Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 24CHCV02268, Date: 2024-12-20 Tentative Ruling

DECEMBER 19, 2024

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24CHCV02268

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Maria Arrezola, individually and as Trustee of the Arrezola Valtierra Trust; and Arrazola & Valtierra, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Brenda Mena; Enrique Mena; Fatima Salcedo Carrillo; Angel Ramirez; and Victor De Leon (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: Defendant Maria Arrezola’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence, but not the contents, of Exhibits i–v and vii, and denied as to Exhibit vi.

Defendant Arrazola & Valtierra, LLC’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence, but not the contents, of Exhibits i–iii.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS: Defendants’ evidentiary objections[1] Nos. 1, 4, 6, and 12 are overruled, and Nos. 24 and 31 are sustained. Defendants’ objection to Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of Brenda Mena is sustained.

This is a habitability action brought by Plaintiffs, tenants residing at 14515 Tyler Street, Sylmar, CA 91342, against Defendants, the owners and managers of the subject property. (Compl. ¶¶ 7–9.) Plaintiffs allege that on 1/1/16, they entered into a lease agreement with Defendants for a month-to-month tenancy of the subject property. (Id. at ¶ 17.) “Throughout Defendants’ ownership, management, and/or control of the premises, and throughout the duration of Plaintiffs tenancy, Plaintiffs have suffered uninhabitable, substandard, and defective housing conditions within the Subject Property.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) “The defective conditions of the premises include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Rodent, pest, and cockroach infestations; b. Mold and/or Mildew; c. Ongoing Plumbing issues; d. Extensive water damage; e. Missing or inadequate heating devices; f. Defective doors and windows; g. Improper or faulty kitchen sink; h. Improper ventilation; i. Inadequate electrical wiring; j. Missing, broken, or rotting roof coverings; k. Faulty or inoperable pool; l. Outgrown or unkept vegetation; m. Ineffective waterproofing and weather protection and n. Illegal unit.” (Id. at ¶ 23.)

On 6/20/24, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Statutory Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; (3) Violation of Civil Code §1942.4; (4) Violation of Civil Code § 1942.5; (5) Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; (6) Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; (7) Private Nuisance; (8) Negligence; (9) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (11) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (12) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing; (13) Violation of LAMC § 151.10(a); and (14) Violation of LAMC 45.33. On 8/16/24, Defendants filed their general denials.

On 10/11/24 and 10/15/24, Defendants filed the instant special anti-SLAPP motions to strike. On 10/28/24 and 12/9/24, Plaintiffs filed their oppositions. On 11/1/24 and 12/13/24, Moving Defendants filed their replies.

A special motion to strike strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPP” actions) provides a procedural remedy to dismiss at an early stage nonmeritorious litigation meant to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights to petition or engage in free speech. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16; Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642; Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 148.) The anti-SLAPP statute is intended to “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance;” therefore, it is to be “construed broadly.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (a).)¿

The anti-SLAPP statute sets forth a two-step procedure for determining whether a cause of action is a SLAPP action.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b); Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) First, the court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the defendant’s acts of which plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds that the defendant has met its threshold burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.¿(Ibid.; Governor Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 456.)

Under the statute, an “‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (e).)

A defendant has the initial burden to show that a plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s protected activity as defined by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “In deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.)

Here, Defendants argue that the instant action is a “retaliatory lawsuit” brought by Plaintiffs in response to the unlawful detainer judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24CHUD00813. According to Defendants, “Plaintiffs concede in their Complaint that the allegations in their Complaint all relate to the termination of the tenancy, and the eviction suit and Judgment entered against them.” (Defs.’ Mot. 11:9–10, citing Compl. ¶¶ 92–93, 97, 101–102.)

The cited provisions of the complaint mainly allege that Defendants “retaliated against Plaintiffs against their complaints of harassment by issuing a 60-day Notice of Termination of Tenancy.” (Compl. ¶ 93.) “Moreover, Defendants knowingly engaged in a pattern of threats and/or intimidation towards the Plaintiffs. They have resorted to using verbal and physical intimidation, making menacing threats, and employing abusive language and behavior to instill fear in Plaintiffs. These acts of intimidation have created an atmosphere of constant anxiety and have had a profound detrimental impact on the Plaintiffs’ emotional well-being and their ability to peacefully enjoy their rented premises.” (Id. at ¶ 97.)

Essentially, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action because it contains “a number of ‘claims’ that actually should have been asserted in the eviction proceeding, but were not, and was filed almost simultaneously with the ongoing eviction proceeding, which Plaintiffs lost.” (Defs.’ Mot. 7:26–8:1.) Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “applies when (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits, (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding, and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding. Upon satisfaction of these conditions, claim preclusion bars not only issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated. (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is narrower than that of res judicata, and operates to bar the relitigation of issues previously litigated, applying only “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 327.)

Here, Defendants contend that “A number of the causes of action asserted in this lawsuit were defenses to the eviction suit and had to be raised there: specifically, Cause of action Two, Statutory Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; Cause of Action Three, Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4; Cause of Action Four, Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4; and Cause of Action Nine, Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment.” (Defs.’ Mot. 10:7–11.)

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that “virtually none of Plaintiffs’ causes of action are based on the termination notice or the eviction proceeding.” (Pls.’ Opp. 2:6–7.) “Numerous anti-SLAPP cases have discussed a landlord’s unlawful detainer action that is followed by a tenant’s lawsuit. Unless the sole basis of liability asserted in the tenant’s complaint is the filing and prosecution of the unlawful detainer action, the tenant’s action will not be targeted at protected activity.” (Ben-Shahar v. Pickart (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1051.) Where “the action is predicated upon conduct distinct from the prosecution of unlawful detainer action—even though the complaint is based upon the unlawful detainer action or arises from it—the tenant’s action is not targeted at protected activity and thus does not meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.” (Id. at 1052.)

Here, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants offer contradictory arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ habitability claims. On one hand, they assert that these claims ‘should have been asserted in the eviction proceeding, but were not’ … implying that they were not adjudicated at that time. On the other hand, they argue that these issues were ‘fully litigated and each of these claims is barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata’ … These conflicting assertions render Defendants’ argument both inconsistent and unreliable.” (Pls.’ Opp. 8:13–19.) This Court agrees. Plaintiffs further argue that the issue of habitability was not fully litigated in the prior unlawful detainer action “since the termination was based on a 60-day notice rather than nonpayment, [therefore] habitability does not serve as a direct affirmative defense to the issue of possession, and Defendants’ argument fails to recognize this critical distinction.” (Id. at 9:8–10.)

Upon review of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court finds that the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ allegations concern the allegedly substandard and defective housing conditions found at the subject property. (Compl. ¶¶ 23–88.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants “have intentionally responded with outright aggression and hostility towards the Plaintiffs,” harassed Plaintiffs, and initiated the unlawful detainer action in retaliation to Plaintiffs’ complaints. (Id. at ¶¶ 89–97.) Therefore, here, as in Ben-Shahar, the Court finds no protected “speech” giving rise to Plaintiffs’ allegations in the instant action, and further agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not collaterally estopped from raising the issues of habitability in the instant action.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims in the instant action do not arise out of Defendants’ protected speech activity. Therefore, the Court need not reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry to determine whether Plaintiffs have made a prima facie factual showing to sustain a favorable judgment. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891; Navellier, 29 Cal.4th at 88–89.) Accordingly, the motions are denied.

[1] The Court notes Defendants’ failure to properly number their evidentiary objections, and therefore refers to the objections in the order in which they are listed. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1354(b).)