Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV00077, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 24CHCV00077 Hearing Date: October 23, 2024 Dept: F51
OCTOBER 22,
2024
MOTION TO VACATE/SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24CHCV00077
Motion
Filed: 5/31/24
MOVING PARTIES: Defendant Bushra Mammo (“Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Blanca Alejandra Castro
Rizzo (“Plaintiff”)
NOTICE:
OK
RELIEF
REQUESTED: An
order quashing Plaintiff’s service of the complaint and summons on Defendant
and vacating the default judgment entered against Defendant on 4/25/24.
TENTATIVE
RULING: The unopposed
motion is granted in part. Defendant is relieved from the entry of default and
default judgment against her. Defendant to separately file and serve her
proposed answer within 10 days.
BACKGROUND
On 1/8/24, Plaintiff filed the instant action against
Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Los
Angeles Municipal Code § 151.00 et seq.; (2) Failure to Pay Relocation Amount
in Violation of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance; (3) Violation of
Civil Code § 789.3; (4) Negligence; (5) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (6)
Nuisance; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (8) Unjust
Enrichment. On 2/1/24, Plaintiff filed a proof of service stating that the
complaint and summons were personally served on Defendant on 1/22/24.
On 4/22/24, the Court entered default against Defendants. On
4/25/24, the Court entered a default judgment against Defendants in the amount
of $124,585.00. On 5/31/24, Defendant filed the instant motion. No opposition
has been filed to date.
ANALYSIS
“The court may, upon any terms
as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a
judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or
other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall
not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case
exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 473, subd. (b).) “The
return of a [registered] process server … establishes a presumption, affecting
the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” (Evid.
Code § 647.) “The filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption
that the service was proper.” (Floveyor International, Ltd. v. Superior
Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795.)
Here, Defendant argues that she “was never personally served
in this matter and disputes the alleged January 22, 2024 personal service upon
her as wholly false.” (Def.’s Mot. 3:20–21, citing Decl. of Bushra Mammo ¶ 8.)
To the extent that Defendant requests an order quashing the purported personal
service of the complaint and summons, this request is untimely. A defendant may move, “on or before the last day of his or
her time to plead,” to quash the service of summons by alleging a lack of
personal jurisdiction, or to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient
forum. (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10, subd. (a).) Here, as Defendant
was purportedly personally served on 1/22/24, she had until 2/21/24 to move to
quash the service. Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendant’s request
to quash the service of the summons and complaint.
To the
extent that Defendant seeks mandatory relief from the default judgment
against her based on her
attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,
Defendant has not provided the Court with the requisite attorney affidavit of
fault, and therefore is not entitled to this form of relief. (Code Civ. Proc. §
473, subd. (b).)
To the
extent that Defendant seeks discretionary relief from the default
judgment against her based on her
own mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, Defendant
contends that she “only received notice of this matter because a copy of the
complaint was sent to a restaurant owed [sic] by the Defendants [sic] son.”
(Def.’s Mot. 3:4–5, citing Mammo Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant argues that the parties
attempted to informally resolve the matter, but were unsuccessful, and that she
discovered the default judgment only when she directed her son to ask her
attorney to check the case status. (Mammo Decl. ¶¶ 5–7.) Thereafter, Defendant
declares that she diligently took action to have her attorney contact
Plaintiff’s counsel and file the instant motion. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
The Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to oppose the
instant motion, and that “because the law strongly favors trial and disposition
on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of
the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston v. City of Turlock
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that
Defendant is entitled to relief from the default judgment entered against her
on 4/25/24. The Court further notes the lack of proofs of service on Defendant
of the entry of default and default judgment against her. Accordingly, the unopposed
motion is granted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision
(b).
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CONCLUSION
The unopposed
motion is granted in part. Defendant is relieved from the entry of default and
default judgment against her. Defendant to separately file and serve her
proposed answer within 10 days.