Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV03169, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV03169    Hearing Date: April 24, 2025    Dept: F51

ANTI-SLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE

Motion Filed: 12/27/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Rebecca Loo (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Merik Migliore, in pro per; and Rebecca Martens, in pro per (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order striking Plaintiffs’ entire complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence, but not the contents, of Exhibits 1–14.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, “acting in her capacity as an attorney and purported Guardian ad Litem (GAL) [for plaintiff Migliore] in the matter of LP014237, engaged in unauthorized actions concerning legal documents pertaining to Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant Loo’s actions included, but were not limited to, unauthorized handling, taking, and receiving of legal proof of service, court documents, and other related legal matters on behalf of the Plaintiffs, all without Plaintiffs’ consent,” and approved the sale of Plaintiffs’ home. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.)

On 9/3/24, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On 12/27/24, Defendant filed the instant special motion to strike Plaintiffs’ complaint. On 3/3/25, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 4/9/25, Defendant filed her reply.

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ANALYSIS

A special motion to strike strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPP” actions) provides a procedural remedy to dismiss at an early stage nonmeritorious litigation meant to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights to petition or engage in free speech. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16; Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642; Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 148.) The anti-SLAPP statute is intended to “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance;” therefore, it is to be “construed broadly.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (a).)¿

The anti-SLAPP statute sets forth a two-step procedure for determining whether a cause of action is a SLAPP action.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b); Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) First, the court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the defendant’s acts of which plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds that the defendant has met its threshold burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.¿(Ibid.; Governor Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 456.)

Under the statute, an “‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (e).)

A.    Protected Speech Activity

A defendant has the initial burden to show that a plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s protected activity as defined by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “In deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) The anti-SLAPP statute protects all petition-related activity before a governmental body, including the judiciary, whether or not the statements involve a public issue. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1116.)

Here, Defendant argues that “since each cause of action unequivocally arises from Loo’s court-appointed role as GAL in the Probate Proceedings, the alleged conduct in this litigation constitutes protected activity pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute.” (Def.’s Mot. 13:22–24.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant “was never legally appointed as Guardian Ad Litem (GAL).” (Pls.’ Opp. 4:4–5.) Plaintiffs argue that their “allegations stem from Defendant’s unauthorized and fraudulent conduct as GAL, which was not legally sanctioned by the court.” (Id. at 4:19–21.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs’ contentions “explicitly contradict the Court’s records that plainly show that the Court appointed Loo as GAL on November 19, 2021 and reaffirmed her appointed on October 15, 2024.” (Def.’s Reply 3:3–5, citing Exs. 1 and 9 to RJN.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has met her initial burden to show that Plaintiffs’ allegations arise out of Defendant’s protected litigation activity as a court-appointed guardian ad litem.

B.     Probability of Plaintiff Prevailing

The second step of the inquiry requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that its claims have at least “minimal merit.” (Bonni, 11 Cal.5th at 1009.) At this stage, the court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891; Navellier, 29 Cal.4th at 88–89.)

Civil Code section 47 makes privileged any publication or communication made “in any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law.” (Civ. Code ¶ 47, subd. (b); Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 [“The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.”].) “The litigation privilege is also relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323.)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, operates to bar the relitigation of issues previously litigated, applying “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 327.)

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing because “Loo’s alleged conduct and statements were in the furtherance of litigation in Probate Court and therefore protected pursuant to the litigation privilege under CCP §47.” (Def.’s Mot. 6:16–17.) Defendant further argues that “Plaintiffs are attempting to relitigate matters that were heard and addressed by the Probate Court and, accordingly, are barred by collateral estoppel.” (Id. at 6:18–19.)

The Court agrees, and notes that Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to rebut that Defendant’s purportedly wrongful conduct was not made in a judicial proceeding, and therefore are not barred by the litigation privilege. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not address the argument that their claims are barred by collateral estoppel. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s special anti-SLAPP motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted.