Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 23CHCV02125, Date: 2024-09-26 Tentative Ruling

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SEPTEMBER 25, 2024

(Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One)

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV02125

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs John Lopata; Jodi Lopata; and Savannah Lopata (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders compelling Defendant’s further responses to the following discovery requests:

· Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 28, 30–31, and 34–35.

Plaintiffs also seek monetary sanctions to be imposed against Defendant and its counsel in the combined amount of $5,400.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motions are granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 29 and 32; and Plaintiffs’ RFPs, Set One, Nos. 28, 30–31, and 34–35 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $460.00, payable within 45 days.

Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 4/6/21, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 16.) Plaintiffs allege that “defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period,” but Defendant “was unable to conform the Subject Vehicle to the applicable express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20.)

On 7/19/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against the dealership and manufacturer defendants the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; (4) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1973.2; and (6) Negligent Repair (against the dealership defendant). On 1/19/24, Defendant filed its answer.

On 12/21/23, Plaintiffs served their first set of discovery requests on Defendant. (Decl. of Armando Lopez ¶ 4.) On 1/24/24, Defendant served its responses thereto, with verifications served on 2/15/24. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

On 4/29/24, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions to compel further responses to the subject discovery requests. On 9/19/24, Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition to the instant motions. On 9/19/24, Defendant filed an untimely opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One.

Here, Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant’s additional responses the subject discovery requests, arguing that Defendant’s objections thereto are without merit.

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that on 3/20/24, he sent Defendant’s counsel a meet-and-confer letter raising the issues discussed herein. (Lopez Decl. ¶ 6.) Counsel for the parties agreed to deadline extensions for supplemental responses and any motions to compel, but no supplemental responses were served. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–9.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300 and 2031.310.

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered; (2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings; or (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).) “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.220.) “If an objection is made to an interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.240, subd. (b).)

A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories if any of the following apply: “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatory No. 29 asks: “Do YOU contend that your response to Plaintiff’s pre-litigation repurchase request is a defense to liability under the Song-Beverly Act?” (Pls.’ SPROG Sep. Stmt.) In response, Defendant asserted relevance objections. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatory No. 32 asks Defendant to “State the date on which you contend the SUBJECT VEHICLE first qualified for a vehicle repurchase under the Song-Beverly Act.” (Ibid.) In response, Defendant answered: “FCA US offered to repurchase the Subject Vehicle in or about March 2023.”[1] (Ibid.)

As to Special Interrogatory No. 29, Plaintiffs argue that the information sought is relevant because “whether FCA contends that its prelitigation offer serves as a defense to liability is the exact type of contention interrogatory that the interrogatories are permitted by the Discovery Act.” (Id. at 1:22–24, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.010, subd. (b); Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 281 [“a defendant in California courts may be required through discovery to disclose not only the evidentiary facts underlying his affirmative defenses … and denials … but also whether or not he makes a particular contention, either as to the facts or as to the possible issues in the case.”].)

While Defendant stands by its relevance objections in its late-filed opposition, it fails to offer any justification or further explanation as to how the request seeks information not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Special Interrogatory No. 29.

As to Special Interrogatory No. 32, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant failed to answer the question as asked, because “FCA is asked to answer what date it contends the vehicle first qualified for repurchase and FCA merely answers that FCA offered to repurchase the vehicle on” 4/4/23. (Pls.’ SPROG Mot. 5:16–18 [emphasis added].) The Court agrees and finds that while Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ argument is merely an issue of semantics, the date that the subject vehicle first qualified for repurchase certainly may differ from the date that Defendant ultimately made its offer to repurchase. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Special Interrogatory No. 32.

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id. at subd. (b).)¿A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) The demanding party must take the initiative to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of any objection by moving to compel a further response, but the objecting party has the burden of justifying the objection. (See, e.g., Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ RFP No. 28 seeks Defendant’s policies and procedures “regarding requiring a consumer in California to sign a release agreement as part of a pre-litigation repurchase.” (Pls.’ RFP Sep. Stmt.) Defendant served objection-only responses to RFP No. 28. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 30–31 seek documents evidencing Defendant’s rationale for its response to Plaintiffs’ pre-litigation repurchase request, and documents constituting Defendant’s pre-litigation letter in response to the repurchase request. (Ibid.) In response, Defendant asserted the same objections and stated that it would comply in part. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 34–35 seek Defendant’s template “goodwill” pre-litigation repurchase letter(s) for vehicles repurchased in California under the Song-Beverly Act. (Ibid.) Defendant served objection-only responses thereto. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs seek to compel further responses to the subject RFPs because “Plaintiff has reason to believe FCA’s response letter was generated using a template and that templates are used systematically in generating FCA’s responses to consumers making similar requests. Plaintiff seeks to determine whether it uses different templates when it does—and when it does not— believe it must comply with the law and how those responses differ.” (Pls.’ RFP Mot. 5:19–23.) “To that end, the information sought by these Requests is relevant to showing whether FCA’s offer (and its systematic procedures for such offers and transactions) complied with or violated the Act, and whether FCA behaved as though it did or did not believe its response was governed by the law.” (Id. at 5:25–28.)

The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiffs have provided sufficient facts to establish the requisite good cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may include a showing that the defendant routinely engaged in a practice of unreasonably denying pre-litigation repurchase requests without due deliberation. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding these practices is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiffs in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to RFP Nos. 28, 30–31, and 34–35.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Here, Plaintiffs request sanctions in the total amount of $5,400.00 to be imposed on Defendant and its counsel. This amount encompasses: (1) 5.2 hours of Plaintiffs’ attorney’s time working on the instant motions; (2) an additional anticipated 2 hours spent reviewing Defendant’s oppositions and drafting replies; and (3) an anticipated 2 hours preparing for and appearing at the instant hearings, at counsel’s hourly billing rate of $400.00 per hour. (Lopez Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs also seek to recover $60.00 in filing fees per motion. (Id. at ¶ 11.) In granting the instant motions, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiffs sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $460.00.

The motions are granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 29 and 32; and Plaintiffs’ RFPs, Set One, Nos. 28, 30–31, and 34–35 within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $460.00, payable within 45 days.

[1] The Court notes that the response reflected in Plaintiffs’ separate statement differs from the attached discovery responses. (Ex. B to Lopez Decl. 15:15–16 [“FCA US offered to repurchase the Subject Vehicle on or about April 4, 2023.”])