroom. Defendants’ Hotel is still recovering from the devastating effects Covid-19 has had on the hospitality industry and the lack of a one-bedroom type guestroom would destroy a significant amount of Defendants’ business. Defendants are responsible for paying a plethora of Hotel staff and the cost to upkeep the Hotel is not small, it would be a major blow to the business if a paid guestroom was completely taken out.” (Id. at 5:18–23.) “If the Court grants this Preliminary Injunction, Defendants will lose at least $45,208.8[0] dollars in hotel fees, as that would be approximately a year’s worth of unpaid hotel fees that Ms. Johnson will not pay.” (Id. at 6:23–25.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the potential harm to Defendant outweighs the potential harm to Plaintiff should the injunction be issued.

A trial court may not issue an injunction, regardless of the amount of interim harm, “unless there is some possibility” that plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (Jamison v. Department of Transp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362; Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 29, 49.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that “defendants locked Ms. Johnson out of the Unit and removed her personal property from the unit without providing proper notice or utilizing the unlawful detainer procedure. Due to the egregious nature of defendants’ illegal self-help eviction, breach of quiet enjoyment and wrongful eviction, Ms. Johnson will prevail on her claims against defendants.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5:14–17.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has violated California penal code 537 (a) through her intentional evasion of paying for the services provided by Defendants[’] Hotel. Plaintiff started her act of fraud on December 11, 2022, since that date she has paid nothing to the Hotel.” (Defs.’ Opp. 3:14–17.) Defendants further argue that “under Civil Code Section 789.3, this law only applies to tenant-landlord situations that involve apartments not a hotel patron and Hotel Innkeeper.” (Id. at 4:10–11.) “Since it is undisputed that Plaintiff has not paid any room charges owed and admits that the Hotel provides the typical hotel services listed in § 1940(b)(2), … Prince Hospitality as an innkeeper is not subject to Civ. Code § 789.3. (Id. at 4:19–22, citing Barr Decl. ¶¶ 4–5.)

California landlord-tenant laws do not apply to tenants who maintain an occupancy at a hotel or motel where the innkeeper retains a right of access to and control of the dwelling unit, and offers all of the following services to all of the residents: facilities for safeguarding of personal property; central telephone service; maid, mail, and room services; occupancy for periods of less than 7 days; and food service provided by a food establishment that is located on or adjacent to the premises of the hotel or motel and that is owned or operated by the innkeeper or the innkeeper's lessee or affiliate. (Civ. Code § 1940, subd. (b)(2).)

Here, Defendants proffer the sworn declaration of defendant Lawrence Barr, the General Manager of the subject property, wherein he states that “the Homewood Suites in [sic] not a residential hotel and does not have long term tenants. It is a standard hotel with nightly hotel guests and provides daily housekeeping and cleaning for the rooms.” (Barr Decl. ¶ 4.) The Court finds persuasive Defendants’ contention that the California landlord-tenant laws do not apply in this action, and that Plaintiff therefore has a reasonably low probability of succeeding on the merits of the instant action. The Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to file a reply argument to Defendants’ opposition. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second prong of the test for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

[1] The Court notes that Defendants’ opposition was filed three court days late. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005, subd. (b).) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 3.110 of the California Rules of Court, to excuse the untimely-filed opposition. Defendants are advised to take note of the filing deadlines under the statute, as future filings made past the statutory deadlines may result in the Court declining to consider the late-filed papers at the hearing.¿