Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV00421, Date: 2024-09-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV00421    Hearing Date: September 20, 2024    Dept: F51

SEPTEMBER 19, 2024

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24CHCV00421

 

Motion Filed: 5/24/24

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Pueblo Restaurant Inc., dba Casa Torres Restaurant Y Cantina; Albert Gonzalez, Jr.; and Daniel Torres (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Crystal Baires (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendants move to strike references to punitive damages from Plaintiff’s complaint.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Moving Defendants to file and serve their answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.

 

BACKGROUND 

 

Plaintiff alleges that on 3/6/22, while Plaintiff was a patron of Moving Defendants’ restaurant located at 14117 Hubbard St., Sylmar, CA 91342, an altercation occurred and Defendants escorted Plaintiff and unnamed assailant Doe defendant 4 from the property. (Compl. ¶ 14.) The nonmoving security defendants allegedly handcuffed Plaintiff to a bench rail and left her unattended, after which the unnamed assailant defendant physically assaulted Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 15–16.)

 

On 2/13/24, Plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Premises Liability; and (3) False Imprisonment. On 5/24/24, Moving Defendants filed the instant motion to strike. On 9/9/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 9/12/24, Moving Defendants filed their reply.

 

ANALYSIS

 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

 

A.    Meet and Confer

 

Moving Defendants’ counsel declares that on 5/23/34, she met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the issues raised in the instant motion, but the parties were unable to informally resolve the issues. (Decl. of Kathleen M. Ward ¶ 3.) The Court therefore finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).

 

B.     Punitive Damages

 

Punitive damages may be recovered in non-contract actions upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Id. at subd. (c); Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

 

Punitive damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)

 

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the security defendants, at Moving Defendants’ direction, “deprived PLAINTIFF of her liberty, freedom of movement and ability to escape the vicious assault by ASSAILANT,” and allowed the assailant to flee the premises. (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 36.) Plaintiff further alleges that she suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries from the subject incident, including permanent disabilities. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 37–39.)

 

Here, Moving Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s factual allegations against Defendants fail to identify any wrongful conduct that meets the description of despicable conduct. The facts stated in support of the punitive damages allegations against Defendants fall short of properly alleging malice oppression or fraud.” (MTS 6:1–3.) “At most, Plaintiff’s claim amounts to negligence against Defendants which is insufficient to meet the standard for pleading entitlement to punitive damages.” (Id. at 6:6–7.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has sufficiently alleged “the ultimate facts necessary to state a claim for punitive damages based upon malice and oppression.” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:15–16, citing Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 16, 18–25, 29, 34, 37, 40.) On reply, Moving Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate to show malice, fraud, or oppression giving rise to the recovery of punitive damages. (Def.’s Reply 2:15–19.) The Court disagrees. Based on a review of Plaintiff’s factual allegations, the Court finds that the Complaint, as pled, sufficiently pleads a basis for punitive damages against Moving Defendants based on malice or oppression. As Plaintiff contends, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Moving Defendants directed the security personnel to restrain Plaintiff by handcuffing her to a bench rail and leaving her unattended and therefore unable to escape the assault by the assailant. (Compl. ¶¶ 34–36.) This alleged conduct sufficiently supports a prayer for punitive damages as a “conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

 

Accordingly, the Court finds that at the pleading stage, Moving Defendants’ alleged conduct as pled may be considered malicious and oppressive as defined by Civil Code section 3294. Further investigation of the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations may be resolved through the discovery process.

 

CONCLUSION 

 

The motion is denied. Moving Defendants to file and serve their answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.