Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV02211, Date: 2024-01-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV02211    Hearing Date: January 5, 2024    Dept: F51

DEMURRER

Demurrer Filed: 11/15/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Pilot Travel Centers LLC, named as Doe 1 (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Jose Antonio Mesa-Marentes; and Maria Guadalupe Esquivel-Carreon (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendant demurs against Plaintiffs’ entire complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND 

This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiffs allege that “on approximately October 26, 2022, Plaintiff JOSE [Mesa-Marentes], was injured and suffered damages during a motor vehicle collision with a motor vehicle operated by Defendant Driver BLOBERG (the ‘Crash’) at the approximate location of Frazier Mountain Park Road and 550 feet west of Lebec Road in Unincorporated, California, the County of Los Angeles.” (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff Esquivel-Carreon alleges loss of consortium as a result of plaintiff Mesa-Marentes’ injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 65–66.) Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendant “owned the land and/or were occupying, managing, controlling, and/or operating a business establishment on the land near the area where the Crash occurred.” (Id. at ¶ 36 [emphasis added].)

On 7/26/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against ten named defendants the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; (2) Negligent Entrustment of a Motor Vehicle; (3) General Negligence; (4) Dangerous Condition of Public Property; and (5) Loss of Consortium. On 9/7/23, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Moving Defendant as Doe defendant 1.

On 11/15/23, Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On 12/19/23, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 12/28/23, Moving Defendant filed its reply.

ANALYSIS

Moving Defendant demur to Plaintiffs’ entire complaint on the bases that “the Complaint is uncertain as to Pilot and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for general negligence and loss of consortium against Pilot.” (Not. of Dem. 2:2–3.)

A.    Meet and Confer

Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that on 11/9/23, he sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter in an attempt to meet and confer regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer, but received no response. (Decl. of Andrew S. Attia ¶ 6.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

B.     General Negligence

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges General Negligence against defendants CFJ Properties, Tujhmm Inc., and Moving Defendant. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) “The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.) “Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) “Consequently, landowners are liable for injuries caused by a lack of due care in the maintenance of their property.” (Jones, 39 Cal.App.5th at 1207.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they were owed a duty of care because “there are no allegations that Plaintiff was ever on Pilot’s property. Plaintiff does not allege the accident occurred on Pilot’s premises, nor do the substantive allegations support a finding that the accident arose from any act or omission of Pilot.” (Dem. 4:3–6.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged Moving Defendant’s duty to them and breach thereof in paragraphs 36 through 38 of the complaint. (Pls.’ Opp. 4:17–21.) In the cited provisions of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendant was “careless and negligent in their ownership of the land and/or in how they designed, operated, managed, maintained, supervised, controlled, and conducted construction, traffic management, traffic control devices, signs, signals, road design, lane re-routing and pavement work in connection with the Business.” (Compl. ¶ 37.)

Moving Defendant argues in reply that, even accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, “the Complaint does not allege Pilot owned, possessed, managed, or controlled the property where the accident occurred. Pilot therefore had no duty to warn of potential dangers posed by traffic on Frazier Mountain Park Road – a public street and major thoroughfare.” (Def.’s Reply 2:6–8 [emphasis in original].) The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the subject incident occurred at Moving Defendant’s business. (Compl. ¶ 36.) The Court further notes that Plaintiffs do not present any legal authority creating liability against a defendant property owner of a private business located near the site of a public roadway where the subject incident allegedly occurred.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a negligence cause of action against Moving Defendant. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained against Plaintiffs’ third cause of action.

C.    Loss of Consortium

In Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action, plaintiff Esquivel-Carreon alleges Loss of Consortium against all Defendants. “There are four elements to a cause of action for loss of consortium: (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and the person injured at the time of the injury; (2) a tortious injury to the plaintiff's spouse; (3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff; and  (4) the loss was proximately caused by the defendant's act.” (Vanhooser v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [internal quotations omitted].) “A cause of action for loss of consortium is, by its nature, dependent on the existence of a cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse.” (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 746.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that “because Plaintiff Mesa-Marentes fails to state a valid cause of action for general negligence against Pilot, this cause of action also fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed against Pilot.” (Dem. 4:26–28.) The Court agrees and finds that to the extent that Plaintiffs base Esquivel-Carreon’s loss of consortium claims on their defective General Negligence cause of action against Moving Defendant, this derivative cause of action likewise fails.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Loss of Consortium against Moving Defendant. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained against Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action.

D.    Uncertainty

Generally speaking, “demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and thus are strictly construed because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery. Such demurrers are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Cal.Jur.3d § 137.) “Where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (2011) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 fn.2.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ entire complaint is uncertain because it “fails to differentiate between Pilot’s alleged conduct and the conduct of Defendant Tujhmm. As framed, Pilot cannot reasonably determine what allegations are directed against it, as opposed to co-defendant Tujhmm.” (Dem. 6:3–5.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “there is no ambiguity or uncertainty as to what issues PILOT must defend, admit or deny. It does not matter to PILOT whether TUJHMM or Caltrans or any other defendant must also defend, admit, or deny certain facts. This is where the discovery process cures any ambiguities.” (Pls.’ Opp. 6:21–24.)

In applying the stringent standard for demurrers filed on this ground, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint is not “so incomprehensible” that Moving Defendant cannot respond to it, particularly where Moving Defendant has offered substantive arguments in opposition thereto. As Plaintiffs note, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.) Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled on this basis.

E.     Leave to Amend

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Here, the Court notes that this is Moving Defendant’s first demurrer brought against Plaintiffs’ original complaint, and that Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend if the Court sustains the instant demurrer. (Pls.’ Opp. 8:8–12.) Therefore, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, Plaintiffs are granted 30 days leave to amend the complaint to cure the defects set forth above.

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend.