Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV02450, Date: 2024-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV02450    Hearing Date: March 8, 2024    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 3/8/24

Case #23CHCV02450

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MARCH 7, 2024

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

(Requests for Admission and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One)

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV02450

Motion filed: 2/13/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Raymundo Rosales (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: NOT OK (fails to identify which discovery requests are at issue)

RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders compelling Defendant’s further responses to the following discovery requests:

· Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission (“RFAs”), Set One, Request No. 3.

· Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Request Nos. 4, 19, 21–24, 28–30, 33–38, 43–46, 49, 52, 54–56, 61, 63, 75, 79, and 81.

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFAs, Set One, is denied. The Court imposes sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $100.00. Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 4, 19, 21–24, 30, 33–38, 43–46, 49, 54–56, 61, 63, 75, 79, and 81, and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 28, 29, and 52.

Plaintiff is reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on or around 5/14/22, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants violated

the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act by failing to conform the Vehicle to the express written warranties within a reasonable number of repair attempts or within the warranty periods, and by failing to promptly replace the vehicle or make restitution to Plaintiff,” after “defects, malfunctions, and nonconformities that were presented to Defendant’s authorized repair facilities multiple times and substantially impair the use, value, and/or safety of the Vehicle.” (Id. at ¶¶ 15–16.)

On 8/16/23, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against the dealership and manufacturer defendants the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200; and (4) Negligent Repair (against the dealership defendant). On 11/27/23, Defendant filed its answer.

On 9/1/23, Plaintiff served his first set of RFAs and RFPs on Defendant. (Decl. of Christopher Im ¶ 3.) On 12/30/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

On 2/13/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motions to compel further responses to his first set of RFAs and RFPs. No oppositions have been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

California law requires a responding party to respond to each propounded request for admission with either a substantive answer or an objection to the particular request, and to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.210; 2031.210, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s additional responses the subject discovery requests, arguing that the matters sought are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, and that Defendant’s objections thereto are without merit.

A. Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.290, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that on 2/5/24, he sent Defendant’s counsel a meet-and-confer letter raising the issues discussed herein but received no response. (Im Decl. ¶¶ 5–7.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (b)(1) and 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).

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B. Request for Admission No. 3

A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to requests for admission if any of the following apply: “(1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete; or (2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (a).)¿

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s further responses to his RFA No. 3, which asks: “Admit that Defendant was a supplier within the meaning of the California Commercial Code § 10103(a)(24), at all times relevant to this case.” (Pl’s RFA Sep. Stmt. 2:3–4.) Defendant responded as follows: “FCA US objects to this request because it calls for a conclusion of law. FCA US further objects because this request seeks the admission or denial of a fact or alleged fact which is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and therefore is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case.” (Id. at 2:6–10.)

Plaintiff argues that “a Request for Admission may be used to request a legal conclusion.” (Id. at 2:22–24, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.010; Burke v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 282.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff further argues that “this request is relevant to establishing if the Defendant was a supplier and Defendant’s knowledge and admission is directly relevant to establishing Plaintiff’s claims.” (Id. at 3:4–6.) However, without any further explanation, it is unclear to the Court how Defendant’s classification as a “supplier” under Commercial Code section 10103 is relevant to Plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act, which does not make reference to any “supplier” as a defined term. (Com. Code § 10103, subd. (a)(24); Civ. Code § 1791.)

The Court further notes that throughout his memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiff cites to the incorrect legal standard, arguing that “Plaintiff’s requests seek documents related to various service bulletins, messages, recalls, Defendant’s policies and procedures, and similar complaints and repurchases of other 2022 DODGE CHALLENGER vehicles with the same or similar nonconformities or defects.” (Pl.’s RFA Mot. 6:15–17.) There are no documents at issue with respect to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to his RFA No. 3.

C. Requests for Production of Documents

If the response to an RFP includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id., subd. (b).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a request for production if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff represents that the subject RFPs “seek the following: (1) information regarding similar complaints made by consumers of vehicles the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle; (2) Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding compliance with the Song-Beverly Act; (3) Information related to Defendant’s decision not to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle; and (4) information related to all codes, technical service bulletins and special service messages generated for vehicles the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Pl.’s RFP Mot. 6:22–27.)

Defendant objected to each of the subject RFPs on the bases that they were “vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Pl.’s RFP Sep. Stmt.) Defendant further objected to RFP Nos. 23, 24, and 75 on the basis of third-party privacy, and to RFP No. 52 on the basis of the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. (Ibid.) Lastly, Defendant stated that it is unable to comply with RFP Nos. 33–38 and 43–46, as the requests are “not compliant with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030(c)(1) and does not provide FCA US with sufficient information to identify the documents or category of documents being sought,” and are “so broad that it is impossible for FCA US to identify any potential custodians or relevant documents and renders the results of any search meaningless.” (Ibid.)

The burden rests with the objecting party to justify the objection. (Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221.) Here, as Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motions, the Court finds that it has failed to meet its burden to justify its objections to Plaintiff’s discovery requests.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court finds that RFP Nos. 28 and 29, which seek “All DOCUMENTS related to YOUR contractual relationship” with the dealership and authorized repair facility involved in selling and servicing Plaintiff’s vehicle, to be overly broad in scope. On their face, these requests are not adequately tailored to seek information relevant to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims, nor does Plaintiff clarify how these requests are relevant or sufficiently narrowly tailored. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to RFP Nos. 28 and 29.

Additionally, the Court finds that RFP No. 52, which seeks “All DOCUMENTS deposition transcripts for the depositions of YOUR Person Most Qualified/Knowledgeable (designated in accordance with Cal Civ. Proc. Code §2025.230 or Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 30(b)(6)) that YOU have used or received in any proceeding (commenced in the State of California) with respect to similar DEFECTS as the VEHICLE in similar make, model, and year Vehicles,” is not relevant. Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Here, prior deposition transcripts of Defendant’s Person Most Qualified would be inadmissible as hearsay unless the declarant was unavailable, and the former testimony is offered against the person who offered it in evidence in his or her own behalf on the former occasion or against the successor in interest of such person. (Evid. Code § 1291, subd. (a)(1).) As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to RFP No. 52.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 4, 19, 21–24, 30, 33–38, 43–46, 49, 54–56, 61, 63, 75, 79, and 81. The motion is denied as to RFP Nos. 28, 29, and 52.

D. Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h); see also Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

Here, in denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFAs, Set One, the Court finds it reasonable to impose sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $100.00. Because the Court neither fully granted nor denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, no sanctions will be imposed in connection with that motion.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFAs, Set One, is denied. The Court imposes sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $100.00.

Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 4, 19, 21–24, 30, 33–38, 43–46, 49, 54–56, 61, 63, 75, 79, and 81, and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 28, 29, and 52.