Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 19STCV20310, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV20310 Hearing Date: October 10, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPT: |
32 |
|
HEARING DATE: |
October
10, 2023 |
|
CASE NUMBER: |
19STCV20310 |
|
MOTIONS: |
Motion
for Summary Adjudication |
|
MOVING PARTY: |
Defendant
Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. |
|
OPPOSING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Rebecca Scherer |
MOVING PAPERS
1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary
Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts
3. Declaration of Don Webster
4. Declaration of Lauren A. Pagan
OPPOSITION PAPERS
1. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
2. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Douglas
Emmett’s Separate Statement of Facts and Plaintiff’s Additional Separate
Statement of Facts in Support
3. Declaration of Troy C. Skinner
4. Declaration of Michael Fagan
REPLY PAPERS
1. Reply in support of Motion for Summary
Adjudication
2. Response to Plaintiff’s Statement
3. Objection to Evidence
BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2023,
Plaintiff Rebecca Scherer (Plaintiff) filed a second amended complaint (SAC)
against Defendants Douglas Emmett, Encino Gateway, and Does 1 to 25 for
negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that on May 31, 2018, she
was riding “Elevator 2” (Elevator) on Defendants’ commercial property, when it
suddenly decelerated and abruptly stopped, causing her to fall backward and
injure her head. (SAC ¶ 74.) Douglas Emmett 198, LLC owned the building while
Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. provided
maintenance for the elevators pursuant to a service agreement. Plaintiff
alleges that Moving Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc., through its agents, acted with malice in
failing to protect or warn against the dangers of Elevator 2. (SAC ¶¶ 107–110.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff prays for punitive damages.
Moving Defendant Mitsubishi
Electric US, Inc. (MEUS), now
moves for summary adjudication arguing that no facts exist to support the claim
for punitive damages.
OBJECTIONS
Defendant
objects to portions of Fagan’s declaration. (Objections 1, 2.) The Court
declines to rule on these objections as they were not relied upon in reaching
the decisions herein.
Defendant’s
objection to Skinner’s declaration ¶ 22 is sustained (Objection 3), to the
extent that the statement is an opinion about the meaning of documents to which
the declarant has no personal knowledge; however, the objection does not address
the admissibility of the documents themselves.
The
Court declines to rule on the remaining objections because the evidence was not
relied upon in reaching the decision herein. (Objections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
The function of a motion for summary
judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing
party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an
order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “[T]he party moving for
summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie
showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he
carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then
subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of
the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment
standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has
no discretion to exercise. If a triable
issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion
must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be
granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the court must
therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder
could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this
manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify
issues rather than to determine issues.
Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the
issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues
must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)
Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a
factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary
judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840
[cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)
DISCUSSION
Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
“‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of
extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens
should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)
“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section
3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’
requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’
interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be
found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th
704, 725.) (emphasis added.) The statute’s reference to despicable
conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage
awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile,
base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked
down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been
described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with
crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
1269, 1287.) Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with
knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and
deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop
Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149,
1155.)
“[M]alice is the basis for assessing punitive damages for
nonintentional conduct; that is, acts performed without intent to harm.
[Citation omitted.] Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of
malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party
intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly
probable that harm will result.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1981) 116
Cal.App.3d 374, 381.)
“[A]lthough the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard is a
stringent one, it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a
case for punitive damages at summary judgment. [Citation omitted.] However,
where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing
evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is
to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the
evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 1017, 1049.) “Summary judgment or summary adjudication on the issue
of punitive damages is proper only when no reasonable jury could find the
plaintiff's evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or
oppression.” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159) (internal quotations omitted.)
MEUS sets forth the following facts, which
Plaintiff disputes:
-
Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. mechanics replaced the
door looks on the elevators at the Subject Property the day before the
incident, and cleaned the door tracks the morning of the incident. (UMF 5.)
-
Given the fact that the elevators at the Subject
Property were 32 years old at the time of the incident, Douglas Emmett and MEUS
did everything they reasonably could have done to handle the maintenance and
repair thereof, including with respect to responding quickly to requests for
repairs of the elevators. (UMF 7.)
-
Elevators manufactured in the United States are not
that well-built, and are of marginal quality at best; parts are difficult to
come by and there is no technical support for them. (UMF 12.)
-
Douglas Emmett and MEUS did a good job with what they
had to work with. (UMF 13.)
-
As to quality of maintenance, MEUS was doing everything
it possibly could, given the age of the elevator equipment at the Subject
Property; with intermittent problems it can be difficult to pick up on what is
really going on; MEUS did everything it could do and based on email
correspondence produced, both MEUS and Douglas Emmett got supervisors involved
to work together to get the elevator fixed; MEUS responded quickly to requests
for maintenance and repairs of the elevators; Douglas Emmett and MEUS did everything
they reasonably could have done to handle the maintenance and repair thereof,
including with respect to responding quickly to requests for repairs of the
elevators; Douglas Emmett met its duties with respect to the industry standard
for the lifespan of elevators at least 25-30 years older by modernizing them.
(UMF 17.)
-
The door locks for the elevators were replaced on all
of the floors of the subject building where the incident occurred the day
before the incident. (UMF 18.)
-
Defendant MEUS did not prematurely put the subject
elevator back into service due to any external pressure from Defendant Douglas
Emmett. (UMF 19.)
-
Defendant MEUS's technicians who replaced the door
locks on the elevators at the subject building prior to the incident sincerely
believed the subject elevator was ready for service when it was placed back
into service. (UMF 20.)
-
There is no evidence that the previous incidents that
occurred with respect to the subject elevator are related to the same issues
that actually caused the incident. (UMF 23.)
Plaintiff sets forth the following facts,
which MEUS does not dispute for the most part, but largely argues are irrelevant:
-
There were at least two occasions where the number of
entrapments exceeded three in a month in Elevator 2 alone. The month of June of
2016 and the Month of May of 2018, three days prior to plaintiff’s injury.
(PAMF 4.)
-
Page 16 of the service agreement provides that “in case
of any entrapment, Contractor’s supervisor (James Broadbent) will produce a
complete report of the incident, including the exact cause of the entrapment
and any precautions or repairs which are being undertaken to prevent
recurrence. Contractor’s supervisor will visit the property as needed, or upon
request of the Owner, to investigate any entrapment.” James Broadbent was the
supervisor for this property and was responsible for handling these reports and
entrapments. (PAMF 5.)
-
James Broadbent as a Service Superintendent was
assigned as the service supervisor for Mitsubishi under The Service Agreement
and was responsible for approximately 19 to 20 employees who reported to him.
In addition, he oversaw approximately 50 to 100 hundred properties in his role.
James Broadbent, confirmed during his deposition that he would be notified when
there was an entrapment at the building. (PAMF 6.)
-
Broadbent, as the service supervisor, approved all of
the work performed by any service mechanic at The Property from 2015 through
2018. Service Mechanics were required to submit a “Service Work Order” SWO for
all of the work performed at The Property. This was done for two reasons.
First, to approve the hours that the mechanic worked, but more importantly to
approve the work which was being proposed to be done on The Property. (PAMF 7.)
-
Despite being required to do so, James Broadbent and
Mitsubishi did not create a single report for any of the entrapments at the
premises, nor visit the premises to investigate any entrapment, despite the
numerous and dangerous elevator entrapments at the Property. (PAMF 8.)
-
The “Encino Gateway Ticket history” of hours worked by
Mitsubishi employees shows an entrapment at this property on January 15, 2016.
Another entry shows a malfunction with the elevator doors opening February 2,
2016. Another entry shows a malfunction with Elevator 2, where it “jerks” on
February 12, 2016. Another entry shows a malfunction whereby the elevator
entrapped a passenger and “jolted” again. The car was also rattling and made
noise while traveling, on March 24, 2016. On April 27, 2016 another passenger
was entrapped and stuck between floors. On June 16, 2016 another passenger was
entrapped on the 8th floor. Two days later, on June 18, 2016 another passenger
was entrapped in the same elevator. Five days after that entrapment, on June
23, 2016, another passenger was stuck on the 20th floor and had to hit the
emergency button to be rescued) Seven days after that another passenger was
entrapped on June 30, 2016. (PAMF 12.)
-
On May 22, 2017 an entry lists “Elevator 2 steps
(stops) with a jolt on the 17th floor when traveling from the 6th floor”. The
Elevator 2 entrapped a passenger on June 22, 2017 and again on December 16,
2017 there is another entrapment, again likely in Elevator no 2. (PAMF 13.)
-
On May 24th, 2017 an “Elevator Modernization
Specification” was provided for the six elevators on the property. (PAMF 14.)
-
Elevator 2 entrapped a passenger on January 30, 2018.
(PAMF 15.)
-
Elevator 2 entrapped passengers on May 14, and May 15th
of 2018. (PAMF 16.)
-
On May 15th, 2018 Stacy Hough/La Charite
informs James Broadbent and Harrison Gray that Elevator 2 had two separate
entrapments within a 24 hour period and that at least one passenger was trapped
for approximately 50 minutes. (PAMF 17.)
-
On May 16th Service Tech Kevin Toya emailed James
Broadbent regarding the May 16, 2018 Entrapment. The elevator was found out of
the door zone 2 feet above the eight floor. The elevator doors had to be forced
open to free the passengers. Kevin Toya informs Broadbent that this was unsafe
for the passengers to be freed from the entrapment. (PAMF 18.)
-
Elevator 2 entrapped another passenger on May 22, 2018.
May 24, 2018 lists “#2 Troubleshoot”. An entry in the Logs kept at the building
states “Car #2 needs more run time. An entry for May 24, 2018 states “went
through door locks. found door lock car#2 on p3 Bad Replaces. Left down for the
tonight. will turn back in service tomorrow morning.” (PAMF 19.)
-
On May 24, 2018 Stacy Hough/La Charite informs James
Broadbent via email that there was yet another entrapment in elevator 2 on May
22 and that she was told the elevator had to be put out of service. Despite
this warning, Broadbent put the elevator back in service. (PAMF 20.)
-
Page 16- 17 of the service agreement provided that MEUS
was required to secure an elevator including leaving the elevator out of
service if an issue was found but that issue could not be corrected
immediately. (PAMF 21.)
-
On May 24th, James Broadbent acknowledges that elevator
2 is experiencing a super intermittent problem. Despite this acknowledgment,
Broadbent put the elevator back in service. (PAMF 22.)
-
On May 24th Jarrad Jones of Mitsubishi asks whether or
not Robert Lutes of Douglas Emmett would allow them to leave an elevator out of
service without any penalty until the modernization began. Showing concern for
the monetary penalty over and above the safety of the elevator passengers. (PAMF 23.)
-
The maintenance logs show that this prior entrapment on
or about May 22 was caused by door lock issues, as an entry on An entry for Bad
door lock was found on Elevator 2 on May 24, 2018 on P3. The door lock was
replaced on May 24, 2018. More faulty door locks were found on May 25, 2018.
The maintenance logs show that a prior entrapments may have been caused by door
lock, as an entry on May 30, 2018 lists “Car 2 door lock issues” “replace door
locks”. (PAMF 24.)
-
There is evidence that the building had notice of such
a problem occurring before, the subject elevator abrupt stopping event and
consequently had reason to take corrective action, or provide warnings to
individuals such as plaintiff by placing a warning sign or removing the
elevator from service until they were assured by Mitsubishi that the elevator
properly repaired and tested and was safe to operate. (PAMF 40.)
-
Douglas Emmet and Mitsubishi both had the opportunity
to keep the elevator out of service until the reliability issue was fully
resolved. The No. 2 elevator is one of the 6 car group of elevators that
operate collectively to provide service to the building tenants. (PAMF 41.)
MEUS argues that “there is no proof that they
intended to cause injury to Plaintiff, or that they engaged in despicable
conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights or
safety,” relying on Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and the arguments that MEUS
did the best it could to fix the issues with the elevator, that it timely
responded to service calls and provided quality maintenance, that MEUS did not
have pressure from DE 1998 to prematurely put the elevator back in service, and
that MEUS technicians sincerely believed the elevator was ready for service.
(Motion at pgs. 6-7, Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts.) MEUS further
argues that its expert has opined that DE 1998 and MEUS did everything they
reasonably could have done to handle the maintenance and repair of the
elevator, and also that Plaintiff has no evidence regarding whether any of the
prior incidents involving problems with the subject elevator were related to
Plaintiff’s incident. (Id.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that MEUS
prematurely put the subject elevator back in service due to financial pressure
from DE 1998, and that while MEUS technicians may have sincerely believed the
elevator was ready to go back into service, Plaintiff’s argument is that Supervisor
James Broadbent’s judgment to do so given the knowledge that he had about prior
incidents supports a claim for punitive damages. (Opposition at pgs. 8-10.)
The Court finds that there are triable issues
of material fact regarding whether the decision to put the elevator back in
service despite knowledge of the prior incidents constitutes despicable conduct
which was carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s
safety. Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence of a connection
between the prior incidents and Plaintiff’s incident, Plaintiff argues that the
door locks were fixed before, but the elevator continued to have problems, and
therefore Defendant’s decision to keep the elevator in operation prior to
establishing satisfactory operation constituted malice. Moreover, as to
Defendant’s arguments regarding the technicians’ sincere beliefs, Plaintiff has
presented evidence of Supervisor Broadbent’s decisions despite knowledge of the
dangers caused by prior entrapments, which were never satisfactorily resolved
according to Plaintiff, as well as communications by DE 1998 representatives
with MEUS.
In its reply brief, MEUS argues for the first
time that Plaintiff has failed to show that any MEUS officer, director, or
managing agent engaged in, authorized, or ratified any of the conduct,
specifically arguing that Broadbent is not a managing agent. (Reply at pgs.
7-8.) However, this motion was brought by MEUS, who bears the initial burden of
proving the absence of a triable issue of fact. The motion did not set forth
any evidence regarding Broadbent, nor did it raise this argument. The failure
to do so is inexcusable given that Defendant has been aware of the issue and in
fact previously raised in a motion to strike the failure to plead a specific
managing agent, with which the Court agreed. (Minute Order Dated March 21,
2023.) In response, Plaintiff amended the complaint to specifically allege that
Broadbent “was acting as a managing agent on behalf of Defendant Mitsubishi.”[1] (SAC
¶ 4.) Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief will not ordinarily
be considered. (See generally St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 762, 783.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s
favor, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Mitsubishi
Electric US, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
Defendant shall
provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPT: |
32 |
|
HEARING DATE: |
October
10, 2023 |
|
CASE NUMBER: |
19STCV20310 |
|
MOTIONS: |
Motion
for Summary Adjudication |
|
Defendant Douglas Emmett 1998 LLC |
|
|
OPPOSING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Rebecca Scherer |
MOVING PAPERS
1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Adjudication;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
3. Declaration of Don Webster
4. Declaration of Vanessa K. Herzog
OPPOSITION PAPERS
1. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
2. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Douglas
Emmett’s Separate Statement of Facts and Plaintiff’s Additional Separate
Statement of Facts in Support
3. Declaration of Troy C. Skinner
4. Declaration of Michael Fagan
REPLY PAPERS
1. Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition
2. Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Separate
Statement
3. Objection to Evidence
BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2023, Plaintiff
Rebecca Scherer (Plaintiff) filed a second amended complaint (SAC) against
Defendants Douglas Emmett, Encino Gateway, and Does 1 to 25 for negligence and
premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that on May 31, 2018, she was riding
“Elevator 2” (Elevator) on Defendants’ commercial property, when it suddenly
decelerated and abruptly stopped, causing her to fall backward and injure her
head. (SAC ¶ 74.) Douglas Emmett 198, LLC (“DE 1998” or Defendant) owned the
building while Mitsubishi Electric provided maintenance for the elevators
pursuant to a service agreement. Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendant
Douglas Emmett 1998, LLC (erroneously sued as Douglas Emmett), through its
agents, acted with malice in failing to protect or warn against the dangers of
Elevator 2. (SAC ¶¶ 113–117.) Accordingly, Plaintiff prays for punitive
damages.
Moving Defendant Douglas
Emmett 1998, LLC (DE 1998), now moves for summary adjudication arguing that no
facts exist to support the claim for punitive damages.
OBJECTIONS
Defendant
objects to portions of Fagan’s declaration. (Objections 1, 2.) The Court
declines to rule on these objections as they were not relied upon in reaching
the decisions herein.
Defendant’s
objection to Skinner’s declaration ¶ 22 is sustained (Objection 3), to the
extent that the statement is an opinion about the meaning of documents to which
the declarant has no personal knowledge; however, the objection does not address
the admissibility of the documents themselves.
The
Court declines to rule on the remaining objections because the evidence was not
relied upon in reaching the decision herein. (Objections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
The function of a motion
for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether
an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and
to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “[T]he party
moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a
prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact;
if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing
party is then subjected to a burden of production of his
own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar
apply to summary adjudication motions].)
Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a
motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to
exercise. If a triable issue of material
fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied.
If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's
Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the
court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a
factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence
in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to
identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may
the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict,
the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)
Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a
factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary
judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840
[cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)
DISCUSSION
Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
“‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of
extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens
should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)
“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294]
plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’
requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’
interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be
found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th
704, 725 (emphasis added).) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct
represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.)
Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable,
wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by
ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the
character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v.
Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further,
“[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable
dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid
these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.)
“[M]alice is the basis for assessing punitive damages for
nonintentional conduct; that is, acts performed without intent to harm.
[Citation omitted.] Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of
malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party
intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly
probable that harm will result.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1981) 116
Cal.App.3d 374, 381.)
“[A]lthough the ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard is a
stringent one, it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a
case for punitive damages at summary judgment. [Citation omitted.] However,
where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing
evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is
to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the
evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 1017, 1049.) “Summary judgment or summary adjudication on the issue
of punitive damages is proper only when no reasonable jury could find the
plaintiff's evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or
oppression.” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159) (internal quotations omitted.)
DE 1998 sets forth the following
facts, which Plaintiff disputes:
-
Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. mechanics replaced the
door looks on the elevators at the Subject Property the day before the
incident, and cleaned the door tracks the morning of the incident. (UMF 5.)
-
Given the fact that the elevators at the Subject
Property were 32 years old at the time of the incident, Douglas Emmett and MEUS
did everything they reasonably could have done to handle the maintenance and
repair thereof, including with respect to responding quickly to requests for
repairs of the elevators. (UMF 7.)
-
Douglas Emmett met its duties with respect to the
industry standard for the lifespan of elevators at least 25-30 years older by
modernizing them. (UMF 8.)
-
Douglas Emmett wrote specifications for the
modernization of the elevators at the Subject Property and MEUS put in the bid.
(UMF 9.)
-
Douglas Emmett took a step further by hiring a
consultant with respect to the modernization project. (UMF 10.)
-
Elevators manufactured in the United States are not
that well-built, and are of marginal quality at best; parts are difficult to
come by and there is no technical support for them. (UMF 12.)
-
Douglas Emmett and MEUS did a good job with what they
had to work with. (UMF 13.)
-
As to quality of maintenance, MEUS was doing everything
it possibly could, given the age of the elevator equipment at the Subject
Property; with intermittent problems it can be difficult to pick up on what is
really going on; MEUS did everything it could do and based on email
correspondence produced, both MEUS and Douglas Emmett got supervisors involved
to work together to get the elevator fixed; MEUS responded quickly to requests
for maintenance and repairs of the elevators; Douglas Emmett and MEUS did everything
they reasonably could have done to handle the maintenance and repair thereof,
including with respect to responding quickly to requests for repairs of the
elevators; Douglas Emmett met its duties with respect to the industry standard
for the lifespan of elevators at least 25-30 years older by modernizing them.
(UMF 17.)
-
The door locks for the elevators were replaced on all
of the floors of the subject building where the incident occurred the day
before the incident. (UMF 18.)
-
Defendant MEUS did not prematurely put the subject
elevator back into service due to any external pressure from Defendant Douglas
Emmett. (UMF 19.)
-
Defendant MEUS's technicians who replaced the door
locks on the elevators at the subject building prior to the incident sincerely
believed the subject elevator was ready for service when it was placed back
into service. (UMF 20.)
-
Defendant Douglas Emmett made every effort to fulfill
its duty as a common carrier by hiring Defendant MEUS, a licensed, qualified
contractor, to repair the subject elevator. (UMF 21.)
-
Defendant Douglas Emmett was diligent in trying to get
the subject elevator fixed and running. (UMF 22.)
-
There is no evidence that the previous incidents that
occurred with respect to the subject elevator are related to the same issues
that actually caused the incident. (UMF 23.)
Plaintiff sets forth the following
facts, which DE 1998 does not dispute but largely argues are irrelevant:
-
There were at least two occasions where the number of
entrapments exceeded three in a month in Elevator 2 alone. The month of June of
2016 and the month of May of 2018, three days prior to plaintiff’s injury.
(PAMF 4.)
-
Page 16 of the service agreement provides that “in case
of any entrapment, Contractor’s supervisor (James Broadbent) will produce a
complete report of the incident, including the exact cause of the entrapment
and any precautions or repairs which are being undertaken to prevent
recurrence. Contractor’s supervisor will visit the property as needed, or upon
request of the Owner, to investigate any entrapment.” James Broadbent was the
supervisor for this property and was responsible for handling these reports and
entrapments. (PAMF 5.)
-
James Broadbent as a Service Superintendent was
assigned as the service supervisor for Mitsubishi under The Service Agreement
and was responsible for approximately 19 to 20 employees who reported to him.
In addition, he oversaw approximately 50 to 100 hundred properties in his role.
James Broadbent, confirmed during his deposition that he would be notified when
there was an entrapment at the building. (PAMF 6.)
-
Broadbent, as the service supervisor, approved all of
the work performed by any service mechanic at The Property from 2015 through
2018. Service Mechanics were required to submit a “Service Work Order” SWO for
all of the work performed at The Property. This was done for two reasons.
First, to approve the hours that the mechanic worked, but more importantly to
approve the work which was being proposed to be done on The Property. (PAMF 7.)
-
Despite being required to do so, James Broadbent and
Mitsubishi did not create a single report for any of the entrapments at the
premises, nor visit the premises to investigate any entrapment, despite the
numerous and dangerous elevator entrapments at the Property. (PAMF 8.)
-
Several months before the Service Agreement was entered
into between Douglas Emmett and Mitsubishi, an elevator passenger by the name
of David Axelrad was injured in Elevator 2, along with nine of his co-workers.
The elevator abruptly stopped on the eleventh floor and then “dropped” two
floors. The report created for that elevator entrapment and “drop” noted that
the elevators had “been having problems.” (PAMF 9.)
-
Emails from Stacy Hough/La Charite, assistant project
manager from Douglas Emmett to Karen Totah, Property Manager, and Monia
Kirskey, another employee of Douglass Emmett, contains information regarding
this incident. This email describes that Karen Totah received two emails where
Ms. Totah was informed that at least one person had reported a neck injury
resulting from a “two floor drop” in that elevator incident, and that it was
elevator no. 2 and stated that “dropping two floors can be frightening.” This event
occurred on August 14, of 2015. (PAMF 10.)
-
Following this event there began a string of issues
with Elevator 2, including entrapments, the car jolting, the car doors hitting
patrons, rattling, making noises and requiring substantially more preventative
maintenance than the other five (5) elevators on the property. (PAMF 11.)
-
The “Encino Gateway Ticket history” of hours worked by
Mitsubishi employees shows an entrapment at this property on January 15, 2016.
Another entry shows a malfunction with the elevator doors opening February 2,
2016. Another entry shows a malfunction with Elevator 2, where it “jerks” on
February 12, 2016. Another entry shows a malfunction whereby the elevator
entrapped a passenger and “jolted” again. The car was also rattling and made
noise while traveling, on March 24, 2016. On April 27, 2016 another passenger
was entrapped and stuck between floors. On June 16, 2016 another passenger was
entrapped on the 8th floor. Two days later, on June 18, 2016 another passenger
was entrapped in the same elevator. Five days after that entrapment, on June
23, 2016, another passenger was stuck on the 20th floor and had to hit the
emergency button to be rescued) Seven days after that another passenger was
entrapped on June 30, 2016. (PAMF 12.)
-
On May 22, 2017 and entry lists “Elevator 2 steps
(stops) with a jolt on the 17th floor when traveling from the 6th floor”. The
Elevator 2 entrapped a passenger on June 22, 2017 and again on December 16,
2017 there is another entrapment, again likely in Elevator no 2. (PAMF 13.)
-
On May 24th, 2017 an “Elevator Modernization
Specification” was provided for the six elevators on the property. (PAMF 14.)
-
Elevator 2 entrapped a passenger on January 30, 2018.
(PAMF 15.)
-
Elevator 2 entrapped passengers on May 14, and May 15th
of 2018. (PAMF 16.)
-
On May 15th 2018 Stacy Hough/La Charite informs James
Broadbent and Harrison Gray that Elevator 2 had two separate entrapments within
a 24 hour period and that at least one passenger was trapped for approximately
50 minutes. (PAMF 17.)
-
Elevator 2 entrapped another passenger on May 22, 2018.
May 24, 2018 lists “#2 Troubleshoot”. An entry in the Logs kept at the building
states “Car #2 needs more run time. An entry for May 24, 2018 states “went
through door locks. found door lock car#2 on p3 Bad Replaces. Left down for the
tonight. will turn back in service tomorrow morning.” (PAMF 19.)
-
On May 24, 2018 Stacy Hough/La Charite informs James
Broadbent via email that there was yet another entrapment in elevator 2 on May
22 and that she was told the elevator had to be put out of service. Despite
this warning, Broadbent put the elevator back in service. (PAMF 20.)
-
Page 16- 17 of the service agreement provided that MEUS
was required to secure an elevator including leaving the elevator out of
service if and issue was found but that issue could not be corrected
immediately. (PAMF 21.)
-
On May 24th, James Broadbent acknowledges that elevator
2 is experiencing a super intermittent problem. Despite this acknowledgment,
Broadbent put the elevator back in service. (PAMF 22.)
-
On May 24th Jarrad Jones of Mitsubishi asks whether or
not Robert Lutes of Douglas Emmett would allow them to leave an elevator out of
service without any penalty until the modernization began. Showing concern for
the monetary penalty over and above the safety of the elevator passengers. (PAMF 23.)
-
The maintenance logs show that this prior entrapment on
or about May 22 was caused by door lock issues, as an entry on An entry for Bad
door lock was found on Elevator 2 on May 24, 2018 on P3. The door lock was
replaced on May 24, 2018. More faulty door locks were found on May 25, 2018.
The maintenance logs show that a prior entrapments may have been caused by door
lock, as an entry on May 30, 2018 lists “Car 2 door lock issues” “replace door
locks”. (PAMF 24.)
-
Douglas Emmett was informed of the numerous entrapments
occurring in 2018 in Elevator 2 by way of incident reports which are created by
Allied Universal, security for the property, which were delivered to Douglass
Emmett to be put into their system. There were four reports created for the
year 2018 prior to Plaintiff’s injury, which describes four other entrapments
dated January 30, 2018, May 14, 2018, May 15, 2018 and May 22, 2018. (PAMF 25.)
-
Property manager Karen Totah confirmed that Douglas
Emmett was given these reports by Allied Universal shortly after the
entrapments as a course of business. (PAMF 26.)
-
On June 25, 2018 Robert Lutes emails Robert Slack
telling him to keep the elevators running during the modernization. (PAMF 32.)
-
On August 15, 2018 Mitsubishi was penalized for
elevator 2 being out of service for days in May of 2018. 18 days per month at
$50.00 per day. (PAMF 33.)
-
There is evidence that the building had notice of such
a problem occurring before, the subject elevator abrupt stopping event and
consequently had reason to take corrective action, or provide warnings to
individuals such as plaintiff by placing a warning sign or removing the
elevator from service until they were assured by Mitsubishi that the elevator
properly repaired and tested and was safe to operate. (PAMF 40.)
-
Douglas Emmet and Mitsubishi both had the opportunity
to keep the elevator out of service until the reliability issue was fully
resolved. The No. 2 elevator is one of the 6 car group of elevators that
operate collectively to provide service to the building tenants. (PAMF 41.)
DE 1998 argues that “there is no
proof that they intended to cause injury to Plaintiff, or that they engaged in
despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s
rights or safety,” relying on Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and the arguments
that DE 1998 fulfilled its common carrier duty by retaining Mitsubishi to
maintain the building’s elevators, that Mitsubishi routinely maintained the
elevators, that the elevator at issue was repaired just prior to the incident
by replacing the door locks and cleaning the door tracks, and that Mitsubishi
technicians sincerely believed that the elevator was ready to go back into
service. (Motion at pgs. 10-11, Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Material
Facts.) DE 1998 further argues that its expert has opined that DE 1998 and
Mitsubishi did everything they reasonably could have done to handle the
maintenance and repair of the elevator, and also that Plaintiff has no evidence
regarding whether any of the prior incidents involving problems with the
subject elevator were related to Plaintiff’s incident. (Id.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that Mitsubishi
prematurely put the subject elevator back in service due to financial pressure
from DE 1998, and that while Mitsubishi technicians may have sincerely believed
the elevator was ready to go back into service, Plaintiff’s argument is that Supervisor
James Broadbent’s judgment to do so given the knowledge that he had about prior
incidents supports a claim for punitive damages. (Opposition at pgs. 8-10.)
The Court finds that there are
triable issues of material fact regarding whether the decision to put the
elevator back in service despite knowledge of the prior incidents constitutes
despicable conduct which was carried on with a willful and conscious disregard
for Plaintiff’s safety. Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence
of a connection between the prior incidents and Plaintiff’s incident, Plaintiff
argues that the door locks were fixed before, but the elevator continued to
have problems, and therefore Defendant’s decision to keep the elevator in
operation prior to establishing satisfactory operation constituted malice. Moreover,
as to Defendant’s arguments regarding the technicians’ sincere beliefs, Plaintiff
has presented evidence of Supervisor Broadbent’s decisions despite knowledge of
the dangers caused by prior entrapments, which were never satisfactorily
resolved according to Plaintiff, as well as communications by DE 1998
representatives with Mitsubishi.
In its reply brief, DE 1998 argues
for the first time that Plaintiff has failed to show that any DE 1998 officer,
director, or managing agent engaged in, authorized, or ratified any of the
conduct, specifically arguing that Robert Lutes and Stacy La Charite are not a
managing agent. (Reply at pgs. 8-9.) However, this motion was brought by DE
1998, who bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a triable issue of
fact. The motion did not set forth any evidence regarding Lutes or La Charite, nor
did it raise this argument. The failure to do so is inexcusable given that
Defendant has been aware of the issue and in fact previously raised in a motion
to strike the failure to plead a specific managing agent, with which the Court
agreed. (Minute Order Dated March 21, 2023.) In response, Plaintiff amended the
complaint to specifically allege that Totah and La Charite were “acting as a
managing agent on behalf of Defendant Douglas Emmett” and Lutes was acting as a
“director on behalf of Defendant Douglas Emmett.”[2]
(SAC ¶ 8, 9.) Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief will not
ordinarily be considered. (See generally St. Mary v. Superior Court
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783.)
Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary
adjudication.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Douglas
Emmett 1998 LLC’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
Defendant shall
provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.
[1] The
evidence was also presented in Plaintiff’s motion to conduct financial
discovery and, as such, Defendant has long been on notice of the issues of
which it bears the initial burden of production. (See Minute Order Dated April
13, 2023 (“In sum Plaintiff advances evidence of numerous incident reports
detailing elevator maintenance issues, … as well as deposition testimony that
Service Superintendent for Mitsubishi Electric would be notified of said
issues. The evidence indicates Defendants’ [sic] knew of the malfunctioning
elevator and failed to remedy the issue, evincing a conscious disregard for the
safety of others.”).)
[2] The
evidence was also presented in Plaintiff’s motion to conduct financial
discovery and, as such, Defendant has long been on notice of the issues of
which it bears the initial burden of production. (See Minute Order Dated April
13, 2023 (“In sum Plaintiff advances evidence of numerous incident reports
detailing elevator maintenance issues, [and] deposition testimony establishing
that Defendant Douglas Emmett was aware of said issues…. The evidence indicates
Defendants’ [sic] knew of the malfunctioning elevator and failed to remedy the
issue, evincing a conscious disregard for the safety of others.”).)