Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 24CHCV03719, Date: 2025-02-20 Tentative Ruling

FEBRUARY 19, 2025

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24CHCV03719

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Arpine Khudanyan; and Torgom Abraamyan (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendant demurs against Plaintiffs’ entire complaint. Moving Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiffs’ references to attorney fees and punitive damages from the complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is granted, with 30 days leave to amend.

Plaintiffs are reminded that “each page must be numbered consecutively at the bottom unless a rule provides otherwise for a particular type of document.” (CRC 2.109.) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

This is a habitability action in which Plaintiffs alleges that on 6/1/24, they leased certain residential property owned and managed by nonmoving defendant Sirun Harutyunyan, located at 10335 Ruffner Street, Granada Hills, California 91344. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–4.) Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendant is Harutyunyan’s husband. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs allege that on 8/31/24, they discovered mold in the subject residence, notified Defendants, and “were forced to vacate the premises and rent a different property from a family member.” (Id. at ¶¶ 8–10.)

On 10/11/24, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Nuisance; (4) Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (5) Negligence; and (6) Breach of Contract.

On 12/16/24, Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On 2/3/25, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 2/13/25, Moving Defendant filed his reply.

As a general matter, a party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and is uncertain, meaning “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the pleading’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the pleading, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Here, Moving Defendant demurs to the entire complaint on the bases that it is uncertain and that Plaintiffs fail¿to allege facts sufficient to state any cause of action against him.

Before filing a demurrer and motion to strike, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that on 12/4/24 and 12/9/24, he sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a meet and confer letters discussing the issues raised in the instant demurrer and motion to strike, but received no response. (Decl. of Vahe Khojayan ¶¶ 3–4.) Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements set forth by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.31.

A defendant may demur against a complaint where “there is a defect or misjoinder of parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d).) Here, Moving Defendant asserts that the complaint fails against him because it “does not describe any action, or agreement with Karen Grigoryan that will give rise to the causes of action in this case. Specifically, Karen Grigoryan is not the owner of the Property, did not sign any contracts in question, and did not owe any duties or obligations to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs admit by their own complaint that the Property is owned by Defendant Sirun Harutyunyan.” (Dem. 5:5–10, citing Compl. ¶ 4.) “Grigoryan is only mentioned as he had one or two conversations with one of the Plaintiffs. No other facts refer to him or describe his involvement in the case.” (Id. at 5:16–18 citing Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12.)

As Moving Defendant observes, “Plaintiffs did not allege any facts to establish any claims against Defendant. Plaintiffs’ Opposition did not seem to dispute this matter.” (Def.’s Reply 2:5–6.) As Plaintiffs failed to provide any opposition argument addressing this issue, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts state a claim against Moving Defendant. Accordingly, the demurrer against the entire complaint is sustained on this basis. Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to reach a determination of the factual sufficiency of each individual cause of action.

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

An award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, Plaintiffs prays for the recovery of attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.4 and the lease agreement. (Compl. p. 9, ll. 19–20, ¶ 4.)

Moving Defendant argues that “here the complaint fails to allege any basis for attorney fees. Plaintiff cites no statute that would entitle it to recovery of attorney fees against a non-landlord defendant. Similarly, as Grigoryan is not party to the alleged contract … there can be no attorney fee claim against him.” (Dem. 11:15–17.) The Court agrees, and further notes that Plaintiffs fail to address this issue in their opposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a basis for the recovery of attorney fees against Moving Defendant. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorney fees.

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Id. at subd. (c); Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) Punitive damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s allegations do not even come close to alleging conduct that would give rise to punitive damages.” (Dem. 11:23–24.) The Court agrees and reiterates its finding that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against Moving Defendant, who was neither the owner nor manager of the subject property. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to address this issue in their opposition. Accordingly, the motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages is granted.

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Here, the Court notes that this is the first demurrer and motion to strike brought against Plaintiffs’ original complaint, and Plaintiffs request leave to amend in the event the Court finds merit to any of Moving Defendant’s arguments. (Opp. 8:5–7.)[1] Therefore, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, Plaintiffs are granted 30 days leave to amend the complaint to cure the defects set forth above.

The demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is granted, with 30 days leave to amend.

[1] As noted above, Plaintiffs have failed to paginate their opposition. As such, the Court references the document’s page numbers in accordance with the total number of pages in the e-filing.