Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV00310, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV00310    Hearing Date: November 12, 2024    Dept: F51

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

Demurrer with Motion to Strike Filed: 7/3/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant City of Santa Clarita (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Estate of Limmie Jones, Jr.; Latuanza Jones; Willie Richie; and Brian Hagen (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Moving Defendant also seeks an order striking Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages.

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is granted without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND 

This is a wrongful death action brought by Plaintiffs, who are the estate, the siblings, and son, of decedent Limmie Jones, Jr. (“Decedent”). (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that on 1/9/23, Decedent was struck and killed by a freight train in Santa Clarita, California, on land owned by Moving Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

On 1/30/24, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against eight named defendants the following causes of action: (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property; (2) Premises Liability (Private Entity); (3) Negligence; (4) Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision & Retention; (5) Wrongful Death; and (6) Survivorship Action.

On 7/3/24, Moving Defendant filed and served the instant demurrer and motion to strike. No opposition has been field to date.

DEMURRER

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and is uncertain, meaning “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

Here, Moving Defendant¿demurs to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action on the basis that the complaint fails¿to allege facts sufficient to¿state¿a cause of action for Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision & Retention.

A.    Meet-and-Confer 

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that on 6/26/24, he sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a meet and confer letter regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer and motion to strike, but received no response. (Decl. of Robert L. Theiring ¶¶ 7–8.) The Court finds that therefore, counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

B.     Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision & Retention

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action alleges Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision & Retention against Defendants. The elements of a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are: (1) the employer’s hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee; (2) the employee was incompetent or unfit; (3) the employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and (4) harm occurs. (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836–837.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that “while the Complaint is too vague to ascertain the City’s specific duties or alleged breach thereof, the action is clearly based on ownership, operation, and entrustment of property allegedly owned or maintained by public entities. … Otherwise stated, the Fourth Cause of Action against the City is a common law negligence action against a public entity, something specifically prohibited by California law.” (Dem. 5:19–23, citing Gov. Code § 815, subd. (a). [“A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”].)

Moving Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is fatally uncertain because it “states that it is directed ‘By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION.’ … Based on the styling of the pleading, the City is uncertain if Plaintiffs are alleging the Fourth Cause of Action against all named Defendants, including the City, or just the Union Defendants.” (Id. at 6:6–10.) The Court agrees, and notes that Plaintiffs have failed to file any opposition to Moving Defendant’s demurrer.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention cause of action against Moving Defendant, a public entity. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is sustained.

MOTION TO STRIKE

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.) Here, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages.

A.    Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)

Here, as previously mentioned, Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that on 6/26/24, he sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a meet and confer letter regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer and motion to strike, but received no response. (Theiring Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.) Therefore, counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).

B.     Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Id. at subd. (c); Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

“A public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Gov. Code § 818.) “Thus, if a complaint seeks damages that are primarily punitive (that is, retributive or deterrent in nature) against a public agency defendant, section 818 requires the trial court ‘to strike those portions of the complaint.’” (X.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1022–1023, citing McAllister v. South Coast Air Quality Etc. Dist. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 653, 656.)

Here, to the extent that Plaintiffs pray for exemplary and punitive damages against Moving Defendant, a public entity, in their complaint, those damages are barred under Government Code section 818. Accordingly, the motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages is granted.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Here, the Court again notes that Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the instant demurrer and motion to strike. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that the pleading can be successfully amended. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs leave to amend.

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is granted without leave to amend.