Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCP00313, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24CHCP00313    Hearing Date: March 27, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO VACATE/SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT

Motion Filed: 12/12/24

MOVING PARTIES: Defendant Jason Arman (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Sharyn Arman; and Paige Arman (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order vacating the default entered against Moving Defendant on 9/12/24.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. Moving Defendant is relieved from the entry of default against him. Moving Defendant to separately file and serve his proposed answer and cross-complaint within 10 days.

Moving Defendant is reminded that all documents “must be text searchable when technologically feasible without impairment of the document's image.” (CRC 2.256(b)(3).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

This is a corporate action wherein Plaintiffs, Sharyn Arman, and her daughter Paige Arman, seek the removal of Sharyn’s husband and Paige’s father, moving defendant Jason Arman, from his positions as both a director and member of two companies he shares with Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–16.) Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendant “has experienced an unprecedented series of arrests with escalating frequency, exacerbated by severe substance abuse, and continues to both (i) materially breach his fiduciary duties in relation to both JPAC and TPL (generally referred to herein collectively as the ‘Companies’ and individually as a ‘Company’) as well as their respective shareholders and members; and (ii) seriously threaten the health and productivity of each of the Companies, its owners and their respective clients.” (Id. at ¶ 14.)

On 8/8/24, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Moving Defendant, J.P. Arman Company (“JPAC”), and Triple P Lot, LLC (“TPL”), alleging the following causes of action: (1) Removal of Director; (2) Removal of Member; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duties; (4) Declaratory Relief; (5) Appointment of Director; and (6) a Derivative Action for Damages and Injunctive Relief.

On 8/19/24, Plaintiffs filed a proof of service stating that the complaint and summons were personally served on Moving Defendant at his inpatient rehabilitation facility on 8/11/24. On 9/12/24, default was entered against Moving Defendant.

On 12/12/24, Moving Defendant filed the instant motion. On 3/18/25, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 3/20/25, Moving Defendant filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 473, subd. (b).)

Here, Moving Defendant seeks to vacate the entry of default against him because he “failed to file a timely response to plaintiffs’ verified complaint due to his mistake and excusable neglect while he was in inpatient alcohol rehabilitation and homeless in the nine days immediately thereafter before default was taken.” (Def.’s Mot. 1:3–5.) “Any neglect by Jason was excusable, considering he was in residential rehab for most of the 30 days after the complaint was served, and trying to meet his basic needs after leaving rehab.” (Id. at 8:20–21.) “Practically speaking, Jason did not have the full 30 days to respond to a complaint like the average defendant, because he was effectively hospitalized for three quarters of that time.” (Id. at 9:2–4.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that “voluntary intoxication is not considered ‘excusable neglect’ that would justify relief under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b).” (Pls.’ Opp. 13:22–23, citing Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 741 [“The term ‘excusable neglect’ in [Penal Code] section 1387.1 is given the same construction in criminal cases as it has been given in civil cases. … Simply expressed, excusable neglect is neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.”] [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Plaintiffs therefore argue that “voluntary drinking and related conditions that have directly resulted from his chronic substance abuse are voluntary acts of neglect resulting from circumstances within one's control; they do not constitute ‘excusable neglect,’ and may not serve as the basis for discretionary relief under CCP §473(b).” (Id. at 13:13–16.) Plaintiffs assert that “this court should ensure the Defendant’s voluntary alcohol consumption does not serve as a basis for relief under CCP §473(b).” (Id. at 15:4–5.)

In reply, Moving Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to rebut Jason’s showing that he met all requirements for the relief requested, and ignores the strong policy favoring trial on the merits with all doubts resolved in favor of granting relief.” (Def.’s Reply 2:4–6.) “A reasonably prudent person standing in Jason’s alcoholic, homeless shoes would similarly have prioritized participating in and completing his inpatient treatment, and then finding a place to stay and securing funds for food and basic needs.” (Id. at 3:26–28.) Moving Defendant further argues that “it cannot be denied that Jason suffered from some degree of mental confusion or illness during the time to file a response, based on the totality of circumstances in this case.” (Id. at 4:5–7.)

Moving Defendant further argues that the Miller case is inapposite because the Court of Appeal did not go “so far as to hold that voluntary conduct or circumstances under one’s own control cannot be excusable neglect.” (Id. at 4:11–12, citing 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 741–743.) Moving Defendant asserts that “no authority cited by plaintiffs supports their argument that neglect arising out of circumstances under one’s own control is not excusable.” (Id. at 5:21–23.) The Court agrees. Finally, Moving Defendant argues that he “does not contend he is entitled to relief merely because he was self-represented during the time a response was due, but rather that his state of mind and the totality of the circumstances, including his understandable lack of representation at the time, and his right to clear communication are factors supporting a finding of mistake justifying relief sought.” (Id. at 6:14–18.)

The Court notes that “because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) The Court therefore finds that, based on the totality of circumstances, Moving Defendant’s failure to file a timely response to Plaintiffs’ complaint was based on mistake or excusable neglect. Furthermore, the Court agrees with Moving Defendant that granting his requested relief and moving forward on the merits of the action would not unduly prejudice Plaintiffs.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Moving Defendant is entitled to relief from the default entered against him on 9/12/24. Accordingly, the motion is granted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted. Moving Defendant is relieved from the entry of default against him. Moving Defendant to separately file and serve his proposed answer and cross-complaint within 10 days.