Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 25CHCV00378, Date: 2025-05-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25CHCV00378    Hearing Date: May 7, 2025    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 05/07/25

Case #25CHCV00378

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION TO STRIKE

Motion filed: 03/13/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Svetlana Kacherova

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Alejandro Buitrago

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant moves to strike references to punitive damages from Plaintiff’s complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. Defendant shall file and serve her answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 20 days of this hearing date.

BACKGROUND

This a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on or about 11/21/23, at approximately 2:10 p.m., Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle while it was parked. (Compl., ¶¶7-8.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant was driving under the influence at the time of the collision and caused Plaintiff to suffer serious injuries as a result. (Id. at ¶¶8-9.)

On 3/13/25, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike. On 4/10/25, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 4/30/25,, Defendants filed her reply brief.

ANALYSIS

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id. at subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.)¿Here, Defendant moves to strike the portions of Plaintiff’s complaint referencing punitive damages.

A.    Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).) The parties are required to meet and confer at least five days before the date a motion to strike must be filed, otherwise the moving party is granted a 30-day extension to file the motion. (Ibid.)¿ 

Here, Defendant’s counsel declares that she met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the issues raised in the instant motion to strike, but the parties were unable to come to a resolution. (Hayre Decl., ¶¶4-6, Ex. B.) Therefore, the Court finds that counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet-and-confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a).)

¿¿ 

B.     Punitive Damages 

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Ibid.; Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) 

Punitive damages must be supported by factual allegations. Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)

Here, Defendant argues that “the Complaint fails to allege any facts upon which to establish fraud, oppression, or malice by any standard, and, in particular, by the required ‘clear and convincing’ evidence.” (MTS at 6:25-26.) Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant was “under the influence” at the time of the accident without allege what substance Defendant was “under the influence” or any arrest/criminal charge or conviction for the alleged conduct. (Id. at 8:10-13.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the present motion is a boilerplate motion without merit because the Complaint alleges that “Defendant was intoxicated and driving the Sedan under the influence. (Complaint ¶ 8). Defendant’s sedan was traveling at a high speed on Doral Ave. (Complaint ¶ 8). Suddenly, without warning Defendant’s Sedan collided and rear ended at a high rate of speed with the SUV. (Complaint ¶ 8).” (Opp. at 3:19-23.) Plaintiff further asserts that the Complaint alleges that “Defendant knew or should have known that operating Defendant’s sedan in an unsafe manner while intoxicated, exposed Plaintiff and other motorist to serious injuries.” (Id. at 7:16-19.)

In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, the court held that “while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896.) The Taylor court went on to find that alleging a defendant became intoxicated voluntarily and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite knowing the safety hazard thus created by defendant was enough to support a request for punitive damages. (Id.)

Like in Taylor, Plaintiff in this instant action has alleged that Defendant became intoxicated, knew she was intoxicated, and proceeded to drive at a high rate of speed causing the collision at issue. As such, the facts alleged are sufficient to allege malicious conduct warranting a prayer for punitive damages. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to strike Plaintiff’s references to punitive damages from the complaint.

CONCLUSION

The motion is DENIED. Defendant shall file and serve her answer to Plaintiff’s complaint within 20 days of this hearing date.