Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 24CHCV03815, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV03815    Hearing Date: March 27, 2025    Dept: F51

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO STRIKE

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Motion Filed: 12/19/24

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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Mona Hamza (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Hasmik Minasyan (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

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RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant moves to strike references to punitive damages from Plaintiff’s complaint.

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TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. Defendant to file and serve her answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.

BACKGROUND¿ 

This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 3/21/23, she “was lawfully and carefully operating her vehicle on Balboa Blvd in Granada Hills. Defendant, while recklessly operating the AUDI, made a sudden U-turn, striking the driver’s side door of Plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff Minasyan suffered various injuries.” (Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff further alleges that “immediately following the accident, the Defendant engaged in a verbal altercation with Plaintiff Minasyan and fled the scene without providing any personal or insurance information, as required by California law.” (Id. at ¶ 14.)

On 10/18/24, Plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging against Defendant a sole cause of action for Negligence. On 12/19/24, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike. On 3/14/25, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 3/19/25, Defendant filed her reply.

ANALYSIS

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

A.    Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).) “The moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating … The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised by the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that on 12/19/24, he sent Plaintiff’s counsel correspondence regarding the issues raised in the instant motion, but the parties were unable to informally resolve the issues. (Decl. of Mark P. LaScola ¶ 3.) The Court therefore finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).

B.     Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be recovered in non-contract actions upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Id. at subd. (c); Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

Punitive damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)

Here, Defendant argues that “nowhere does the Complaint attempt to support its specious conclusion that Defendant acted with malice, oppression or fraud, via the required despicable conduct. In fact, there is zero evidence whatsoever to warrant a request for punitive damages.” (MTS 3:7–9.)

In opposition, Plaintiff notes that “in order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Pl.’s Opp. 3:9–11, quoting Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–896.) Plaintiff argues that here, “a conscious and deliberate disregard for the safety of others—as demonstrated by Defendant’s reckless U-turn and flight from the scene—is sufficient to support punitive damages at the pleading stage.” (Id. at 3:14–16.) “Defendant in this case engaged in dangerous, unlawful conduct and then actively attempted to evade responsibility. Her actions reflect more than mere negligence—they demonstrate a willful and knowing disregard for the rights and safety of others.” (Id. at 4:16–18.)

On reply, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate to show malice, fraud, or oppression giving rise to the recovery of punitive damages. The Court disagrees. Based on a review of Plaintiff’s factual allegations, the Court finds that the Complaint, as pled, sufficiently pleads a basis for punitive damages against Defendant based on malice or oppression. As Plaintiff contends, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant negligently caused her vehicle to collide into the driver’s door of Plaintiff’s vehicle, engaged in a verbal altercation with Plaintiff, and fled the scene thereafter. (Compl. ¶¶ 12–14.) This alleged conduct sufficiently supports a prayer for punitive damages as a “conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

Accordingly, the Court finds that at the pleading stage, Defendant’s alleged conduct as pled may be considered malicious and oppressive as defined by Civil Code section 3294. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that further investigation of the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations may be resolved through the discovery process. (Pl.’s Opp. 5:4–6 [“Whether Defendant’s conduct ultimately warrants punitive damages is a factual issue that should be determined through discovery, not resolved on a motion to strike.”].)

CONCLUSION¿ 

The motion is denied. Defendant to file and serve her answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 30 days.