Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 23CHCV03607, Date: 2025-01-09 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251. Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

JANUARY 8, 2025

(Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One)

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV03607

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Smart Main Panel Inc., dba LA/TX Solar Group (“Defendant”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders compelling Defendant’s further responses to the following discovery requests:

· Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 3 and 4.

Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions to be imposed against Defendant in the combined amount of $7,195.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One, is granted in part. Defendant to provide further objection-free responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatory Nos. 1, 7–11, 13–15, and 18–19 within 30 days.

The motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, is granted. Defendant to provide further responses to RFP Nos. 3 and 4 within 30 days.

This is a contract action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 8/10/23, Defendants each entered into agreements with Plaintiff, engaging Plaintiff as their authorized dealer and sales affiliate to solicit orders for Defendants’ solar energy equipment and services. (SAC ¶¶ 6–12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the agreement by, inter alia, failing to pay Plaintiff sales commissions, terminating the agreements without sufficient notice, and otherwise frustrating Plaintiff’s efforts to complete projects. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–33.)

On 11/29/23, Plaintiff filed its complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (4) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. On 2/9/24, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging the same causes of action against Defendants. On 8/1/24, Plaintiff filed its operative second amended complaint (“SAC”), alleging the same causes of action against Defendants. On 8/27/24, Defendants filed their answer.

On 4/22/24, Plaintiff served its first set of discovery requests on Defendant. (Decl. of Adam Losey ¶ 2.) On 5/22/24, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 3.) On 7/17/24, Defendant served supplemental responses to the subject discovery requests. (Ibid.)

On 9/3/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motions to compel further responses to the subject discovery requests. On 12/26/24, Defendant filed its oppositions thereto. On 1/2/25, Plaintiff filed its replies.

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s additional responses the subject discovery requests, arguing that Defendant’s responses are evasive and incomplete, and its objections are without merit.

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that on 8/8/24, he sent Defendant’s counsel a meet-and-confer letter raising the issues discussed herein. (Losey Decl. ¶ 4.) On 8/26/24, counsel for the parties met and conferred telephonically, but were unable to resolve the dispute. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (b)(1) and 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).

As a preliminary matter, Defendant argues that the instant motions to compel should be denied as untimely. “A motion to compel further response … [must] be made within 45 days of the service of the response.” (Standon Co. v Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 902.) “Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (c); 2031.310, subd. (c) [emphasis added].)

Defendant contends that the parties agreed upon a deadline of two weeks after any supplemental responses were served for Plaintiff to file the instant motions. (Def.’s Opp. 3:6–22, citing Exs. 2–4 to Decl. of Geoffrey G. Melkonian.) Defendant asserts that because it served its supplemental responses to the subject discovery requests on 7/17/24, Plaintiff had until 7/31/24 to file the instant motions. However, “rather than filing its Motion to Compel, or even attempting to meet and confer with Defendant’s counsel on or before July 31, 2024, Plaintiff waited until August 8, 2024, after the mutually agreed upon deadline to file any motions to compel, to first meet and confer regarding the discovery responses.” (Id. at 4:3–6.)

Plaintiff argues in reply that the plain language of the statute cannot be interpreted to shorten the statutory 45-day period for parties to bring motions to compel further discovery responses. The Court agrees with Plaintiff, and notes that the statute unambiguously allows for the propounding and responding parties to agree upon a date later than the 45-day statutory period for the propounding party to bring a motion to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (c); 2031.310, subd. (c).) As Plaintiff observes, “the inclusion of the word ‘later’ plainly indicates that the rule does not contemplate that a party may waive or limit their rights to bring such a motion by agreeing to an earlier date.” (Pl.’s Reply 3:13–15 [emphasis added].)

Plaintiff contends that “‘extension’, of course, means enlargement and cannot possibly be construed to mean that Plaintiff agreed to narrow the new 45-day period to 14 days.” (Pl.’s Reply 3:20–22.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the parties’ agreement to a two-week extension added two weeks to the 45-day statutory period to file the instant motions. The Court agrees.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the deadline for Plaintiff to bring the instant motions was 9/16/24, which is two weeks after the 45-day statutory period provided under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300 and 2031.310. Accordingly, as the instant motions were filed on 9/3/24, the Court finds that the motions are not untimely.

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered; (2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings; or (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (c).)

A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories if any of the following apply: “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

A demanding party must take the initiative to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of any objection by moving to compel a further response, but the objecting party has the burden of justifying the objection. (See, e.g., Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.) Here, Defendant asserted the following objections to each of the subject interrogatories: “Objection. This request is objected to on the grounds that the information sought is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, overly broad, harassing and oppressive, and seeks information Protected by the attorney-client privilege.”

However, as Plaintiff observes, Defendant’s “Opposition and Response have not carried Defendant’s burden of justifying any of its objections or incomplete answers and does not even attempt to address the inappropriateness on the boilerplate objections.” (Pl.’s Reply 5:14–16.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections are without merit.

Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatory No. 1 seeks, “with specificity, the facts around the decision-making process that led up to Michael Le’s email to Blake Yang on September 28, 2023 that said, ‘our relationship will be terminated as of OCT 1.’” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 4:3–5.) Defendant’s supplemental response to Special Interrogatory No. 1 states that “the September 28, 2023 email was sent as Propounding Party had breached the agreement and was actively sabotaging jobs.” (Id. at 4:16–17.) Plaintiff argues that this further response is impermissibly conclusive and evasive, as “Plaintiff has the right to be apprised of the alleged factual basis of such statements. This response must be updated to provide specificity.” (Id. at 5:1–2.) Defendant argues in opposition that its response is adequate, that “Plaintiff may send subsequent interrogatories to further inquire or take the Defendant’s deposition but the ‘follow up’ interrogatory should not be a Motion to Compel.” (Def.’s Sep. Stmt. 3:11–13.) The Court finds that Defendant’s response is evasive and incomplete, and therefore the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 1.

Special Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 14 ask Defendant to identify documents supporting Defendant’s responses to separate related interrogatories. In response, Defendant cited: “Contracts, communications between the parties, communications with customers, project documents, and project spreadsheet.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 5:18–19, 13:15–16.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s responses are insufficient because they fail “to identify with specificity the responsive documents.” (Id. at 6:2, 13:20.) The Court agrees and finds these responses impermissibly vague. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 14.

Special Interrogatory No. 8 asks Defendant to “identify all business entities, as of August 1, 2023, that were contracted with YOU as ‘an authorized dealer’ (as that term is used in the AGREEMENT).” (Id. at 6:8–9.) Special Interrogatory No. 10 seeks additional information on these purported additional authorized dealers. (Id. at 8:5–8.) In response, Defendant asserts that “the AGREEMENT does not contain the exact phrase ‘an authorized dealer’ as such, the request is vague and ambiguous with regard to that term. Notwithstanding said objections and in the spirit of discovery, the AGREEMENT does not contract with any other ‘authorized dealer’ other than Propounding Party.” (Id. at 6:11–14.) However, as Plaintiff observes, the phrase “authorized dealer” is contained on the first page of the subject agreement. (Ex. B to SAC, p. 1.) The Court further finds Defendant’s response to be evasive, deliberately maintaining that the “Agreement” does not contract with other authorized dealers, rather than stating whether Defendant contracts with other authorized dealers, as the term is used in the subject agreement. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 8 and 10.

Special Interrogatory No. 9 asks Defendant to “state, with specificity, why SolarSesame’s ability to complete site surveys and credit applications in YOUR DMS portal was revoked in late August 2023.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 7:3–4.) In its further response, Defendant stated that “access was not permitted as Propounding Party had breached the Agreement.” (Id. at 7:15–16.) Plaintiff argues that this response is impermissibly vague, as Defendant fails to state, for example, “when did Plaintiff alleged breach the Agreement? And how?” (Id. at 8:1–2.) While Defendant maintains that its response is sufficient, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the response is incomplete as written. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 9.

Special Interrogatory No. 11 asks Defendant to “identify any and all persons assigned by YOU as Project Manager under the Agreement.” (Id. at 9:6–7.) Special Interrogatory No. 15 asks Defendant to “state, with specificity, the facts and circumstances behind why Michael Le is no longer employed by or otherwise associated with YOU.” (Id. at 14:3–4.) Defendant provided objection-only responses to the subject interrogatories. Plaintiff argues that a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 11 is necessary because “the subject agreement required Defendant to assign a ‘Project Manager’ to support Plaintiff’s projects and ‘serve as the main point of contact.’ … This is plainly relevant to this breach of contract action, so none of the objections are applicable, even if they were not per se inappropriate.” (Id. 9:15–18.) Plaintiff further argues that Special Interrogatory No. 15 “seeks information regarding the termination of Michael Le, who was Plaintiff’s primary point of contact with Defendants during the term of the subject agreement. … Such information is within the scope of discovery and admissible evidence.” (14:11–14.) The Court agrees, and therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 11 and 15.

Special Interrogatory No. 12 asks Defendant to “state, with specificity, the relationship between YOU and Defendant LA SOLAR GROUP, INC., including but not limited to any arrangements for the sharing of employees.” (Id. at 10:3–4.) Defendant responded that “the parties are ‘sister’ organizations doing business in separate states. There is no formal agreement between the parties.” (Id. at 10:15–16.) Plaintiff asserts that this response is insufficient because “the statement that they are ‘sister’ companies provides no useful information beyond the fact that they are affiliates. Do they share the same ownership? If employees are shared, which company(ies) formally employ them? Etc.” (Id. at 11:1–3.) However, to this extent, the Court finds that this interrogatory does not specifically seek information about Defendant’s shared ownership with co-defendant LA Solar Group. Defendant argues in opposition that “Defendant is uncertain what further information Plaintiff is looking for and cannot speculate to respond further.” (Def.’s Sep. Stmt. 9:18–19.) The Court finds Defendant’s response to be sufficient, and therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 12.

Special Interrogatory No. 13 asks Defendant to bolster a previously-produced deal spreadsheet with the following information: “the status of each such project (completed, canceled by customer, canceled by YOU, etc.), moneys received by YOU attributable to such project, amounts still due to YOU from such project, and moneys paid by YOU to SolarSesame attributable to such project.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 11:15–18.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant partially complied with this request, producing a “file [which] only contained a status update and did not contain the moneys received by Defendant, the amounts still due, or the moneys paid to SolarSesame. These monies are at the heart of this dispute.” (Id. at 12:14–16.) Defendant maintains that no additional responses are warranted. (Def.’s Sep. Stmt. 10:19–11:1.) The Court disagrees and finds Defendant’s response to be incomplete. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 13.

Special Interrogatory No. 18 asks Defendant to “describe, with specificity, YOUR relationship with Monique Cruz from August 1, 2023 to the present, including but not limited to any authority she had or has to act on YOUR behalf.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 14:17–19.) Defendant responded that “Responding Party is not familiar with Monique Cruz.” (Id. at 15:13.) Plaintiff argues that a further response is warranted because “it seems unlikely that Defendant would be unfamiliar with Monique Cruz after a good faith diligent inquiry, considering that Plaintiff is aware of communications with her, coming from a @lasolargroup.com address (noting that Defendants are ‘sister’ companies as admitted above in response to No. 12) and signed as ‘Project Manager.’” (Id. at 15:17–20.) Defendant maintains that no further response is warranted. “The object of discovery is to prevent surprise at trial,” therefore a responding party may not delay “producing what was clearly in his possession and failed to make a diligent search for records he could easily have obtained.” (Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1025.) The Court is not persuaded that Defendant’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 18 reflects a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information sought, and therefore finds Defendant’s response to be evasive. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (c).) Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 18.

Special Interrogatory No. 19 asks Defendant to “state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of any PERSON who was involved in drafting or revising the AGREEMENT.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 16:3–4.) Defendant’s response states that “the AGREEMENT was drafted and negotiated between the parties. Responding Party is not aware who initially drafted the AGREEMENT.” (Id. at 16:15–17.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that “Defendant has provided only a vague response that does not identify a single person.” (Id. at 16:23.) The Court is not persuaded that Defendant’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 19 reflects a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information sought, based on Defendant’s undisputed access to its own business records, and therefore finds Defendant’s response to be evasive. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (c).) Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 19.

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff’s RFP No. 3 seeks all communications between Defendant and any customer since the 8/1/23. (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 3:3–4.) In response, Defendant asserted objections based on ambiguity, relevance, overbreadth, and privacy. (Id. at 3:5–12.) Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that “this request is highly relevant, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, because Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant exercised bad faith in cancelling projects with mutual customers and also in communicating to Plaintiff that certain projects were being cancelled when they in fact were not.” (Id. at 3:20–22.) The Court agrees that the documents sought by RFP No. 3 are relevant. In opposition, Defendant maintains that “the request is overbroad in that it seeks all communications with all customers.” (Def.’s Sep. Stmt. 2:23.) However, the Court notes that the party objecting to a discovery request on this basis bears the burden of supplying evidence of “the quantum of work required,” and here, Defendant has made no such showing. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to RFP No. 3.

RFP No. 4 seeks “any and all COMMUNICATIONS between D. A. Dabner and Ara Petrosyan that refer to or otherwise concern the AGREEMENT or the propounding party.” (Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. 5:3–4.) In response, Defendant asserted objections based on relevance, overbreadth, and attorney-client privilege. (Id. at 3:5–12.) Plaintiff argues that “the request is patently not overbroad, as it is narrowly tailored to communications between two of Defendant’s executives that ‘refer to or otherwise concern the AGREEMENT or the propounding party.’ Communications that reference the contract at the heart of this dispute, or otherwise concern Plaintiff, are patently discoverable and admissible – such communications could include, for example, admissions by Defendant’s agents of the amounts owed to Plaintiff, or how Defendant improperly terminated the agreement. … The only exception would be communications subject to the attorney-client privilege – however, Defendant has not provided a privilege log as required by CCP § 2031.240(b).” (Id. at 5:11–19.) The Court agrees, and therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to RFP No. 4.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories [or RFPs], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).) Additionally, “the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff requests a total combined sum of $7,195.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant, which encompasses: (1) 5.3 hours of Plaintiff’s attorney’s time spent preparing the motions; and (2) 8 hours preparing Plaintiff’s replies; at counsel’s hourly billing rate of $450.00 per hour. Plaintiff also seeks to recover $60.00 in filing fees per motion, and an anticipated 2 hours attending the instant hearing, at counsel’s hourly billing rate of $545.00 per hour. In granting the instant motions, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff monetary sanctions in the amount of $960.00 against Defendant.

The motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One, is granted in part. Defendant to provide further objection-free responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatory Nos. 1, 7–11, 13–15, and 18–19 within 30 days.

The motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, is granted. Defendant to provide further responses to RFP Nos. 3 and 4 within 30 days.

JANUARY 8, 2025

(Requests for Production of Documents, Set One)

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV03607

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Smart Main Panel Inc., dba LA/TX Solar Group (“Defendant”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant’s compliance with its responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, agreeing to provide documents responsive to RFP Nos. 1, 2, and 5. Plaintiff also seeks to recover monetary sanctions against Defendant and/or its counsel in the amount of $465.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted. Defendant is ordered to produce documents to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 1, 2, and 5, in compliance with its responses thereto, within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $250.00.

On 4/22/24, Plaintiff served its first set of RFPs on Defendant. (Decl. of Adam Losey ¶ 2.) On 7/17/24, Defendant served supplemental responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

On 10/4/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s compliance with its agreement to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 1, 2, and 5. No opposition has been filed to date.

A responding party must respond to each propounded request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) “If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.320, subd. (a).)

Here, “in response to three of the Requests (No. 1, 2, and 5), Defendant stated: ‘Responding party shall comply with this request by producing any and all documents in his possession, custody and/or control.’” (Losey Decl. ¶ 4.) However, as of the filing date of the motion, “no documents have been forthcoming other than the single spreadsheet.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)

The Court notes that Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion. Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel Defendant’s compliance with its responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel compliance with a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.320, subd. (b).) Additionally, “the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $465.00 to be imposed against Defendant and/or its counsel. This amount includes 0.9 hours of Plaintiff’s attorney’s time spent working on this motion, at his hourly billing rate of $450.00 per hour. (Losey Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff also seeks to recover an additional $60.00 in filing fees. (Ibid.)

In granting the instant unopposed motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Moving Defendant sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $250.00.¿To the extent that Defendant has now produced documents responsive to the subject RFPs, thereby rendering the instant motion moot, the request for sanctions is respectively moot.

The unopposed motion is granted. Defendant is ordered to produce documents to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, Nos. 1, 2, and 5, in compliance with its responses thereto, within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $250.00.