Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV02139, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV02139    Hearing Date: May 3, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 12/1/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Lucia Elizabeth Lujan (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order striking Defendant’s objections and

compelling further responses, within 10 days, to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 1–31.

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs, Request Nos. 1–31, within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $500.00.

Plaintiff is reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle she purchased on or around 1/25/22, which was manufactured and distributed by Defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff alleges that “the Subject Vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to, transmission, engine, emission, and electrical system defects.” (Id. at ¶ 10.)

On 7/20/23, Plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2. On 8/21/23, Defendant filed its answer.

On 9/20/23, Plaintiff served her Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, on Defendant. (Decl. of Gregory Sogoyan, ¶ 15.) On 10/17/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 16.) On 11/27/23, the parties entered into a Stipulated Protected Order regarding documents designated as confidential.

On 12/1/23, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to her Requests for Production, Set One. No opposition has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) 

If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id., subd. (b).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete”; “(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive”; or “(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel additional responses to her first set of RFPs. “Requests 1 through 14 seek documents relating to Plaintiff’s own vehicle. … Requests 15 through 29 seek documents reflecting Defendant’s written warranties and the policies and procedures related to what is covered under said warranties, how coverage is determined, training related to warranty coverage, etc. … Finally, Requests 30 and 31 seek documents related to Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Pl.’s Mot., 5:5–18.) Plaintiff argues that the motion is warranted because “Defendant has not produced any emails, memoranda, data, or investigations that could help Plaintiff establish Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model.” (Sogoyan Decl. ¶ 17.)

A.    Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.) 

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that beginning on 10/20/23 and 11/17/23, he sent Defendant’s counsel two meet and confer letters regarding raising the issues in the instant motion but received no response. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶¶ 18–19, 23.) The Court therefore finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). 

B.     Defendant’s Objections

Here, Plaintiff argues, in part, that Defendant’s objections to her first set of RFPs are without merit. (Pl.’s Mot. 7:4–5; Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) Defendant objected to each request at issue on the bases of, inter alia, relevance, undue burden, and trade secret privilege.

a.                   Scope/Relevance 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s objections to the subject RFPs on the basis that they seek irrelevant matter are meritless because “the requested documents establish Defendant’s knowledge of the defects and its ability (or inability) to repair the defects.” (Pl.’s Mot. 10:9–10.) “This evidence is relevant to establish Defendant’s knowledge and inability to repair the defects, as well as its failure to repurchase the Subject Vehicle despite Defendant’s inability to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of repair opportunities. The discovery sought will support Plaintiff’s claims and request for civil penalties.” (Id. at 11:13–17.)

Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.) 

Here, the discovery at issue “includes requests for information that can establish the existence of defects in the Subject Vehicle, as well as Defendant’s knowledge of the existence of similar or related defects.” (Id. at 10:1–3.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to establish the requisite good cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may be based on the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiff’s is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiff in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects. While the cases relied on by Plaintiff (i.e., Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967) may not involve the exact circumstance before this Court, they are sufficient to show that the requested information could itself be admissible or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case.

The Court notes that Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s relevance objections to the subject RFPs are without merit.

b.                   Undue Burden

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s objections to her first set of RFPs on the basis that they are unduly burdensome and oppressive are meritless without any additional showing of any such undue burden or oppression. (Pl.’s Mot., 7:22–23.) The party objecting to a discovery request on this basis bears the burden of supplying evidence of “the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) 

“If a party objects to the discovery of electronically stored information on the grounds that it is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense and that the responding party will not search the source in the absence of an agreement with the demanding party or court order, the responding party shall identify in its response the types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that it asserts are not reasonably accessible. By objecting and identifying information of a type or category of source or sources that are not reasonably accessible, the responding party preserves any objections it may have relating to that electronically stored information.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (d) [emphasis added].)

Here, the Court notes that Defendant has not supplied evidence to show the “quantum of work required” to respond in full to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, nor has Defendant stated the categories of sources of ESI that are not reasonably accessible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to the requests to the extent that they are unduly burdensome or oppressive are without adequate support and agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant has waived any objections it may assert relating to ESI.

c.                   Trade Secrets 

Defendant objected to the subject RFPs to “to the extent it may call for information that is confidential, commercially sensitive, proprietary, and/or trade secret.” (Ex. 4 to Sogoyan Decl.) Evidence Code § 1060 provides that the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret and to prevent others from disclosing it, unless allowing the privilege will conceal fraud or result in injustice. A party that is claiming the trade secret privilege has the burden of proving the party's entitlement to that privilege. (Amgen Inc. v California Correctional Health Care Servs. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 733.)

“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civ. Code § 3426.1, subd. (d).)

Here, the Court notes that the parties have already stipulated to a protective order, which would protect against the disclosure of any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information. Moreover, the Court again notes that Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown adequate cause why the specific documents requested by Plaintiff are protected trade secrets. Further, any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information may be adequately protected by the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order entered on 11/27/23.

C.    Sanctions 

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).) 

Here, in granting the instant motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff sanctions against Defendant and in the amount of $500.00.

CONCLUSION

The unopposed motion is granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s first set of RFPs, Request Nos. 1–31, within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $500.00.