Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV01971, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 24CHCV01971 Hearing Date: June 2, 2025 Dept: F51
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT
DEPARTMENT F-51
MAY 30, 2025
MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24CHCV01971
Motion Filed: 4/9/25
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Henry Tascoe Wallace III; Henry Tascoe Wallace Enterprises, Inc.; and W.I.N.G.S of America, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Rachel Rickole Johnson, in pro per (“Plaintiff”)
NOTICE: OK
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order expunging the Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) recorded by Plaintiff, and an award of attorney fees in the amount of $3,660.00.
TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted. Defendants are awarded $360.00 in attorney’s fees and costs.
BACKGROUND
This is a wrongful eviction action in which Plaintiff alleges that she entered into a romantic relationship with defendant Wallace, and on 6/1/23, she entered into a lease agreement for she and her three minor children to reside at a condominium located at 27054 Trail View Lane, Santa Clarita, California 91381. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20.) The subject property was owned/managed by defendants Wallace and Henry Tascoe Wallace Enterprises, Inc. (“Wallace Enterprises”). (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that Wallace physically and mentally abused her, and on 4/11/24, effectively evicted her and her children from the subject property by force. (Id. at ¶¶ 22–26.)
On 5/24/24, Plaintiff and her three minor children filed their complaint against Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code 1501.09; (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1940.1; (3) Violation of Civil Code § 1940.2; (4) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (5) Violation of Code Civ. Proc. § 1159; (7) Violation of Civil Code § 1954(a)(2); (8) Trespass; (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (10) Nuisance; (11) Violation of Civil Code § 52.1; and (12) Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act. On 2/24/25, Defendants filed their answer.
On 6/28/24, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens with this Court, and the lis pendens was recorded on 7/3/24. On 4/9/25, Defendants filed the instant motion to expunge lis pendens. No opposition has been filed to date.
ANALYSIS
Any party¿or a non-party having an interest in the property affected by a notice of lis pendens¿may move for expungement¿any time after the lis pendens is recorded.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30.)¿ A lis pendens must be removed for being improper on account of (a) the¿pleading on which the notice is based¿not containing a real property claim, assuming the allegations to be true, or¿(b) the claimant not being able to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.31, 405.32;¿Ziello v. Superior Court¿(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th¿321, 331–332; Urez Corp. v. Superior Court¿(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1149.)
¿¿
A. Nature of Claim
A real property claim lies where the causes of action, if proven, would affect either: (a) title to or the right to possession of specific real property, or (b) the use of an easement identified in the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4.) In determining whether a real property claim has been asserted, the Court engages in a demurrer-like analysis. (Park 100 Investment Group II, LLC v. Ryan¿(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 795, 808.) “Review ‘involves only a review of the adequacy of the pleading and normally should not involve evidence from either side, other than possibly that which may be judicially noticed as on a demurrer.’” (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 648.)
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims do not affect the title or right to possession of the subject property. (Defs.’ Mot. 4:25–6:22.) The Court disagrees. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants forcibly evicted Plaintiffs from the subject property, thereby wrongfully depriving Plaintiffs of their right to possession thereof under the lease agreement and a Court protective order. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 5–11, 21, 30, 60, 65, 69.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support a real property claim affecting possession of the subject property for purposes of the lis pendens statutes.
B. Probable Validity of Claim
When questioning the evidentiary merit of a claim, the claimant who filed the lis pendens has the burden of proof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30.) Thus, that claimant, in opposing the motion to expunge the lis pendens, must demonstrate the following: (1) the action affects title to or right of possession of the real property described in the notice; (2) insofar as the said notice is concerned, the party recording the notice has commenced the action for a proper purpose and in good faith; and (3) the probable validity of the real property claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (Hunting World, 22 Cal.App.4th at 70; Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30 et seq.)
“A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 481.190.) Here, as Plaintiff has failed to oppose the instant motion, the Court finds that she has failed to meet her burden to prove the probable validity of her claims. Accordingly, the motion to expunge the lis pendens is granted.
C. Service
“A party contending that a lis pendens is ‘void and invalid’ for purposes of section 405.23 due to defective service may raise this ground in a motion for expungement filed pursuant to section 405.30.” (J&A Mash & Barrel, LLC v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1, 24–25.) “Immediately following recordation, a copy of the notice shall also be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Service shall also be made immediately and in the same manner upon each adverse party later joined in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.22.) “Any notice of pendency of action shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the requirements of Section 405.22 are met for that party or owner and a proof of service in the form and content specified in Section 1013a has been recorded with the notice of pendency of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.23.)
Here, Defendants argue that the lis pendens must be expunged as void and invalid because “the Lis Pendens was not filed with the Court after it was recorded, nor was Wallace provided with a conformed copy of the Lis Pendens following recordation.” (Defs.’ Mot. 4:4–6.) The Court agrees, and further notes that Plaintiff has failed to oppose the instant motion. Accordingly, the motion is granted on this additional basis.
D. Attorney Fees
Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38 provides that “the court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.)
Here, Defendants request attorney fees in the amount of $3,660.00, encompassing (1) 6 hours of Defendants’ attorney’s time spent preparing the instant motion; and (2) an anticipated 6 hours to review Plaintiff’s opposition, prepare a reply, and appear at the instant hearing, a t counsel’s hourly rate of $300.00 per hour. (Decl. of Kelly A. Neavel ¶ 1.) Defendants also seek to recover $60.00 in filing fees. (Defs.’ Mot. 8:1.)
In granting the instant unopposed motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Defendants $360.00 in attorney’s fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
The unopposed motion is granted. Defendants are awarded $360.00 in attorney’s fees and costs.