Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV02619, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV02619    Hearing Date: March 4, 2024    Dept: F51

DEMURRER

Demurrer Filed: 10/11/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Timothy Burkhart; Timothy Dofflow; Jeffrey D. Hudgins; and Justin Miyahira (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Anne Hawley and William Hawley, individually and as Successors in Interest to Decedent, Christopher Hawley (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendants demur against Plaintiffs’ entire complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled.

BACKGROUND 

This is a wrongful death action wherein Plaintiffs are the parents of decedent Christopher Hawley (“Decedent”). Plaintiffs allege that on 6/23/22, Decedent visited Six Flags Magic Mountain amusement park, located at 26101 Magic Mountain Parkway in Valencia, California, and rode the X2 rollercoaster, after which he sustained a brain injury resulting in his death. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 24–32.) Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendants were employees of Six Flags Magic Mountain “before, during, or around the time Decedent Christopher Hawley rode X2 on June 23, 2022.” (Id. at ¶¶ 12–15.)

On 8/30/23, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against seven named defendants the following causes of action: (1) Strict Liability – Design Defect; (2) Strict Liability – Failure to Warn; (3) Negligent Product Design; (4) Negligent Failure to Warn; (5) Negligence; and (6) Premises Liability. All causes of action other than the sixth are alleged against Moving Defendants.

On 10/11/23, Moving Defendants filed the instant demurrer. On 2/20/24, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 2/26/24, Moving Defendants filed their reply.

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ANALYSIS

Here, Moving Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ entire complaint on the basis that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to constitute any of the causes of action against Moving Defendants.

1.      Meet and Confer

Here, Moving Defendants’ counsel declares that on 9/25/23, she sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter discussing the issues raised in the instant demurrer. (Decl. of Sanaz Cherazaie ¶ 2.) On 9/29/23, counsel met and conferred telephonically, but were unable to come to an informal resolution. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

2.      Products Liability Causes of Action

Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, and fourth causes of action respectively allege against Defendants (1) Strict Liability – Design Defect; (2) Strict Liability – Failure to Warn; (3) Negligent Product Design; and (4) Negligent Failure to Warn. “A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer is liable in tort if a defect in the manufacture or design of its product causes injury while the product is being used in a reasonably foreseeable way.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 560.) “A duty to warn or disclose danger arises when an article is or should be known to be dangerous for its intended use, either inherently or because of defects.” (DeLeon v. Commercial Manufacturing and Supply Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 336, 343.)

Here, Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ products liability causes of action fail because “undoubtedly, Moving Defendants are not a manufacturer, distributor, supplier, etc. that would subject them to liability under either the law of products liability. Plaintiffs have not pled any specific facts as to the individual Moving Defendants to support their products liability claims against Moving Defendants. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to demonstrate that the individual employees provided any product to Mr. Hawley.” (Dem. 9:22–26.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they “allege that each Individual Defendant was individually responsible for some aspect of X2’s (1) design, (2) construction, maintenance, and/or operation pursuant to that design, (3) certification to state authorities, and (4) safety.” (Pl.’s Opp. 11:17–12:2, citing Compl. ¶¶ 12–15.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that: “Defendant Burkhart was responsible for overseeing the maintenance and operation of rides at Six Flags Magic Mountain, including the X2 rollercoaster, … Defendant Dofflow was responsible for overseeing the maintenance of rides at Six Flags Magic Mountain, including X2, … Defendant Hudgins was responsible for certifying that rides at Six Flags Magic Mountain, including X2, meet all applicable design requirements, and Defendant Miyahira was responsible for ensuring the safety of Six Flags Magic Mountain patrons.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12–15.)

On reply, Moving Defendants maintain that “Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for products liability as moving Defendants are not a manufacturer, distributor, supplier, etc. that would subject them to liability under either the law of products liability.” (Defs.’ Reply 6:12–14.) However, the Court finds it sufficient that Plaintiffs have alleged that each of the individual Moving Defendants was responsible for the design, maintenance, operation, and/or safety of the X2 rollercoaster. As Plaintiffs observe, “the question of whether amusement park rides give rise to liability under products-based causes of action requires a well-developed evidentiary record.” (Pl.’s Opp. 11:24–25, fn.2, citing Sharufa v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 493, 502–05.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute their products liability causes of action. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, and fourth causes of action.

3.      Negligence Causes of Action

Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and fifth causes of action respectively allege against Defendants (3) Negligent Product Design; (4) Negligent Failure to Warn; and (5) Negligence. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

Here, Moving Defendants argue that “there are no facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint related to Moving Defendants’ individual liability, whatsoever.” (Dem. 12:5–6.) “Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to provide any factual details in which Moving Defendants may ascertain the specific act Moving Defendants either participated in or otherwise authorized/directed which serves as the basis for his liability in this action.” (Id. at 13:2–4.) “Without facts identifying the duty owed by Moving Defendants or how [each] Defendant allegedly breached his purported duty, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that Defendant breached his duty (as alleged in Paragraph 89) does not pass muster.” (Id. at 13:13–25.)

Moving Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs alleging a claim against an officer or director of a corporation must show that the individual defendant personally directed or participated in the tortious conduct.” (Dem. 10:27–1:2, citing Frances T. v. Village Green Owner Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 503.) In Frances T., the plaintiff condominium unit owner brought an action against the condominium owner’s association and individual members of its board of directors for negligence, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty regarding injuries she sustained when she was attacked in her unit. (42 Cal.3d at 495–497.)

The Frances T. Court found that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to show the “defendant’s awareness of the need for additional lighting and of the fact that lighting could aid in deterring criminal conduct, especially break-ins.” (Id. at 503.) The Court concluded that “under the facts as alleged by plaintiff, the directors named as defendants had specific knowledge of a hazardous condition threatening physical injury to the residents, yet they failed to take any action to avoid the harm; moreover, the action they did take may have exacerbated the risk by causing plaintiff's unit to be without any lighting on the night she was attacked. Plaintiff has thus pled facts to support two theories of negligence, both of which state a cause of action under the standard stated above.” (Id. at 509.)

Here, Plaintiffs argue in opposition that they have similarly sufficiently alleged “that the Individual Defendants, in their respective roles within Six Flags and Magic Mountain which are identified in the Complaint, negligently contributed to the design, production, maintenance, inspection, repair, maintenance, operation, and warnings for X2, which negligence was a substantial and legal cause of Mr. Hawley’s death after the ride caused him to suffer caused severe intracranial hemorrhaging.” (Pls.’ Opp. 12:18–23.) “Plaintiffs’ Complaint clearly pleads that each Individual Defendant had direct, personal involvement in the tortious activity, which is alleged to have resulted in Mr. Hawley’s death.” (Id. at 13:7–9, citing Compl. ¶¶ 12–15, 33–36, 38–42, 49–55, 62–66, 73–82, 89–92.) The Court finds that here, similar to Frances T., Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendants were on notice of the hazardous nature of X2, yet “made the conscious, knowing, and informed decision not to warm or otherwise inform Six Flags Magic Mountain patrons and potential X2 passengers this danger.” (Compl. ¶¶ 60, 87.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs, and finds it sufficient that at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs have alleged facts to support each element of negligence, including Moving Defendants’ duty to Plaintiffs (Compl. ¶¶ 63, 64, 74, 75, 89, 90), their breach thereof (Compl. ¶¶ 65, 91), causation (Compl. ¶¶ 66–69, 82–85, 92–95), and damages (Ibid.). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to constitute their negligence causes of action. The Court again notes that further investigation of the merits of Plaintiffs’ allegations may be resolved through the discovery process. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Motion Filed: 10/11/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Magic Mountain LLC; and Six Flags Entertainment Corporation (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Anne Hawley and William Hawley, individually and as Successors in Interest to Decedent, Christopher Hawley (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendants move to strike references relating to punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND 

On 10/11/23, Moving Defendants filed the instant motion to strike. On 2/14/24, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 2/22/24, Moving Defendants filed their reply.

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ANALYSIS

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

A.    Meet and Confer

Moving Defendants have not attached a meet-and-confer declaration to the instant motion. However, “a determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).)

B.     Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Id. at subd. (c); Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

1.      Malice, Fraud, or Oppression

Punitive damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)

In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants, and each of them, knew, and at various times reported to state safety authorities, numerous prior injuries caused by the normal and intended operation of X and X2 including, but not limited to, severe back, spine, neck, and head injuries, as well as traumatic brain injuries. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that Defendants, and each of them, have been involved in prior litigation involving such injuries.” (Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs further allege that “despite this knowledge, said Defendants consciously disregarded these known and appreciated risks and instead made the conscious, knowing, and informed decision not to redesign X2, putting park profits over the safety of their paying customers.” (Id. at ¶ 47.)

Here, Moving Defendants argue that “the subject Complaint states nothing more than a prayer for punitive damages, and general allegations of ‘oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious intent.’” (MTS 8:18–19.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently met the pleading standard for punitive damages because the “Complaint asserts that these Defendants were responsible for owning, operating, and controlling X2, the ride that caused Mr. Hawley’s death. As owners, operators, and controllers of X2, Plaintiffs assert that Six Flags and Magic were both involved in the redesign process for X2, and … were responsible for X2’s warning, which was inadequate, failing to inform patrons that severe back, spine, neck, and head injuries, as well as traumatic brain injuries, may result from the normal and intended operation of the ride. Finally, Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts that Six Flags and Magic Mountain consciously disregarded the safety of X2 passengers by ignoring these known and appreciated risks, along with the countless publicly-posted concerns and complaints by prior X2 passengers regarding the very safety issues that resulted in Mr. Hawley’s death.” (Pls.’ Opp. 11:24–12:6, citing Compl. ¶¶ 11, 23, 33–35, 47, 60, 71, 87, 97, and 108.)

On reply, Moving Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have failed to point to any clear and convincing evidence that Defendants acted with a willful and conscious disregard for the safety of others.” (Defs.’ Reply 5:26–27.) Moving Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged “actual notice of any risks, dangers, and unsafe conditions of the X2 ride, merely because an [sic] plaintiff alleged the same in another litigation case, which resulted in no findings of fault against Defendants.” (Id. at 6:17–19.) The Court declines to weigh the merits of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations at the pleading stage.

Based on the foregoing factual allegations, the Court finds that at this stage, Moving Defendants’ alleged conduct, as pled, may be considered malicious and oppressive as defined by Civil Code section 3294. Further investigation of the merits of Plaintiffs’ allegations may be resolved through the discovery process.

2.      Employer Liability

“An employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages … based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b).)

In their complaint, Plaintiffs name four individual Defendants who were employees of Six Flags Magic Mountain “before, during, or around the time Decedent Christopher Hawley rode X2 on June 23, 2022.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12–15.) Plaintiffs further allege that “the aforementioned acts were committed by Defendants, and each of them, by and through their respective officers, directors, managing agents, agents and/or representatives and/or were known to, aided, abetted, authorized by, ratified by and/or otherwise approved by their respective officers, directors, managing agents and/or representatives.” (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 59, 70, 86, 96, 107.)

Here, Moving Defendants argue that “there are no allegations against any particular officers, directors or managing agents of Magic Mountain, LLC and Six Flags Entertainment Corp., which would support a punitive damage award.” (MTS 10:2–4.) “Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts to support acts of malice, oppression, or fraud on against the individual employee Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege facts to support a finding that the individual employee Defendants, or any directors, officers, or managing agents, had specific knowledge of any wrongful conduct and ratified the same.” (Id. at 11:4–7.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Moving “Defendants once again attempt to fabricate a strict pleading requirement that Plaintiffs are not required, by law, to meet.” (Pls.’ Opp. 6:25–26.) The Court agrees. As Plaintiffs observe, “Plaintiffs need not include the level of detail that Six Flags and Magic Mountain believe is required. Through discovery, Plaintiffs will be able to identify the specific names of the Six Flags and Magic Mountain officers, directors, managing agents, or other corporate decisionmakers who (a) negotiated and worked with Arrow Dynamics to design and build X2’s predecessor, X, (b) negotiated with S&S Worldwide to design X2, (c) signed the pertinent contracts, (d) oversaw the design and construction of X2, (e) drafted X2’s warning language, (f) oversee the company’s receipt and analysis of prior accidents and injuries, (g) control the day-today operation of X2, and (h) are responsible for monitoring the safety of X2.” (Id. at 14:12–19.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that at this stage, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Moving Defendants ratified/approved of the allegedly wrongful conduct by their agents and/or employees. The Court again notes that further investigation of the merits of Plaintiffs’ allegations may be resolved through the discovery process. Accordingly, the Court denies Moving Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint referencing punitive damages.

CONCLUSION 

The motion to strike is denied.