Judge Anne Hwang, Case Number: 18STCV03165, Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

On October 31, 2018, Plaintiffs Mildred James, Woodrow James, Jr., and Anetra Ross, a minor by and through Guardian ad Litem Mildred James (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued Defendants Maria Guevara, Jamie Alcantara, Jeffrey Munoz (erroneously sued as “Jefrey Munoz Arriaga”), and Hector Hernandez (collectively, “Defendants”) based on a multi-vehicle collision that occurred on November 3, 2016.

On October 31, 2018, Guevara filed a complaint against Munoz and Hernandez for negligence in 18STCV03814, which was later consolidated with the James case.

On August 24, 2020, Guevara filed a cross-complaint against Munoz and Hernandez for indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief based on the damages alleged in the James complaint. In turn, on February 10, 2021, Jeffrey Munoz and Hector Hernandez filed a cross-complaint against Maria Guevara for indemnity, apportionment of fault, contribution, and declaratory relief.

On January 4, 2023, the Court granted Jeffrey Munoz and Hector Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment directed at Plaintiffs’ (James) complaint. Thereafter, on January 27, 2023, judgment was entered in their favor.

Jeffrey Munoz and Hector Hernandez (hereinafter, “Movants”) now move for judgment on the pleadings as to Maria Guevara’s cross-complaint. Maria Guevara (hereinafter, “Guevara”) opposes the motion.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, but may be made after the time to demur has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).) “Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013.) In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true.” (Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.)

As a preliminary matter, the instant motion is untimely. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 438(e), a motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be made after entry of a conference order under Code of Civil Procedure § 575 or within 30 days of the date initially set for trial, which ever is later. If the time to move for judgment on the pleadings has elapsed, it is within the Court’s discretion whether to consider an untimely motion. (Sutherland v. City of Fort Bragg (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 13, 25.) In this case, trial was originally set for April 29, 2020, and the instant motion was not filed until July 10, 2023. Nevertheless, “[t]he interests of all parties are advanced by avoiding a trial and reversal for defect in pleadings.” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) Therefore, the Court shall consider Movants’ untimely motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Movants request that the Court take judicial notice of the James complaint, Guevara’s cross-complaint, answer to cross-complaint, minute order granting Cross-Defendants’ summary judgment motion, and judgment, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d). They further request that the Court take judicial notice of Guevara’s release of all claims, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(h). (See also Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 666 n.2 (“We take judicial notice of the El Nino settlement agreements and consider their contents even though they are outside the four corners of the complaint, as there is and can be no factual dispute concerning the contents of the agreements.”) The requests are unopposed. The Court grants the requests. As to Guevara’s requests to take judicial notice of admissions, Guevara appears to dispute the meaning of the discovery responses, but not the fact that she signed the document entitled “Settlement Agreement and Release.” (See Evid. Code § 452(h).) Accordingly, the Court denies the requests to take judicial notice of the requests for admissions and responses, except to the extent that it establishes Guevara’s signature on the document.

Here, Movants first argue that, because their motion for summary judgment was granted as to the James Plaintiffs, they were not found liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Consequently, Movants reason that Guevara’s cross-complaint for indemnity and contribution against them lacks merit and should be dismissed.[1] (Motion at pg. 5.) However, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Movants took the motion off calendar as to Guevara. The question is whether there is a sufficient connection between the James Plaintiffs and Guevara to allow a judgment against the James Plaintiffs to be asserted against Guevara without depriving Guevara of due process. (Long Beach Grand Prix Assn. v. Hunt (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1200; Columbus Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sight-Seeing Companies Associated, Inc. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 622). Here, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Guevara had a strong incentive to be heard when she was negotiating a settlement and therefore the motion for summary judgment as to Guevara had been taken off calendar by Movants.[2]

Second, Movants assert that Guevara signed a general release that released Movants from all claims. In opposition, Guevara argues that she did not execute a release of all claims because the settlement agreement and general release only applied to the claims that Guevara raised in her separate action against the Movants (18STCV03814). To support this argument, Guevara points to the fact that she is referenced as “Plaintiff” in the settlement agreement and Movants are referred to as “Defendants.” (Opposition at pg. 3.) However, this argument is not persuasive based on a clear reading of the settlement agreement. (See, e.g., Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 232, 239 (“ ‘[W]here an ambiguous contract is the basis of an action, it is proper, if not essential, for a plaintiff to allege its own construction of the agreement. So long as the pleading does not place a clearly erroneous construction upon the provisions of the contract, in passing upon the sufficiency of the complaint, we must accept as correct plaintiff’s allegations as to the meaning of the agreement.’ [Citation.] Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law.”).)

“Said payment represents the full settlement of all claims among and between and against these parties and their agents, representatives and other related parties arising out of or related to the incidents or claims contained within the lawsuit. A serious and important part of this Agreement is the complete release of all Defendants. …this Agreement is contingent upon the complete release of all liability and exposure to the Defendants arising from this matter.”

“Except for the rights and obligations expressly created or retained herein, Plaintiff, claimant and all others expressly or by implication receiving settlement monies hereby expressly dismiss, release and forever quitclaim and discharge the Defendants together with each of their agents, representatives, employees, insurers, predecessors, accessors, assigns, heirs, personal representatives, firms, consultants, attorneys, accountants, associations, co-partners, co-venturers, subsidiaries, parents, stock holders, officers, directors, related companies, affiliates or corporations connected therewith and each of them, from any and all manner of actions, claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, costs, expenses, attorney's fees, actions and causes of action in every nature, including the actions for subrogation or rights for recovery of every nature, character and description which Plaintiff listed and identified above have asserted, or may assert, against these Defendants and any of them, whether known or unknown, including but not limited to, those claims arising out of or related to the lawsuit which forms the subject of this action.”

(Solis Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. G at pp. 2-3 [emphasis added].) No reservation of rights is stated, including any indemnity claim which was also at that time pending in the same action and lawsuit. The settlement agreement acknowledges that “the subject of the litigation (Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case Numbers 18STCV03165 and 18STCV03814)” is the automobile accident that occurred on October 14, 2017. (Id. at pg. 1.) The Court finds that the contract is not ambiguous, and the general release encompasses all claims, including Guevara’s claims in her then-pending cross-complaint.

Accordingly, Movants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted without leave to amend.

Movants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

[1] The cross-complaint alleged that the cross-defendants (Movants) “were negligently, or tortiously, responsible in whole or in part in some proportional relation to themselves and to cross-complainant for the injuries, if any, suffered by plaintiffs [James]. In the event that cross-complainant be judged jointly liable with cross-defendants, each cross-defendant herein should be required to pay to cross-complainant a sum equal to the proportionate share of monetary payments, if any there be, made to plaintiffs.” (Cross-Complaint ¶ 9.) Summary judgment was granted in favor of Movants against the James Plaintiffs based on the sudden emergency doctrine. (See Minute Order Dated 1/4/23.) Guevara initially opposed the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that triable issues of fact existed as to whether there was a sudden emergency. (See Guevara Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Dated 12/21/22.)

[2] The Court notes, however, that Guevara had the opportunity to be heard, but did not use it due to the negotiation of the settlement agreement which is the subject of this motion.

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	August 23, 2023
CASE NUMBER	18STCV03165
MOTION	Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
MOVING PARTY	Cross-Defendants Jeffrey Munoz and Hector Hernandez
OPPOSING PARTY	Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Maria Guevara