TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action, and sustained as to Plaintiff’s second and fourth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a quiet title action in which Plaintiff and Defendant allegedly own neighboring properties located at 15308–15312 Parthenia Street and 15300–15306 Parthenia Street, North Hills, California. (FAC ¶¶ 1–2.) Plaintiff alleges that the parties share a common parking lot, accessed by an entrance on the side owned by Defendant, and on which an easement has been created by custom and practice. (Id. at ¶¶ 5–9.) “Los Hijos de Sanchez, Inc. has now erected barriers on the property line to the common boundary of the adjoining buildings interfering with the flow of traffic to the tenants of the Jaffa properties and causing damage to the Jaffa tenants’ visitors’ cars.” (Id. at ¶ 10.) 

On 1/5/24, Plaintiff filed its original complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Quiet Title; (2) Declaratory Relief – Prescriptive Easement; (3) Declaratory Relief – Easement by Necessity; (4) Declaratory Relief – Easement by Acquiescence; (5) Permanent Injunctive Relief; and (6) Nuisance. On 4/2/24, Plaintiff filed its FAC, alleging against Defendants the same causes of action. 

On 4/18/24, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On 7/8/24, Plaintiff filed its opposition. On 7/10/24, Defendant filed its reply. 

ANALYSIS 

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and is uncertain, meaning “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) 

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿ 

Here, Defendant¿demurs against Plaintiff’s entire FAC, on the bases that Plaintiff fails¿to allege facts sufficient any of the causes of action contained therein, rendering the FAC fatally uncertain. 

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).) 

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to respond to any request to meet and confer. (Decl. of Gary A. Starre, ¶ 2a.) Therefore, counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a). 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendant alleges Quiet Title. An action for quiet title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) In an action for quiet title, a plaintiff must plead (1) “[a] description of the property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,” (3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that (1) the parties own neighboring properties located at 15308–15312 Parthenia Street and 15300–15306 Parthenia Street, North Hills, California, with a shared parking lot accessed by an entrance on the side owned by Defendant (FAC ¶¶ 1–2, 5–8); (2) that an easement over Defendant’s portion of the parking lot has been created by custom and practice (FAC ¶ 9); (3) that Defendant has wrongfully erected barriers to Plaintiff’s tenants’ visitors’ access to the allocated parking spaces (FAC ¶¶ 10–11); and (4) that “Plaintiff seeks an order quieting title across the parking lot and then to the parking areas so as to permit Plaintiff’s tenants visitors’ access to the allocated parking spaces.” (FAC ¶ 16.) 

Defendant argues that “simply stated, the facts alleged in the first amended complaint do give rise to a case for quiet title, as Plaintiff has never possessed title to the Sanchez parking lot, nor does it seek title.” (Dem. 5:19–20.) Defendant further argues that “quiet title can be used in an adverse possession case, in which title is sought and Plaintiff is in possession, but the statute does not provide for its use in an easement case, as is the situation in this complaint.” (Reply 3:18–21.) The Court disagrees, based on the plain language of the statute, which provides that a cause of action lies to quiet title to any property interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) As an easement is a property interest, the Court finds no basis to sustain the demurrer against Plaintiff’s first cause of action on this ground. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support each element of a cause of action for Quiet Title. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action. 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges Declaratory Relief – Prescriptive Easement against Defendant. “To establish the elements of a prescriptive easement, the claimant must prove use of the property, for the statutory period of five years, which use has been (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) hostile to the true owner; and (4) under claim of right.” (Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1032.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that it “has used the portion of the parking lot on Defendant’s side of the adjoining buildings openly, notoriously in derogation of Defendant’s otherwise legal rights, continuously and pursuant under a claim of right, for over a five-year period. Plaintiff’s tenants have the legal right to use the parking spaces behind Defendant’s building, to access across the property to the Plaintiff’s side of the parking area and to use the parking spaces behind the Plaintiff’s property free of any interference by Defendants.” (FAC ¶ 18.) 

Defendant argues that no hostile use giving rise to a prescriptive easement can be alleged where Plaintiff has also alleged that “Plaintiff’s tenants ability to access its parking spaces has been created by agreement.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that this alleged “agreement” between the parties applies only to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, which is factually distinct from its second cause of action. “Plaintiff’s first cause of action seeks to have this court validate its tenants rights to traverse across the common parking lot unimpeded by the acts of the Defendant who have now created blocks to travel across the common parking area. The Second Cause of Action seeks a determination that Plaitniff’s [sic] tenants have the legal right to park on any available parking space behind the 2 common buildings not just behind Plaintiff’s tenant’s buildings as has been the custom of the parties over years if not decades.” (Opp. 6:14–20.) 

However, the Court finds the factual distinction argued by Plaintiff unclear from a cursory reading of the FAC. With respect to this cause of action, Plaintiff mentions its tenants’ legal rights, explicitly including any right “to access across the property to the Plaintiff’s side of the parking area.” (FAC ¶ 18.) This allegation, when made in connection with Plaintiff’s second cause of action, is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s argument that this cause of action is factually distinct from its first cause of action, which likewise “seeks an order quieting title across the parking lot and then to the parking areas so as to permit Plaintiff’s tenants visitors’ access to the allocated parking spaces.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support each element of a cause of action for Prescriptive Easement. Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action. 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges Declaratory Relief –Easement by Necessity against Defendant. “An easement by way of necessity arises by operation of law when it is established that (1) there is a strict necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimant’s property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity.” (Moores v. Walsh (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1049.) 

Here, “Plaintiff alleges that there is a strict necessity for the right-of-way, as Plaintiff’s property is landlocked. Plaintiff’s tenants cannot proceed to the parking spaces behind Plaintiff’s building without first traversing across Defendant’s parking area. There is a strict necessity to access the dominant tenement to preserve the value and use of Plaintiff’s property.” (FAC ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further alleges that “the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity,” and that it “is strictly necessary for its tenant’s visitors to access to the dominant tenement.” (Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.) 

Defendant argues on demurrer that the property is not landlocked. However, at the demurrer stage, the Court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The Court does not engage in weighing the merits of Plaintiff’s factual allegations at the demurrer stage. (Ibid.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support each element of a cause of action for an Easement by Necessity. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action. 

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges Declaratory Relief – Easement by Acquiescence against Defendant. Defendant argues that Easement by Acquiescence is neither a valid legal term nor cause of action, and that this cause of action is duplicative of Plaintiff’s second cause of action for a prescriptive easement. (Dem. 9:15–22.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that “the Fourth Cause of Action is for Declaratory Relief which requests that this Court find that the parities [sic] acquiesced to the easements at issue.” (Opp. 8:14–15.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant and finds no basis for a cause of action for “easement by acquiescence.” Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained against Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action. 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action seeks Permanent Injunctive Relief. “To qualify for a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of a cause of action involving the wrongful act sought to be enjoined … and (2) the grounds for equitable relief.” (San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gallagher (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 501, 503.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant has illegally created obstructions to Plaintiff’s tenants’ visitors use of the parking spaces” in violation of the purported easement across Defendant’s property. (FAC ¶ 33.) As such, “Plaintiff seek[s] an order enjoining Defendants from creating any form of obstruction to Plaintiff’s tenants’ visitors use of the parking spaces. Plaintiff request[s] an order that the Defendant not erect any interferences with Plaintiff’s tenants’ visitors’ access to the parking spaces allocated to Plaintiff’s tenant’s visitors.” (Id. at ¶ 34.) 

Defendant argues that “if the first four causes of action fail, so does any claim for an injunction.” (Dem. 9:27.) However, as discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute its first and third causes of action, and likewise has sufficiently alleged grounds for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action. 

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges Nuisance against Defendant. Public nuisances are “substantial and unreasonable” “offenses against, or interferences with, the exercise of rights common to the public.” (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 305.) In an action for private nuisance, (1) “the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property”; (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage”; (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262–263.) 

Here, while Plaintiff has not specified whether it alleges against Defendant a public or private nuisance, it appears from the pleadings that Plaintiff intends to allege a private nuisance. Plaintiff alleges that (1) Defendant “has erected bollards, signs and threatens to call police authorities to interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to maintain and use its property to its most maximum financial benefit and to tenants’ visitors use of the parking lot as is permitted by the long history of the property owners of the properties and thus restricting Plaintiffs use of the property to it maximum financial benefit (FAC ¶ 36); (2) “Defendant’s invasion of the Plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land was substantial” (FAC ¶ 38); and (3) Defendant’s invasion of Plaintiff’s right to use the easement was unreasonable with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (FAC ¶ 39.) 

Defendant argues that “the claim of nuisance, public or private, is dependent on establishing that there is in fact an easement at all. In the absence of stating a cause of action to establish an easement. Plaintiff has not stated any facts of any kind that a non-existent easement has been abused causing damage to its use of the property. If there is no easement, then there is no nuisance, under the facts plead.” (Dem. 10:8–14.) The Court again notes its finding that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that there exists an easement over Defendant’s portion of the parking lot. Accordingly, it finds that Defendant’s argument is without merit. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support each element of a cause of action for Nuisance. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action. 

Generally speaking, “demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and thus are strictly construed because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery. Such demurrers are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Cal.Jur.3d § 137.) “Where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (2011) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 fn.2.) 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint is uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f). In applying the stringent standard for demurrers filed on this ground, the Court finds that the complaint is not “so incomprehensible” that Defendant cannot respond, especially given the extensive analysis it has argued against the pleading. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled on this ground. 

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). 

Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff specifically requests leave to amend in the event the Court sustain the instant demurrer, and that this is the first demurrer brought against the operative pleading. Therefore, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend the cross-complaint to cure the defects set forth above. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that “following an order sustaining a demurrer … with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. … The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.) 

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action, and sustained as to Plaintiff’s second and fourth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend.