Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV00694, Date: 2024-08-19 Tentative Ruling
Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).
Case Number: 24CHCV00694 Hearing Date: August 19, 2024 Dept: F51
AUGUST 16, 2024
MOTION TO STRIKE
Los Angeles Superior Court Case  # 24CHCV00694
 
Motion Filed: 5/7/24
 
MOVING PARTY: Defendant State Farm General Insurance  Company (“Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff  Arto Boyajian (“Plaintiff”)
NOTICE: OK
 
RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant  moves to strike references to punitive damages from Plaintiff’s complaint.
 
TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Defendant to file and serve its answer  to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.
BACKGROUND 
This is an  insurance action in which Plaintiff, a homeowner of certain real property  located at 12215 Hondero Court, Los Angeles, CA 91344, alleges that Defendant  wrongfully withheld funds from Plaintiff relating to a claim Plaintiff filed  after his property was damaged on 9/1/23 due to water intrusion, and continues  to delay the resolution of the matter. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–17.)
On 3/5/24,  Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes  of action: (1) Breach of Contract; and (2) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and  Fair Dealing. On 5/7/24, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike. On 8/6/24,  Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 8/12/24, Defendant filed its reply.
ANALYSIS
The court may, upon a motion, or at any  time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant,  false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436,  subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn  or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order  of the court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the  face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)
A.    Meet  and Confer
Defendant’s counsel declares that on an unspecified date,  she met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the issues raised in  the instant motion, but the parties were unable to informally resolve the  issues. (Decl. of Christy Gargalis ¶ 2.) The Court therefore finds that counsel  has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil  Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).
B.     Punitive  Damages
Punitive  damages may be recovered in non-contract actions upon a proper showing of  malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code §  3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a  person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard  for the rights or safety of others. (Id. at subd. (c); Turman v.  Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust  hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud”  is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact  known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or  otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)
In the  insurance context, “it is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law,  under which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its  contractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal fairly and in  good faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to compensate  its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a  cause of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and  fair dealing.” (Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 574.)  An insurance carrier may be liable for punitive damages if it is found to have  acted with malice, fraud, or oppression in failing to deal fairly and in good  faith with its insured. (Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d  910, 922–923.)
Punitive  damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations,  devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that  parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court  (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v.  Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)
In the  complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that following the water intrusion at  his home, his contractor advised that Plaintiff and his family should relocate  while the home was undergoing necessary repairs. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Thereafter, “Defendant  nevertheless promptly denied an alternative housing allowance, unreasonably  maintaining that it was not needed since there was ‘running water.’” (Id. at  ¶ 10.) After Plaintiff retained counsel, “Defendant reassessed its position on  housing and agreed to an allowance of $22,500 per month for three months.  However, to date, State Farm has not paid this allowance, notwithstanding  Plaintiff’s delivery of and Defendant’s receipt of a lease and payment for  same.” (Id. at ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff  further alleges that no progress was made by Defendant to investigate the  physical damage to the home, and that multiple adjustors were assigned to the  case, but to date, Defendant has yet to make progress in the investigation  while Plaintiff “and his family continue to live in a state of disrepair and  damages.” (Id. at ¶¶ 13–17.) 
Here,  Defendant argues that “while Boyajian has alleged conducted in an unreasonable  manner to support a claim for bad faith, he has not alleged malicious,  oppressive or fraudulent conduct.” (MTS 4:27–28.) “Here, Plaintiffs have  alleged a dispute as to the amount of benefits or the manner and speed in which  State Farm handled his claim.” (Id. at 6:4–5.)
In opposition,  Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged that “Defendant unreasonably  and in bad faith: Delayed Dr. Boyajian’s claim for property damage and  alternative housing when it knew the claim was covered; Knowingly withheld  payment of sums rightfully owed; Deliberately failed to conduct a timely and  thorough investigation, violating industry standards and statutory requirements;  Prioritized its own interests over the insured’s, contravening its fiduciary  duty; Compelled Dr. Boyajian to institute litigation to recover policy amounts  due; [and] Forced Dr. Boyajian to undermine his family’s financial security by  failing to timely pay for repairs” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:15–24, citing Compl. ¶ 30.)
On reply,  Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate to show malice,  fraud, or oppression giving rise to the recovery of punitive damages. (Def.’s  Reply 2:22–3:12.) The Court disagrees. Based on a review of Plaintiff’s factual  allegations, the Court finds that the Complaint, as pled, sufficiently pleads a  basis for punitive damages against Defendant based on malice or oppression. As  Plaintiff contends, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant caused  unreasonable delay in failing to investigate and resolve the matter for over 6  months, causing Plaintiff and his family to either be displaced at Plaintiff’s  expense or to remain at the damaged and dangerous home. This alleged conduct  sufficiently supports a prayer for punitive damages as a “conscious disregard  for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)
Accordingly,  the Court finds that at the pleading stage, Defendant’s alleged conduct as pled  may be considered malicious and oppressive as defined by Civil Code section  3294. Further investigation of the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations may be  resolved through the discovery process.
CONCLUSION 
The motion to  strike is denied. Defendant to file and serve its answer to Plaintiff’s  complaint within 30 days.