Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV00671, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV00671    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA

Motion filed: 11/8/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Wilbur Curtis Co. Inc. (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Renau Corporation (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order quashing Plaintiff’s 10/14/24 deposition subpoena for production of business records, propounded and served on non-party deponent Elan Industries, Inc., and monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and its counsel.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

This is a contract action brought by Plaintiff, which sells components to Defendant to be used in Defendant’s professional coffee making equipment. (SAC ¶ 10.) On 8/20/96, the parties entered into an Exclusive Distribution Agreement, renewed automatically year-to-year. (Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the Agreement by cancelling purchase orders without justification and refusing to pay for goods already delivered to Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant utilized Plaintiff’s competitor, Elan Industries, Inc. (“Elan”), to manufacture and supply to Defendant substantially the same components, in breach of the Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 61.)

On 3/5/24, Plaintiff filed its original complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Goods Rendered; (4) Quantum Valebant; and (5) Fraud and Deceit. On 3/6/24, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging the same causes of action. On 12/5/24, Plaintiff filed its second amended complaint (“SAC”), alleging the same causes of action.

On 10/14/24, Plaintiff served a deposition subpoena for business records on Elan, seeking the production of documents relating to communications with Defendant and the design and development of “the WC774-E controller.” (Ex. A to Decl. of Jennifer M. Oliver.) On 11/8/24, Defendant filed the instant motion to quash the deposition subpoena. On 2/24/25, Plaintiff filed its opposition. On 2/28/25, Defendant filed its reply.

ANALYSIS

A party may move to quash a deposition subpoena to strike, modify, or direct “compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (a).) Here, Plaintiff’s 10/14/24 deposition subpoena to Elan contains the following document demands:

“REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and WILBUR CURTIS between January 1, 2020 and the present, RELATING TO YOUR design, development and/or manufacture of the WC-774-E controller.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: ALL DOCUMENTS sufficient to show when YOU began design and development of the WC-774-E controller.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: ALL DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all persons who designed and developed the WC774-E controller for YOU.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: ANY and ALL COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and WILBUR CURTIS discussing RENAU or any of RENAU’S products, items or parts, from January 1, 2020 to the present.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS, drawings, schematics, or other materials sent or given to YOU by WILBUR CURTIS, RELATED or RELATING TO any component part for any WILBUR CURTIS product.” (Ex. A to Oliver Decl.)

Defendant moves to quash the subject subpoena “because it: (1) seeks documents already in the possession of a party to this action, Wilbur Curtis; (2) seeks documents that are not relevant to any allegation or cause of action in the Amended Complaint, which is currently subject to a demurrer; (3) is not stated with particularity as required by the Discovery Act, (4) is overly broad and unduly burdensome, especially in the context of a nonparty, and (5) seeks highly confidential, sensitive and proprietary information and violates the intellectual property and privacy rights of Elan and possibly other nonparties.” (Def.’s Mot. 2:13–19.)

A.    Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, Defendant argues that “Elan is an Illinois corporation with a principal address in Illinois. Because Elan is a foreign corporation, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to issue a subpoena Elan and Renau’s subpoena must be quashed. (Id. at 5:3–5, citing Amoco Chemical Co v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 554, 560.) The Amoco court held that the plaintiff’s notice requiring the custodian of records of a nonresident party to attend trial and bring documents was void and unenforceable. (34 Cal.App.4th at 559–560.) The Amoco holding relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 1989, which provides that “a witness, including a witness specified in subdivision (b) of Section 1987, is not obliged to attend as a witness before any court, judge, justice or any other officer, unless the witness is a resident within the state at the time of service.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1989.) However, the rule limiting subpoenas to California residents does not apply to subpoenas served on custodians of records, unless their personal attendance is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.3 [“When a subpoena duces tecum is served upon a custodian of records or other qualified witness … and his personal attendance is not required by the terms of the subpoena, Section 1989 shall not apply.”].)

Here, the subject subpoena was served on Elan’s custodian of records and seeks the mailing of the subject document production to the deposition officer’s office. (Ex. A to Oliver Decl.) Therefore, the Court finds that the rule limiting the subpoena power over nonresident witnesses does not apply here. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.3.)

B.     Meet and Confer

The parties further contest the sufficiency of meet and confer efforts. However, there is no meet and confer required prior to the bringing of a motion to quash under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1. Accordingly, the Court declines to address these arguments.

C.    Relevance

A Court may quash a deposition subpoena for being overly broad to the extent that it amounts to “nothing more than a fishing expedition” and therefore seeks the production of irrelevant evidence. (People v. Serrata (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 9, 15.) Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)

Here, Defendant argues that “none of [Plaintiff’s] allegations or claims bear any relation to the third-party communications and business records sought in the Subpoena, which focus solely on Wilbur Curtis’ communications and development efforts with nonparty Elan.” (Def.’s Mot. 6:20–22.) Defendant asserts that the requests are irrelevant because “Elan is mentioned nowhere in the Amended Complaint.” (Id. at 7:16–17.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “the documents and communications sought, which relate directly to the timing of Elan’s design, research, development, manufacture and supply to Wilbur Curtis of one particular component (Elan’s Model WC-774-E) will shed light on (1) when Wilbur Curtis began working with Elan to have Elan supply Wilbur Curtis with a component to replace Renau’s model WC-774 controller (in direct breach of the 1996 exclusive distribution and requirements contract), (2) who at Wilbur Curtis instigated or directed the actions or was involved in the undertaking and conduct leading to the breach, and (3) whether and where any of Renau’s proprietary information and know-how (entrusted to Wilbur Curtis) was shared or given to Elan to enable Elan to more quickly and efficiently duplicate Renau’s WC-774 controller.” (Pl.’s Opp. 4:1–9.) Plaintiff further observes that it filed its SAC after Defendant filed the instant motion, and “Elan is specifically and repeatedly mentioned in the operative SAC.” (Id. at 4:17–18, citing SAC ¶¶ 61, 75, 89, and 112.)

Plaintiff further argues that “the requested documents and communications, which go to Elan’s design and development of its version of this component for Wilbur Curtis, will demonstrate what involvement Wilbur Curtis had in Elan’s design and development of this component, including whether Wilbur Curtis shared with and/or supplied Elan with Renau’s confidential and proprietary design or manufacturing information which had been entrusted to Wilbur Curtis through the decades-long exclusive supply relationship.” (Id. at 6:12–17.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the requests seek information relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant, “because, under the terms of the 1996 Exclusive Distribution Agreement contract, Wilbur Curtis was required to purchase its full requirements of components exclusively from Renau. The documents requested will shed light on when Wilbur Curtis began surreptitiously working with Elan to replace Renau as its supplier of components covered by the 1996 Exclusive Distribution Agreement.” (Id. at 8:2–6.)

D.    Scope

Defendant argues that the subject document requests are analogous to those in Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, where the defendant claimed that gun mounts it contracted with the plaintiff to manufacture did not meet the designated specifications, refused to accept the gun mounts, and contracted with a third party to supply them. (53 Cal.App.4th at 219.) In the course of litigation, the Calcor plaintiff served the third party manufacturer with a document subpoena that included 32 document demands, “to, in effect, produce all materials in its possession relating to gun mounts, going back nearly ten years.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found that the “12–page demand might as well be condensed into a single sentence: Produce everything in your possession which in any way relates to gun mounts.” (Id. at 222.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the subpoena was impermissibly overbroad because, “although facially detailed and particularized, the demand, in effect, is very simple. It orders Calcor to produce everything in its possession which has anything to do with gun mounts (including the gun mount assemblies themselves).” (Id. at 220.) “The burden is sought to be imposed on Calcor to search its extensive files, at many locations, to see what it can find to fit Thiem’s definitions, instructions and categories.” (Id. at 222.)

Here, Defendant argues that like in Calcor, Plaintiff’s subpoena to Elan “is impermissibly broad and incredibly burdensome, lacks a reasonable temporal scope because it would require a full forensic search for more than four years of communications between business partners, and demands voluminous information from a nonparty when that information is already in the possession of a party.” (Def.’s Mot. 8:3–6.)

Upon review of the subject subpoena, the Court finds that the subject document requests are not as egregiously overbroad as those in Calcor, as Request Nos. 1–3 seek documents relating only to the design and development of the WC-774-E controller. (Ex. A to Oliver Decl.) Request Nos. 1 and 4 are also limited in scope to a relevant time from beginning on 1/1/20 to present. (Ibid.) “Renau is willing to narrow Request No. 5 to seek only those materials that Wilbur Curtis supplied to Elan that relate to the Wilbur Curtis components that were, for almost three decades, supplied by Renau.” (Pl.’s Opp. 3:12–14.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the document requests are sufficiently limited in scope. The Court finds it immaterial that the requests may seek the production of documents also within the possession of Defendant.

E.     Confidentiality

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff “seeks disclosure of competitively sensitive and highly confidential design materials including drawings and schematics prepared for Wilbur Curtis.” (Def.’s Mot. 9:9–11.) Defendant asserts that “nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements govern” the relationship between Elan and Defendant. (Id. at 9:16.) “Under those agreements, Elan cannot disclose any documents that reflect or disclose any confidential or proprietary information of Wilbur Curtis without Wilbur Curtis’ permission.” (Id. at 9:17–19.)

Evidence Code § 1060 provides that the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret and to prevent others from disclosing it, unless allowing the privilege will conceal fraud or result in injustice. A party that is claiming the trade secret privilege has the burden of proving the party's entitlement to that privilege. (Amgen Inc. v California Correctional Health Care Servs. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 733.)¿

“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civ. Code § 3426.1, subd. (d).)¿

Here, Plaintiff’s document request No. 5 seeks: “ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS, drawings, schematics, or other materials sent or given to YOU by WILBUR CURTIS, RELATED or RELATING TO any component part for any WILBUR CURTIS product.” (Ex. A to Oliver Decl.) As noted above, Plaintiff “is willing to narrow Request No. 5 to seek only those materials that Wilbur Curtis supplied to Elan that relate to the Wilbur Curtis components that were, for almost three decades, supplied by Renau.” (Pl.’s Opp. 3:12–14.)

Plaintiff argues in opposition that this request “is designed to ascertain what, if any, confidential and proprietary information and materials of Renau was shared with or provided to Elan by Wilbur Curtis (for Elan to develop its WC-774-E component).” (Id. at 8:17–19.) Plaintiff offers that “the parties will enter into a protective order which will protect confidentiality and alleviate such concerns.” (Id. at 8:21–22.)

The Court notes that while Plaintiff’s requests may seek to discover materials which may be considered trade secrets, any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information may be adequately protected by the terms of a protective order, which is not yet before this Court. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown adequate cause why the specific documents, as limited by Plaintiff, are protected trade secrets. Further, any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information may be adequately protected by the terms of a protective order.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s document subpoena to Elan.

F.     Sanctions

“In making an order pursuant to motion made under … Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.2, subd. (a).) Additionally, “the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendant requests that the Court “award Wilbur Curtis for the reasonable fees and costs that it incurred to bring this Motion.” (Def.’s Mot. 10:8–9.) In denying the instant motion, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to recover for such fees and expenses.

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied.