Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 23CHCV03816, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 23CHCV03816    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 3/5/25

Case #23CHCV03816

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 11/5/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Rafael Juarez (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 1–3, 7, 9, 14–20, 27–28, 37–38, 41–42, 45–46, 51–54, 67–72, 81–84, 87, 90–91, 102, 105–106, 108, 112–113, 118–119, 124–125, and 133–140.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Nos. 9, 15–16, 27–28, 41–42, 45–46, 51–54, 71, 81–82, 108, 124–125, 137, and 139–140, subject to the limitations set forth below, within 45 days.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on or around 9/3/21, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that “defects and/or nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, engine defects, transmission defects, body defects; among other defects and/or non-conformities,” but Defendant “has failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.” (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 15.) 

On 12/15/23, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability. On 1/17/24, Defendant filed its answer.

On 6/14/24, Plaintiff served his RFPs, Set One, on Defendant. (Ex. 6 to Decl. of Anita J. Marks.) On 9/17/24, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Marks Decl. ¶ 23.)

On 11/5/24, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to his RFPs, Set One. On 2/20/25, Defendant filed its opposition. On 2/26/25, Plaintiff filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) 

If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id., subd. (b).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete”; “(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive”; or “(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s additional responses to his first set of RFPs, Nos. 1–3, 7, 9, 14–20, 27–28, 37–38, 41–42, 45–46, 51–54, 67–72, 81–84, 87, 90–91, 102, 105–106, 108, 112–113, 118–119, 124–125, and 133–140, arguing that Defendant’s objections thereto are without merit and that “at the time of filing this Motion, Defendant has not produced any documents.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5:24.)

A.    Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further RFP responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating, “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.) 

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that on 10/2/24 and 11/5/24, she emailed Defendant’s counsel meet and confer letters regarding the issues raised in the instant motion but received no response. (Marks Decl. ¶¶ 30, 33.) The Court therefore finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). 

B.     Defendant’s Responses

As a preliminary matter, the Court observes that Defendant responded to RFP Nos. 1–2, 16, 20, 72, 90, and 113 with a statement of compliance, agreeing to produce responsive documents. Defendant responded to RFP Nos. 3, 7, 14, 17, 18, 37–38, 83–84, 87, 91, 102, 105–106, and 138 with a statement of inability to comply. The Court finds that these substantive responses are code-compliant under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210, subdivision (a). The Court addresses the remaining RFPs at issue, RFP Nos. 9, 15–16, 27–28, 41–42, 45–46, 51–54, 67–71, 81–82, 108, 112, 118–119, 124–125, 133–137, and 139–140, below.

C.    Defendant’s Objections

Here, Defendant argues that “AHM provided substantive responses to all relevant inquiries. Objection-only responses were limited to requests seeking unrelated consumer data or exceeding this lawsuit’s scope.” (Def.’s Opp. 9:26–28.) Plaintiff argues that further responses are warranted because “Plaintiff specifically tailored his RFPs to obtain information relevant to this lawsuit, including internal investigations and analyses regarding vehicles equipped with the same 3.5L engine and 9-speed transmission as the Subject Vehicle, as well as the same Defects Plaintiff experienced.” (Pl.’s Mot. 7:13–15.)

The demanding party must take the initiative to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of any objection by moving to compel a further response, but the objecting party has the burden of justifying the objection. (See, e.g., Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.) Here, Defendant objected to each request at issue on the bases of, inter alia, scope and relevance.

Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that further responses to the subject RFPs should be compelled because each request seeks relevant matter.

Defendant argues in opposition that “this lawsuit’s scope should be laser-focused on Plaintiff’s vehicle, its repair history, and AHM’s response to his specific concerns.” (Def.’s Opp. 12:28–13:1.) Defendant further argues that the requested documents are irrelevant to determine whether Defendant willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act, because “for purposes of willfulness and civil penalty, it is unnecessary to look beyond the vehicle at issue and the circumstances surrounding the vehicle at issue.” (Id. at 14:12–13, citing Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051–1052.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to establish the requisite good cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may be based on the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiff’s is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiff in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects.

Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendant’s reliance on Lukather is misplaced, where the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding of willfulness based on the plaintiff’s testimony and evidence of telephone logs. (181 Cal.App.4th at 1051–1052.) The Lukather court did not set forth any rule limiting the evidence relevant to a manufacturer’s “willful” violations of the Song-Beverly Act solely to the repair history of the subject vehicle. Here, the Court finds that the documents concerning defects in other vehicles are relevant to aid in a factfinder’s determination of whether Defendant’s decision not to refund Plaintiffs or repurchase the subject vehicle was made reasonably and in good faith.

1.      Limitations

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court finds that many of Plaintiff’s requests remain overbroad in scope. For example, the term “ACURA MDX VEHICLES” is defined as “all ACURA MDX VEHICLES manufactured and/or sold by Honda that are equipped with the same 3.5L engine and 9-speed transmission as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (Ex. 6 to Marks Decl., 6:8–10.) The Court further limits this definition to include only 2019 Acura MDX vehicles. (See, e.g., RFP Nos. 15–20, 27–28, 37–38, 41–42, 71–72, 105–106, 137–140.)

With respect to discovery of documents relating to customer complaints, the Court limits the requests to complaints regarding vehicles purchased only in the State of California. (See, e.g., RFP Nos. 27–28, 37–38, 41–42, 81–84.) With respect to discovery of documents relating to internal investigations, the Court limits the requests to the extent that they require Defendant to search its email database. (See, e.g., RFP Nos. 37–38, 41–42, 45–46, 51–54, 81–84.)

RFP Nos. 67–70 seek “all documents” concerning the engine and transmission defects in vehicles equipped with the same components as the subject vehicle, and all documents, including emails, concerning any fixes thereof. (Ex. 6 to Marks Decl.) The Court agrees with Defendant that these requests are ambiguous and “fails to describe with reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents being requested.” (Def.’s Opp. Sep. Stmt. 69:10–11, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.030, subd. (c)(1).) Accordingly, the Court denies the motion as to RFP Nos. 67–70.

RFP Nos. 112–113 and 118–119 seek Defendant’s communications with suppliers and government agencies regarding any issues or defects with the 3.5L engine or 9-speed transmission in Acura MDX vehicles. RFP Nos. 135–136 seek the same as to Defendant’s employees. RFP Nos. 133–134 seek documents produced in other lawsuits. The Court notes the volume of Song-Beverly cases in California, and finds that RFP Nos. 112–113, 118–119, 133–134, and 135–136 are overly broad and unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion as to RFP Nos. 112–113, 118–119, 133–134, and 135–136.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted in part. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Nos. 9, 15–16, 27–28, 41–42, 45–46, 51–54, 71, 81–82, 108, 124–125, 137, and 139–140, subject to the limitations set forth above, within 45 days.