Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 19STCV07622, Date: 2023-09-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV07622 Hearing Date: September 28, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached.  If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  
TENTATIVE
RULING
| 
   DEPT:  | 
  
   32  | 
 
| 
   HEARING DATE:  | 
  
   September
  28, 2023  | 
 
| 
   CASE NUMBER:  | 
  
   19STCV07622  | 
 
| 
   MOTIONS:    | 
  
   Motion
  for Summary Judgment  | 
 
| 
   Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,
  Inc.  | 
  
 |
| 
   OPPOSING PARTY:  | 
  
   Plaintiffs
  Edma Kizirian, Taline Boyamian, Armand Kizirian, and Estate of Sebouh
  Kizirian    | 
 
MOVING PAPERS
1.      Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,
Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities; Declaration of Greg Bunch
2.      Declaration of Timothy Everett  
3.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
OPPOSITION PAPERS
1.      Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment
2.      Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice 
3.      Declaration of Armand Kizirian 
4.      Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed
Material Facts
5.      Declaration of Armand Kizirian Requesting
Continuance of Hearing
REPLY PAPERS
1.      Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment; Declaration of Greg Bunch 
2.      Reply to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement
3.      Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Request
for Judicial Notice
BACKGROUND
            On March 4, 2019, Plaintiffs Edma
Kizirian, Taline Boyamian, Armand Kizirian, and Estate of Sebouh Kizirian filed
a complaint against Moving Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Southern California Permanente Medical Group, and
various other medical providers for wrongful death, medical malpractice, and
loss of consortium. The lawsuit stems from the death of Sebouh Z. Kizirian, who
died on December 5, 2017 after receiving two surgeries to address a ventral
hernia. On August 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. 
Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (“Defendant” or “KFHP”)
now moves for summary judgment arguing that as a health care service plan, it
cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligent acts or omissions
of contracted health care providers. 
Plaintiffs oppose, or in the alternative, seek to continue the hearing
on this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(h).
LEGAL
STANDARD
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if,
and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with
the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment
bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of
production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie
showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.;
Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474
[summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary
adjudication motions].)  Further, in line
with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary
adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as
to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable
issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise
Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the
court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a
factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence
in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to
identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may
the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict,
the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) 
Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a
factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary
judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840
[cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)  
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiffs request the Court take
judicial notice of three documents pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(h).
Although the documents are not properly judicially noticeable, the Court’s
consideration of the documents does not change the rulings herein.
OBJECTIONS
 
            Plaintiffs object to each of
Defendant’s material facts on the same grounds: “The proffered statement is
vague, misleading, incomplete, and calls for a legal conclusion. The evidence
cited does not support Moving Party’s Undisputed Material Fact. Plaintiffs
object to the instant statements to the extent that it is conclusory, lacks
foundation and calls for a legal conclusion.” Plaintiffs also cite to their
Exhibits 1-3. The Court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections.
DISCUSSION
The
Knox-Keene Act 
The Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 (Knox-Keene)
governs health care services in California. (Gopal
v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 425, 430; see Health & Saf. Code § 1340 et seq.) Under
the Act, a “health care service plan” is defined as “[a]ny person who
undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care services to subscribers
or enrollees, or to pay for or to reimburse any part of the cost for those
services, in return for a prepaid or periodic charge paid by or on behalf of
the subscribers or enrollees.” (Health & Saf. Cod, § 1345(f)(1).) Health
care service plans “are not health care providers under any provision of law,”
(Civ. Code, § 3428 (c)), but “may employ, or contract with, any professional”
licensed in the state. (Health & Saf. Code § 1395 (b).) A “provider” is
“any professional person, organization, health facility, or other person or
institution licensed by the state to deliver or furnish health care services.”
(Health & Saf. Code § 1345(i).)
“Knox-Keene bars claims against a
plan for vicarious liability.” (Gopal v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, Inc., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at 431.) “A plan, any entity
contracting with a plan, and providers are each responsible for their own acts
or omissions, and are not liable for the acts or omissions of, or the costs of
defending, others.” (Health & Saf. Code § 1371.25.) 
In Gopal, appellants did not
dispute that Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., determined by the court to be
a “health care service plan” within the meaning of Knox-Keene, had no direct
involvement with Gopal’s care or “that section 1371.5 bars vicarious liability
between health plans and providers. In an effort to avoid section 1371.5,
however, appellants rely on an enterprise theory of liability, arguing that
Health Plan, Kaiser Hospitals and SCPMG [Southern California Permanente Medical
Group] constitute a single enterprise, and thus, Health Plan is liable for all
acts and omissions of the other components of the enterprise. The trial court
rejected this theory as a matter of law, and [the Court of Appeal agreed] that
it fails.” (Gopal, 248 Cal.App.4th at 431.) The court concluded that as
a matter of law, the two conditions generally required for the application of
joint enterprise liability were inapplicable. (Id. at 432.) (See also Futterman
v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 656, 667
(distinguishing between holding the health service plan vicariously liable for
the acts of the medical groups, from claims that the plan itself does not
provide coverage); Martin v. PacifiCare of California (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 1390, 1404 (“section 1371.25 applies to prevent the Martins from
holding PacifiCare vicariously liable for Bright’s acts or omissions. In other
words, the liability remains with the party at fault and cannot be shifted to
another by a statutory or common law liability theory or a contractual hold
harmless provision.”).)
Here,
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. proffers the following facts: 
-         
On August 2, 2021, plaintiffs filed the
operative First Amended Complaint in which they set forth specific allegations
against the named physician defendants as well as against Kaiser medical staff.
Plaintiffs then set forth the same contentions in their responses to special
interrogatories. Plaintiffs make no specific allegations of negligence by
Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. as a health care service plan in
their First Amended Complaint or in subsequent discovery conducted to date.
(UMF 1.)
-         
Defendant is a health care service plan licensed
by the California Department of Managed Health Care under the Knox Keene Health
Care Service Plan Act of 1975. (UMF 2.)
-         
Defendant is a non-profit, public benefit
corporation that enrolls members, collects dues, and contracts with Permanente
Medical Groups, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and affiliated providers to
arrange for the provision of healthcare services for its members. In Southern
California, Defendant contracts with Southern California Permanente Medical
Group and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals to arrange for the provision of medical
and hospital services to its members. (UMF 3.) 
-         
Defendant does not provide health care services,
does not operate hospitals, does not render medical care or treatment, and does
not direct or manage the provision of medical care or treatment. (UMF 4.) 
-         
All of the medical care and treatment of
decedent was provided through his membership with Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc., by physicians and staff of Southern California Medical Group and
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals. Defendant did not provide medical care or
treatment to the decedent at any time. (UMF 5.) 
Defendant
has established that it is a health care service plan under the Knox-Keene Act
and thus, cannot be vicariously liable for the acts of providers. There is no
allegation that Defendant was negligent. As a result, Defendant has met
its burden to demonstrate that there are no triable issues of material fact.
Plaintiff argues the Defendant,
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and Southern California Permanente Medical Group
(SCPMG) operated as each other’s agents and are joint employers of the
defendant physicians and part of an integrated enterprise.  
            Plaintiffs
proffer the following facts: 
-         
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, Inc. also share the same corporate address and executive
management team. (PDMF 2, 3, 4, 5.) 
-         
A recruitment page for physicians on Defendant
SCPMG’s website states, “[w]e are an organization that is uniquely integrated
and structured among three entities”. Moreover, this statement is followed by
up a graphic illustrating that SCPMG is intrinsically tied to Defendant Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals and Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. as the
graphic displays icons representing the three entities connected by arrows
pointing towards one another. (PUMF 2.)
-         
The Statement of Information forms filed by
Defendant KFHP and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals with the California Secretary of
State list the same CEO (Gregory Adams), the same CFO (Kathryn Lancaster), and
the same corporate Secretary (Vanessa Benavides), for both entities. In
addition, the corporate office for both entities is listed as One Kaiser Plaza,
Oakland, California 94612. Even an individual of the same name signed both
Statement of Information forms – Hong-Sze Yu. (PUMF 3.)
Plaintiffs cite to cases generally
discussing factors to be considered with regard to joint employment or an
integrated enterprise. (Opp. at pg. 1.) However, Plaintiffs do not address the
Court of Appeal’s decision in Gopal, nor cite to any case that authorizes
a joint employment theory of liability notwithstanding the clear bar in Health
and Safety Code section 1371.5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to meet
their burden to establish a triable issue of fact.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek
a continuance to depose Timothy P. Everett “on the topics he includes in his
declaration,” and “seek to question Mr. Everett about his claims regarding the
involvement of KFHP as to the decedent’s care, and its relationship with the
other Defendants. These matters go to whether KFHP may be deemed to be an
integrated enterprise or joint employer with the other Kaiser entities.”
(Kizirian Decl. Req. Cont. ¶ 4-5.) As discussed, above, Plaintiffs have not
established the relevance of any testimony regarding an integrated enterprise
or joint employment. Even if an integrated enterprise were established, section
1371.5 bars vicarious liability between health plans and providers. Moreover,
Plaintiffs have not shown diligence in seeking this testimony. Accordingly, the
Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for a continuance. (See Bahl v. Bank of
America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, (“The purpose of the affidavit
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) is to inform
the court of outstanding discovery which is necessary to resist the summary
judgment motion…. The statute makes it a condition that the party moving for a continuance
show facts essential to justify opposition may exist.” (Citations and
quotations omitted.).)
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
            Based on the foregoing, Defendant Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
            Defendant
shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.