Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV02533, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24CHCV02533    Hearing Date: April 24, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO STRIKE

Motion Filed: 1/9/25

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Laura Howard (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Bridgette Barajas (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant moves to strike references to punitive damages from Plaintiff’s complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Defendant shall file and serve her answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 20 days of this hearing date.

BACKGROUND 

This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 4/6/24, Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle and fled the scene, and was eventually arrested for Driving Under the Influence of an alcoholic beverage and Hit and Run. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–6.) On 7/11/24, Plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) General Negligence; and (2) Negligence Per Se.

On 1/9/25, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike. On 1/14/25, Plaintiff filed her opposition. No reply has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

A.    Meet and Confer

Defendant’s counsel declares that he met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the issues raised in the instant motion to strike, but the parties were unable to come to a resolution. (Decl. of Willis J. King, ¶ 4.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet-and-confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).)

B.     Punitive Damages 

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Ibid.; Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) 

Here, Defendant argues that “punitive damages cannot be recovered based on negligent conduct, even if it is deemed gross misconduct or malicious.” (MTS 4:9–10.) Defendant further asserts that “in the instant case, there are no facts pled in the Complaint to show that defendants acted with the type of intent, reckless disregard or misconduct that would warrant the imposition of exemplary damage.” (Id. at 7:6–8.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “the Complaint explicitly alleges that: (1) Howard was driving under the influence; (2) Howard rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle; (3) Howard fled the scene; and (4) Howard was arrested and currently faces pending criminal charges. These specific facts establish malice and satisfy the pleading requirements for punitive damages.” (Opp. 3:2–6.) “Howard’s decision to drive while intoxicated shows a willful disregard for public safety.” (Id. at 3:8–9, citing Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 900 [finding that a personal injury complaint brought against an intoxicated driver sufficiently stated a basis for recovery of punitive damages].)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, at the pleading stage, the facts alleged are sufficient to allege malicious conduct warranting a prayer for punitive damages. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to strike Plaintiff’s references to punitive damages from the complaint.

CONCLUSION 

The motion is denied. Defendant shall file and serve her answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 20 days of this hearing date.