Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV03515, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 24CHCV03515    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

DEMURRER

Demurrer filed: 3/12/25

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Saugus Union School District; Andrea Hamilton; Dina Ticas; Chelcie Skrifvars; Chiamaka Okeke; and Stephanie Kay (collectively, “Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff L.C., a minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem Malea Cacia (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendants demur against the third and fourth causes of action in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”).

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled.

BACKGROUND 

This is a personal injury action brought by Plaintiff, a seven year-old former student at Plum Canyon Elementary School, within defendant Saugus Union School District (the “District”). (FAC ¶¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he was a victim of vicious attacks of abuse and bullying by a classmate, defendant J.K., while enrolled at Plum Canyon Elementary School, and that Defendants failed to take proper measures to protect Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 1–5, 20–40.)

On 12/28/24, Plaintiff filed his original complaint against 12 named defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; (5) Battery (against J.K.); (6) Assault (against J.K.); (7) Imputed Liability Pursuant to California Civil Code § 1714.1 (against J.K.’s parents); and (8) Imputed Liability Pursuant to California Education Code § 48904 (against J.K.’s parents). On 2/5/25, Plaintiff filed his FAC, removing five of the named defendants and his seventh and eighth causes of action.

On 3/12/25, Defendants filed the instant demurrer. On 5/9/25, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 5/30/25, Defendants filed their reply.[1]

ANALYSIS

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Here, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action on the basis that Plaintiff fails¿to allege facts sufficient to state those causes of action.

A.    Meet-and-Confer

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Defendants’ counsel declares that beginning on 2/12/25, she met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the issues raised in the instant demurrer via email, but the parties were unable to resolve the dispute. (Decl. of Katrina J. Valencia, ¶¶ 3–8.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

B.     Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendants. “The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “rather than complying with their statutory duties to prevent and protect L.C. from willful harm and foreseeable injury, … Defendants flagrantly ignored all of their statutory duties.” (FAC ¶ 84.) “A reasonable person would not accept or tolerate the bullying, harm, aggression, abuse, neglect, physical violence, and emotional abuse that Defendants permitted to happen to L.C. through their failure to adhere to their statutory duties. … Because Defendants failed to protect L.C., failed to prevent harm inflicted on L.C., and failed to intervene, L.C. became fearful, anxious, and depressed.” (Id. at ¶ 85.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “promised to protect L.C. from bullying and L.C. trusted them to do so. They utterly and blatantly failed to do so when they refused to implement the ‘No Contact Contract’ against the bully, J.K., and withdrew all protective and safety measures.” (Id. at ¶ 81.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged the first element of this cause of action, because “it is unclear … what extreme and outrageous conduct the Plaintiff is claiming that District Defendants engaged in.” (Dem. 4:28–5:1.) “While Plaintiff clearly identifies the actions of Defendant J.K. which would result in emotional distress, Plaintiff merely states in a conclusory fashion that Defendants failed to intervene to stop the bullying by Defendant J.K. while simultaneously identifying multiple examples of intervention by school personnel.” (Id. at 5:11–14.) “The First Amended Complaint’s mere conclusion that SUSD and its staff acted with reckless disregard is not enough. There must be facts showing how SUSD and its staff acted with reckless disregard and why such action or inaction constitutes reckless disregard.” (Id. at 5:16–19.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “here, Defendants intentionally or recklessly caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress when they falsely promised to protect him from physical injuries and bullying, failed to do so, and then characterized the bullying Plaintiff had endured as ‘accidents during games.’” (Pl.’s Opp. 9:22–25.) Plaintiff therefore asserts that “Defendants acted, at minimum, with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiff emotional distress.” (Id. at 12:11–12.)

In reply, Defendants maintain that “while Plaintiff clearly identifies actions of Defendant J.K. which would result in emotional distress, Plaintiff fails to identify conduct by any Defendant that could be considered extreme or outrageous.” (Defs.’ Reply 7:18–20.) Defendants further argue that “what Plaintiff refuses to acknowledge, … are the repeated actions that Defendants took to keep Plaintiff safe from J.K.” (Id. at 6:16–17.) However, the Court finds that Defendants improperly argue the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations at the demurrer stage.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that at the pleading stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts supporting the first element of a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s third case of action.

C.    Negligent Misrepresentation

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges Negligent Misrepresentation against Defendants. “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civ. Code § 1709.) The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are: “[m]isrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed; and resulting damage.” (Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154 [quotations omitted].)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiffs the facts regarding the allegedly safe environment on the Plum Canyon Elementary School campus and made false promises to maintain all students, and specifically L.C., safe and protected. Defendants falsely promised Plaintiffs that L.C. was safe and protected on the school campus.” (FAC ¶ 90.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lack reasonable grounds for believing this representation because “J.K. was a known bully at Plum Canyon and had a history of vicious bullying, shaming, and harassing other students.” (Id. at ¶ 91.) “Plaintiffs relied on Defendants to provide a safe school environment and maintain L.C. safe and protected in that school environment.” (Id. at ¶ 96.)

Defendants argue that “there are no facts alleging that the Defendants promised that there would be no further incidents between Plaintiff and student J.K. Plaintiff incorrectly characterizes the promise that the District made to him.” (Dem. 6:5–7.) Defendants further argue that this cause of action is defective because “Plaintiff did not plead any facts showing that after the removal of the no-contact contract clause he suffered physical injuries. In fact, his First Amended Complaint states that immediately after the removal of the no contact contract he was transferred to Trinity Academy.” (Id. at 7:13–16, citing FAC ¶ 37; Friedman v. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 454, 487 [“we find California law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation involving a risk of emotional injury.”].)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “here, Defendants repeatedly promised Plaintiff would no longer be the victim of J.K.’s bullying and no longer suffer physical injuries. But Plaintiff did suffer physical injuries after Defendants’ false promises and it was foreseeable that Plaintiff would suffer further physical harm when Defendants falsely promised safety measures they either neglected to implement or withdrew.” (Pl.’s Opp. 6:22–25.)

Plaintiff further argues that the Friedman case is inapposite because it concerned a products liability claim, whereas the instant action “involves a very young and vulnerable student being bullied and physically harmed in a public school setting, not a business setting.” (Id. at 7:16–18.) Even so, Plaintiff asserts that he suffered physical injury stemming from Defendants’ misrepresentations, because “on February 2, 2024, after Defendants had promised there would be no contact between Plaintiff and J.K., J.K. approached Plaintiff in the presence of a yard duty supervisor and punched him in the chest.” (Id. at 6:11–13; FAC ¶¶ 26–27, 92.)

In reply, Defendants argue that “even if Defendants promised to keep J.K. away from Plaintiff, their failure to do so would not give rise to a claim for negligent misrepresentation.” (Defs.’ Reply 3:23–24.) “Notably absent from Plaintiff’s FAC are facts which show Defendants had no reasonable grounds for believing their statements to be untrue, i.e., that they knew they would not take action to keep Plaintiff safe.” (Id. at 3:27–4:1.)

However, Plaintiff has explicitly alleged that “Defendants downplayed, or ignored, the tactics of intimidation and manipulation that the abusive bully, J.K., employed against L.C. Defendants Okeke and Kay participated in the concerted effort to downplay the abuse and bullying, falsely alleging that L.C. agreed J.K.’s assaults were accidental and that he had no fears or worries about future attacks. District Defendants engaged in these misrepresentations in an attempt to cover up their own inadequacies, negligence, and lack of adequate training and supervision.” (FAC ¶ 95.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that at the pleading stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts supporting a cause of action for Negligent Misrepresentation. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s fourth case of action.

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled.