Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV03279, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV03279    Hearing Date: June 2, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Motion filed: 3/6/25

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Juan Sanchez (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Kia America, Inc. (“Defendant”)

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set One, Nos. 30–31. Plaintiff also seeks to impose $3,615.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Nos. 30–31, subject to the limitations set forth below, within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant and its counsel in the amount of $455.00.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on or around 5/7/21, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff alleges that “the Subject Vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to, structural and electrical system defects.” (Id. at ¶ 10.) 

On 9/11/24, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2. On 10/17/24, Defendant filed its answer.

On 10/28/24, Plaintiff served his RFPs, Set One, on Defendant. (Decl. of Daniel Gopstein ¶ 13.) On 12/18/24, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

On 3/6/25, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to his RFPs, Set One. On 5/19/25, Defendant filed its opposition. On 5/21/25, Plaintiff filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).) 

If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id., subd. (b).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete”; “(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive”; or “(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s additional responses to his first set of RFPs, Nos. 30–31, arguing that Defendant’s objections thereto are without merit and that “Defendant has not yet provided adequate discovery responses or documents to Plaintiff’s discovery requests.” (Pl.’s Mot. 6:5–6.)

A.    Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further RFP responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating, “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.) 

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that on 1/20/25 and 1/27/25, he emailed Defendant’s counsel meet and confer letters regarding the issues raised in the instant motion but received no response. (Gopstein Decl. ¶¶ 16–17, 21–22.) “While Plaintiff’s counsel is willing and able to further meet and confer, based on Defendant’s responses, as well as prior dealings with this Defendant, it is abundantly clear that Defendant will not likely supplement its responses absent an order from this Court.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) In opposition, Defendant asserts that it responded to Plaintiff’s meet and confer correspondence on 1/24/25 but received no substantive response. (Decl. of Jonathan S. Sniderman ¶¶ 5–6.)

While the parties each dispute the good-faith nature of opposing counsel’s meet and confer efforts, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).¿

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B.     Defendant’s Objections

Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s objections to RFP Nos. 30 and 31 are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).) The demanding party must take the initiative to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of any objection by moving to compel a further response, but the objecting party has the burden of justifying the objection. (See, e.g., Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.) In response to the subject requests, Defendant asserted objections based on overbreadth, ambiguity, relevance, confidentiality, privacy, attorney work product, attorney-client privilege, and undue burden. (Ex. 4 to Gopstein Decl.)

1.      Relevance¿ 

Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)¿ 

Here, the RFPs at issue “seek documents related to Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Pl.’s Mot. 5:4–5.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s objections to the subject RFPs on the basis that they seek irrelevant matter are meritless because “documents tending to prove a defendant had prior knowledge of similar, prior vehicle defects are directly relevant to a finding of willful failure to abide by the SBA.” (Id. at 9:2–4.) Plaintiff contends that “this evidence is relevant to establish Defendant’s knowledge and inability to repair the defects, as well as its failure to replace or repurchase the Subject Vehicle despite Defendant’s inability to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of repair opportunities.” (Id. at 11:15–18.)

In opposition, Defendant “maintains that its objections are appropriate.” (Def.’s Opp. 2:12.) Defendant argues that “the discovery requests propounded by Plaintiff are disproportionate to the claims at issue in this matter involving only one vehicle.” (Id. at 7:23–25.) Defendant further argues that “the amount at issue concerning Plaintiff’s single vehicle does not warrant requiring Defendant to conduct a search for records for potentially hundreds or thousands of other vehicles when the central information necessary to prove or disprove Plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act pertains to the service records and history of Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Id. at 7:27–8:3.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to establish the requisite good cause for production of the subject documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) In order to obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may be based on the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiff’s is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiff in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects. While the cases relied on by Plaintiff (i.e., Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967) may not involve the exact circumstance before this Court, they are sufficient to show that the requested information could itself be admissible or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s relevance objections to the subject RFPs are without merit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court finds that the subject requests are overbroad in scope. Therefore, the Court further limits the scope of the requests to complaints regarding vehicles purchased only in the State of California.

2.      ¿Undue Burden 

Plaintiff furthers argue that Defendant’s objections to RFP Nos. 30 and 31 on the basis that they are unduly burdensome and oppressive are meritless without any additional showing of any such undue burden or oppression. (Pl.’s Mot., 7:21–22.) The party objecting to a discovery request on this basis bears the burden of supplying evidence of “the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.)¿ 

“If a party objects to the discovery of electronically stored information on the grounds that it is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense and that the responding party will not search the source in the absence of an agreement with the demanding party or court order, the responding party shall identify in its response the types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that it asserts are not reasonably accessible. By objecting and identifying information of a type or category of source or sources that are not reasonably accessible, the responding party preserves any objections it may have relating to that electronically stored information.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (d) [emphasis added].) 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant has not supplied evidence to show the “quantum of work required” to respond in full to RFP Nos. 30 and 31, nor has Defendant stated the categories of sources of ESI that are not reasonably accessible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to the requests to the extent that they are unduly burdensome or oppressive are without adequate support and agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant has waived any objections it may assert relating to ESI.

C.    Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Here, Plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of $3,615.00 to be imposed on Defendant and its counsel. This amount includes: (1) 4.5 hours of Plaintiff’s attorney’s time preparing this motion, (2) an anticipated 2 hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition and preparing a reply; and (3) an anticipated 2.5 hours preparing for and appearing at the instant hearing, at counsel’s hourly billing rate of $395.00 per hour. (Gopstein Decl. ¶¶ 29–30.) Plaintiff also seeks to recover $60.00 in filing fees. (Id. at ¶ 31.)

In granting the instant motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff sanctions against Defendant and its counsel in the amount of $455.00. 

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted in part. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs, Nos. 30–31, subject to the limitations set forth above, within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant and its counsel in the amount of $455.00.